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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this research was to understand how the constant adoption of 
reforms affected accountability understanding and its practices in the New 
Zealand public health system.  
 
This study adopted a qualitative methodology and took a critical 
hermeneutics approach in order to explore the reasons for, and formats of, 
public health reform, and the experience of health policy implementers in 
dealing with reforms, policy changes, and accountability. To develop new 
insights about accountability and its practices, this study reviewed a range of 
policy documents and relevant publications, and interviewed senior health 
managers who were experienced in dealing with reforms. 
  
The research evidence is presented in line with Ricoeur’s stages of 
understanding; these are: preunderstanding, understanding, and finally, 
comprehensive understanding. The preunderstanding was developed from 
study of secondary sources, while the understanding was achieved through 
interviews. A comprehensive understanding results from both review of and 
reflection on preunderstanding and understanding.  
 
The findings are that reform can be described as a ‘means without ends’ 
because it was continually implemented in a political loop, in which, demand 
and supply for change were determined by the government’s political 
interests. Postreform accountability was full of frustrations because of its 
complexity in practice.  Surprisingly, despite that fact, the health managers 
still believe that accountability per se is essential.  This study proposes that 
postreform accountability can be understood as two sides of the same coin: 
accountability means being accountable, in a normative sense, and not being 
able to be accountable, in practice. 
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The adoption of constant reforms has increased the level of organisational 
complexity.  This has affected the notion of accountability and its practices 
because accountability rests in the organisational structures. This study 
suggests that accountability cannot be detached from its normative and 
mechanism perspectives.  No matter how much the policy has changed or will 
change in the future, the possibility of policy implementers facing similar 
challenges and the same feelings is high because reform produces two 
identical outcomes for accountability: i.e., hopes and frustrations.  
The study contributes in three ways to an understanding of accountability in 
the context of reform. First, it offers valuable insights into the ongoing 
developments in the public health system and the issues of accountability. 
Second, it contributes to the wider understanding of the effects reform have 
on the notion of accountability and its practices. Third, it advances 
understanding relating to recent discussions on postreform accountability. 
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1 CHAPTER ONE 
  
OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This study seeks to explore how constant changes in the public service 
through the implementation of continual public sector reform affect 
accountability understanding and praxis in public service delivery. This study 
aims to investigate the rationale for and the effects of reform on the meaning 
of accountability in the ever-changing New Zealand public health system by 
exploring the perceptions and lived experiences of a group of public health 
managers within that system. It is anticipated that the knowledge generated 
from this inquiry will afford new insights into accountability in the context of 
public sector reform.  
 
To help readers understand my ideas and thoughts relating to the 
accountability issues in the context of public sector reform and how the 
investigation was carried out in the New Zealand health system, this chapter 
begins with the background of the research issue, followed by discussion of 
the research context and the research problem statement. The statements of 
purpose and research questions are then presented before discussing the 
research approach and the significance of this study.  This chapter ends with 
the presentation of the thesis outline. 
 
1.2 Background of the research issue 
 
I was trained in the field of Public Administration both at undergraduate and 
graduate levels.  I am neither a public manager nor a policy maker but I am a 
Public Administration educator who has a strong interest in the issue of 
accountability and public sector reform. My interest developed from the 
literature related to my subject area in public management and public policy. 
I encountered literature which convinced me of the importance of neoliberal 
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reforms to the public sector. Following the emergence of New Public 
Management (NPM) in the 1980s, I found that governments both in 
developed and developing countries enthusiastically supported the 
implementation of this reform as they believed that the neoliberal strategies 
would improve accountability, efficiency and performance of public 
organisations. 
 
However, most of the literature related to accountability in the context of 
public sector reform concluded that accountability is an elusive concept; my 
teaching experience seemed to confirm the conclusion. For instance, my ten 
years’ experience in teaching public management and policy studies led me 
to confusion around accountability concepts and practices. I found that 
accountability has changed throughout the years of reform; however, the 
changes appear to have had limited success in improving accountability (see 
Day & Klein, 1987; Dubnick, 2011; Mulgan, 2000). I noticed that I was 
struggling to explain to students the notions of accountability in the context 
of reform. While, in my experience, text books have offered a good definition 
for accountability they provide very little information on how accountability 
is practised in a specific public sector setting. I began to wonder whether the 
notion of accountability was idealistic and reforms were designed based on 
false premises.  
 
Interestingly, despite such problems, accountability has remained an 
important indicator for public organisations. It has been used widely in 
governments’ policy documents to impress the public that governments are 
practising a good accountability system. According to Dubnick (2011), 
ignoring accountability is impossible for governments because “it is cited as 
both the cause and cure for every ailment and imperfection in government” 
(p.707).  On the other hand, it is also difficult for public organisations to 
detach themselves from reform because social and economic changes have 
pressured governments to implement change. Therefore, no matter how hard 
the change is, reform “does not seem to want to go away” (Lodge & Gill, 2011, 
p. 141). Considering the important roles of accountability, and the need for 
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public organisations to adopt continual reform, I was intrigued to find out 
how public managers are dealing and engaging with reforms, organisational 
changes and accountability.  
  
Reviewing forms and trends of reform in New Zealand and internationally, 
enlightened me about the changes in the underpinning reform framework. 
The first neoliberal reform model, known as NPM, was introduced in the 
1980s. However, in its later stage, the NPM model moved away from market 
mechanisms and managerial strategies towards social and democratic 
strategies, a model known as New Public Service (NPS). Although both these 
models are rooted in neoliberal reform, they are underpinned by different 
philosophies (see Blanchard, Hinnant, & Wong, 1998; Christensen & 
Laegreid, 2001; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Goldfinch & Wallis, 2010; Larbi, 
1999; Moynihan, 2009). In brief, NPM is characterised by market 
mechanisms and managerial principles. Its reform strategies are primarily 
influenced by accounting techniques, and accountability is narrowly defined 
in terms of financial efficiency and policy output.  In contrast, NPS is 
underpinned by a combination of NPM and social democratic strategies. As 
the post-NPM model, NPS attempts to balance a strong focus of accounting 
and financial strategies with democratic principles, with the aim of increasing 
public sector performance (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000). Under the NPS 
model, accountability is measured in terms of policy performance and 
outcome (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Dubnick, 2011).       
 
Major western countries including the UK, the US, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand gradually changed their reform orientations from NPM to NPS when 
they found that NPM was unable to realise some of its promises due to its 
narrow focus on financial efficiency (see Christensen & Laegreid, 2011b; 
Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Norman, 2003).  In response to the differences 
between NPM and NPS, governments have instigated major changes in their 
public sector management.  For example, during the NPM era, the roles of the 
State as the central provider of public resources were transferred to the 
private sector under privatisation, contracting-out and deregulation policies 
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(Christensen & Laegreid, 2011b; Peters & Pierre, 1998).  Under the NPS 
model, governments promote democratic values in managing public service 
through the adoption of collaborative strategies such as ‘network 
government’, ‘joined-up government’ and ‘whole government’ (Goldfinch & 
Wallis, 2010; Larner, 2000).  
 
The NPM and NPS reforms have broadened the notion of accountability as 
they reinforce the need to harness managerial and professional 
accountability to political accountability (Day & Klein, 1987).  Previous 
research in public sector reform has widely discussed the effects of NPM and 
NPS models on the structures and governance, but given little attention to 
how these changes have affected accountability (Aucoin, 1990; Barberis, 
1998; Blanchard et al., 1998; Christensen & Laegreid, 2011a; Goldfinch & 
Wallis, 2010; Mongkol, 2011; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Rhodes, 1994). While 
some research has acknowledged the risks related to some reform strategies 
on accountability, very little is known about the types of risk or how they 
could affect accountability. 
 
Simply defined, accountability refers to the expectation that those in the 
government sector should be held responsible for their actions (Day & Klein, 
1987).  However, as reforms have led to a fundamental change in the role of a 
bureaucratic State, the function of accountability has shifted beyond 
rendering an account of the resources used.  Accountability is no longer 
about “who can call for an account, and who owes a duty of explanation” (Day 
& Klein, 1987, p. 5). The new accountability format requires managers to 
demonstrate the efficient use of resources, when following through effective 
policy decisions (Kluvers, 2003).  The role of accountability, therefore, 
focuses on the performance of public agencies, where the agencies’ 
achievements are measured on the basis of policy outputs and outcomes 
(Dubnick, 2005; Moynihan & Ingharam, 2003). 
 
Despite the new concept of accountability providing a common background 
for account-giving and justification for acceptable performance (Messner, 
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2009), accountability remains a source of confusion among individuals, 
especially in public organisations (Koppell, 2005).  Research into how 
accountability is practised concludes that the concept of accountability lacks 
clarity (Bovens, 2005, 2007), is ambiguous (Messner, 2009; Mordaunt, 2006; 
Ryan & Walsh, 2004) is multifaceted (Acar, 2001; Acar, Guo, & Yang, 2008) 
and, is multidimensional (Fimreite & Laegreid, 2009).  Overall, the concept of 
accountability in the age of reform remains ill-defined and, therefore, the 
development of accountability theory is hindered; as a result, accountability 
remains ambiguous and elusive, in practice (Kim & Lee, 2010).  
 
In terms of practices, several researchers have reported tensions between 
collaborative agencies over accountability and authority (see Flinders, 2001; 
Vangen & Huxham, 2010), and the requirement to adopt multiple identities in 
different contexts of accountability among public officials (see Newman, 
2004). For these reasons, the proposition that accountability improved after 
the adoption of reforms has been called into question (see Atreya & 
Amstrong, 2002; Christensen & Laegreid, 2011a; Willems & Van Dooren, 
2012).  In the view of  Jones and Kettl (2003) accountability “promised more 
than it delivered” (p. 3). Indeed, Dubnick (2011) refers the issue of 
accountability in the context of reform as a “reformist paradox”, where 
“efforts to improve accountability through reforms generates consequences 
that in fact alters and often undermines existing forms of accountability 
already in place” (p. 706).  Hence, it would be interesting to understand the 
meaning that the term “accountability” has for policy actors who are directly 
involved in managing constant changes in delivering public services. 
 
It must be noted that the public sector is not uniform in nature and each 
sector may utilise different reform strategies (Glynn & Murphy, 1996). For 
example, to meet various policy goals, a government may use the 
privatisation approach in the transportation services, employ concession 
contract for providing utilities such as water, and apply joint venture for 
education services. Thus, it is not possible to study the enormous variety of 
reform strategies adopted by various public services in one study.  For these 
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reasons, this study intends to focus on one specific public sector that has 
experienced constant policy changes following the adoption of NPM and NPS 
reforms.   
 
Globally, accountability is a major issue in public health services.  Reforming 
health strategy under neoliberal reform principles is reported to have missed 
or be missing its targets due to the accountability problems in health 
governance (Gostin & Mok, 2009; Zadek & Radovich, 2006).  Furthermore, 
there are other considerable concerns of accountability in health services. 
The concerns revolve around two major factors.  First, health is a big 
business for government because it consumes a large amount of public 
money, so proper accounting for the use of these funds is essential 
(Brinkerhoff, 2004).  Second, the way health policy is managed and 
implemented will significantly affect people’s lives and well-being; politically 
speaking, therefore, delivery must be seen to be good (Brinkerhoff, 2004).     
 
The New Zealand health service is no exception in this regard.  Following the 
adoption of NPM reform, a number of researchers raised their concerns 
about accountability. For instance, Lawrence, Alam, Northcott, and Lowe 
(1994) revealed that the New Zealand health service has experienced several 
waves of reforms with demonstrable changes in accountability systems.  
Indeed, Davies (1990) claims that “proposed reforms within the public health 
sector in particular create an overloaded accountability structure with 
conflicting and enforceable accountability relationships” (p. 10). Over the last 
decades, accountability has remained an issue in the New Zealand public 
health system (Cordery, 2008; Gauld, 2012; Tenbensel, Mays, & Cumming, 
2007).   The information available on it, therefore, suggests that the New 
Zealand public health system is a useful context for studying the reforms on 
accountability issues.  
 
However, the greatest challenge was that, prior to this research project, I had 
no experience of being involved with the New Zealand public health system. 
As I am not a New Zealander, I had limited knowledge and understanding of 
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the New Zealand public health system. Nevertheless, suggestions from 
Thomas (2011)  made me believe that my lack of knowledge was not an 
obstacle to undertaking this project.  According to Thomas (2011), having a 
local knowledge of the studied phenomenon is an advantage but it is not 
essential for researchers. For Thomas, studying a context without the local 
knowledge is still possible if the researcher chooses a classic or a good case in 
a particular research area.  
 
To ensure the New Zealand public health system would fit this criterion, I 
conducted an extensive historical review of the health system at the 
beginning of this study. I found that the history of New Zealand’s public 
health reform would provide unique and interesting insights, especially for 
researchers who are interested to learn about public sector reform and 
accountability. The uniqueness of the story of health service reform in New 
Zealand lies in its complexity and the mixed structure of public and private 
institutions which had developed long before the ideology of neoliberalism 
was introduced.  The recognition of the private sector roles in delivering 
public health services led to the establishment of a dual system in health.   
 
The dual system refers to two conditions: first, the application of a dual 
funding method and, second, the adoption of a dual accountability 
arrangement between primary and secondary care. The application of the 
dual system led to a fragmentation in the public health structure. 
Interestingly, the dual system has remained untouched, although the public 
health system has been in active transition for the last few decades.  Reform 
has focused on the effort to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
public health system through the adoption of various mechanisms such as, 
contracting-out, privatisation, and joined-up government.  These mechanisms 
increased the level of complexity of the public health system because new 
organisational formats were implemented on top of the dualism structures. 
This scenario means that accountability is now applied to more complex 
structures and relationships; consequently, the New Zealand health system is 
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able to provide a good basis for studying accountability in the context of 
constant reform. 
 
1.3 Context of research 
 
New Zealand’s health services are a major government priority and concern.  
These services are largely tax-based with 78% of total health expenditure 
being financed from the public purse (Ashton, Mays, & Devlin, 2005; Jatrana 
& Crampton, 2009).  Health is reported as the largest and fastest growing 
area of the government spending (Carville, 2014).  For example, in the 
financial year 2001/02, the New Zealand government spent $7.5 billion on 
health, and the expenditure is almost double in 2013/14 with a total spend of 
$14.9 billion. It is anticipated that a similar trend will continue as the 2014 
health expenditure is expected to increase to $15.1 billion (The Treasury, 
2014).  These figures indicate that the economic performance of the health 
sector is of considerable importance in a small economy like New Zealand’s. 
A good accountability system is, therefore, needed to build public confidence 
in the health system. 
 
However, the ageing population, the growth in chronic diseases, and 
increasing public expectations have put considerable pressure on the public 
health system.  In addition, there has been a great advance in the number of 
treatments for health conditions, which has resulted in the growing costs of 
health care.  The ballooning health costs have become a major issue for the 
government because they grow faster than the economy, thus threatening the 
government’s solvency (Ministerial Review Group, 2009).   Due to these 
budgetary constraints, not all the health needs of the population can be met 
by a publicly funded system.  Therefore, the government has developed 
filtering criteria to determine who should have access to certain health 
treatments (Broom et al., 2007).  Ideally, the process of rationing is 
implemented through reforms which aim to improve the level of efficiency 
and effectiveness, as well as accountability, in the health services.    
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The New Zealand public health system has had four different health delivery 
frameworks as a result of the adoption of NPM and NPS reform models (will 
be discussed in Chapter Two). The ongoing changes driven by these reform 
models have brought adjustment in health service delivery methods, 
structures, and the types of people involved in health care services.  Despite 
both NPM and NPS models offering some advantages, the adoption of these 
two models has added complexity to the management of health delivery 
because each model is driven by different policy approaches and methods of 
implementation. 
 
From a critical perspective,  Lawrence (2005) sees health policy reforms as 
the ‘great experiment’ because the introduction of reforms was implemented 
on the basis of political ideology rather than evidence-based analysis of what 
works and what does not.  In Lawrence’s view, the government interference 
has actually caused harm rather than improving the public health system.  
According to Lawrence (2005), the health sector at that time faced ‘a crisis of 
legitimation’ i.e., the government had introduced so many changes that no 
one could provide a rational explanation of  what was happening and why.  In 
terms of accountability, the concept has shifted away from the languages of 
professional autonomy and medicine toward the languages of finance and 
accounting (Lawrence, 2005). 
 
Lawrence is not alone in his view. Over the last decades, the effects of each 
stage of health reform to the policy efficiency and effectiveness have been 
subject to debate (Ashton et al., 2005; Barnett et al., 2009; Gauld, 2008, 2012; 
Tenbensel, Cumming, Ashton, & Barnett, 2008).  The majority of researchers 
agree that reforms have largely failed to secure the expected gains in terms of 
improved policy efficiency and effectiveness (Ashton & Tenbensel, 2012). 
However, little attention has been given to how the constant changes in the 
health structures affect accountability understanding and practices within 
the health delivery system.  This study therefore, attempts to respond to the 
recent calls from the above researchers to investigate the issue of 
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accountability in the New Zealand public health system (see Dubnick, 2011; 
Greitens, 2012; Hodges, 2012).  
 
1.4 Research problem statement 
 
Reform usually comes hand in hand with new policy directions, which 
attempt to promote numerous benefits including improved accountability.  
While the effects of reform have been widely discussed, little attention has 
been given to how reforms affect the notion of accountability and its 
practices (Boston & Gill, 2011; Brandsma, 2007; Broadbent & Guthrie, 2008; 
Christensen & Laegreid, 2011a; Haque, 2000, 2007; Mulgan, 2000). It has 
been reported that the notions of accountability have changed in terms of: 
standards – the criteria by which public officials are held accountable; agents 
– to whom policy implementers are eventually accountable; and, means of 
accountability – how accountability is ensured by the government (Haque, 
2000). However, because the goal of accountability has become complicated,  
how well accountability functions has also become problematic (Hodge & 
Greeve, 2007).   
 
The existing studies identify the rise of accountability tensions in the 
structure of New Zealand health management following the adoption of a 
series of neoliberal reforms. However, the studies do not provide further 
information about the notion of accountability in the context of health service 
delivery, especially with regard to how the continuous reforms in the health 
sector affects the notion of accountability and how accountability has been 
defined in ever-changing, rationing processes (see Dowling, Sheaff, & Pickard, 
2008; Mackie, 2010; Starke, 2010; Tenbensel et al., 2008; Tenbensel et al., 
2007). Indeed, Hodge and Greeve (2007) also indicate a sense of anxiety 
toward accountability because so little is known on how accountability 
functions in the context of NPM and NPS. Van de Walle and Hammerschmid 
(2011) make a call for researchers engaged in public sector studies to 
provide more empirical evidence on the effects of reform on accountability. 
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On the basis of the above scenarios, there is a need to explore, in the context 
of reform, New Zealand health managers’ understanding of accountability 
and its practices as they encounter constant changes in the public health 
system.  
 
1.5 Statement of purpose and research questions 
 
The purpose of this research is to understand how the adoption of constant 
reform affects accountability understanding and its practices in the New 
Zealand public health system.  The purpose of this study is guided by three 
considerations within the public health system. 
 
Firstly, because the decisions about health reform were driven by different 
reform strategies over the past 30 years, it is important to identify the effects 
of reforms on the public health structures, governance and accountability.  
There must be a reason why the adoption of postreform accountability does 
not lead to the outcomes desired by the government and the people they 
represent. By analysing a series of reforms in the New Zealand public health 
system, this study will first, identify the formats of the reforms that have 
taken place and the rationale for adopting reforms in terms of accountability. 
 
Secondly, since health service delivery involves various policy actors from 
the government and private sector, there is a need to consider the effect of 
constant reforms on the accountability arrangements within the mixed 
institutional arrangements of the health services.  Therefore, experienced 
public health managers should be able to consider, if reform is continually 
adopted, what the effect on accountability is.   
 
Thirdly, because health policy reforms in New Zealand move in different 
directions, it is interesting to identify the extent to which the continuing 
reforms have influenced the public health managers’ understanding of 
accountability. If reforms have influenced the accountability understanding 
of public health officials, it is crucial to establish what the meaning of 
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“accountability” has been for public health officials in the context of ever-
changing health reforms.   
 
Based on the above arguments, the central research question set for this 
study is: what does “accountability” mean in the ever-changing New Zealand 
health system? To answer it, the following further research questions will be 
addressed: 
1. What changes in the public health system have taken place over the last 
four stages of reform and what were the rationales for them in terms of 
accountability? 
2. What are the challenges related to constant policy changes, and how do 
health managers feel about dealing with the changes in the public health 
system? 
3. What are the public health managers’ conceptions of accountability after 
encountering the succession of organisational changes? 
 
1.6 Research approach 
 
To develop new insights about accountability understanding and practices in 
the New Zealand public health system, this study adopted a qualitative 
methodology to illustrate the phenomenon under investigation.  In particular, 
I employed critical hermeneutics and Ricoeur’s three stages of understanding 
as the methodological approach with the following research methods: 
 
Documents review 
I examined a range of policy documents published by the Ministry of Health 
prior to the implementation of various reforms.  These documents included 
discussion documents, ministerial statements, review documents and annual 
reports; and academic journals related to public sector reforms, public health 
studies, accountability and organisational changes. The aim of this method 
was develop my preunderstanding knowledge of the New Zealand public 
health reform. The process of analysing and interpreting documents involved 
a historical review and critique of the changing structures and accountability 
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arrangements in the New Zealand public health system.  The analysis focused 
on the issues prior to the implementation of reform and the formats of 
reform. 
 
Interview 
I conducted face-to-face interviews with a number of public health managers 
involved in managing the delivery of health services to the New Zealand 
public.  This method was adopted with the aim of enhancing and validating 
the preunderstanding information gained from the policy documents and 
academic journals. I conducted interviews with 13 experienced public health 
managers from primary and secondary health organisations. The participants 
were purposefully selected using the snowballing technique. The participants 
were public health senior managers who had each worked in the health 
industry for more than 10 years. 
 
The study adopted critical hermeneutics as the analytical framework for the 
process of analysing and interpreting data. In particular, this study employed 
Ricoeur’s concepts of interpretation, namely: historicity; autonomisation and 
distanciation; and appropriation and engagement. The findings of this study 
are presented in three stages of hermeneutics understanding: namely, 
preunderstanding, understanding, and comprehensive understanding. 
 
1.7 Significance of the study 
 
The rationale for this study derives from my desire to understand the 
implication of reforms on the meaning of accountability and its practices in 
public services. In particular, the findings are expected to enhance 
understanding of accountability in the context of a public sector organisation 
which has been subject to continuous reform. By exploring managers’ 
experiences, this study has tried to understand accountability challenges and 
choices when reforms have moved in conflicting directions. 
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In addition, this study offers valuable insights into how the complex process 
of reform affects accountability arrangements in a public sector organisation. 
These findings attempt to illustrate how leaders in a particular type of public 
sector engage with constant policy changes.  Specific descriptions of such 
scenarios are expected to describe the process of policy implementation and 
provide understanding of how best it might be managed.  
 
It is important to understand the notion of accountability in the context of 
health services because dealing with people’s lives and well-being requires 
policy makers to be fully accountable. 
 
1.8 Thesis outline 
 
This thesis comprises seven chapters. A brief overview of the thesis chapters 
is provided below: 
 
Chapter One: Overview of the thesis 
This chapter provides the overview of the thesis.  It describes the background 
to the research issues, the research context, the research problem statement, 
the statement of purpose and research questions, and the significance of the 
study.  
 
Chapter Two: Literature Review  
The aim of this chapter is to review literature related to accountability and 
public sector reform.  This chapter describes the existing understanding of 
the notions of accountability and its practices in the context of neoliberal 
reform.  To understand the changes of accountability in the context of reform, 
this chapter discusses the underpinning models of reform, i.e., NPM and NPS 
before highlighting the knowledge gaps in the existing literature. 
 
Chapter Three: Methodology 
This chapter describes the research concepts that underpin the research 
process. I discuss the rationales of adopting qualitative methodology as the 
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research design and critical hermeneutics as the basis of research inquiry.  
This chapter also provides extended discussions of the hermeneutics 
approach and concepts which helps me to design the process of analysing 
and interpreting data.  
 
Chapter Four: Method 
This chapter explains the process of gathering, analysing and interpreting 
data for this study. It describes how the hermeneutics methodology was 
employed in the process of selecting participants, conducting the research 
process and making meaning of the texts. To establish the credibility of this 
study, I also include the discussion of the ethical consideration that guided 
the research process. 
 
Chapter Five: Preunderstanding 
Chapter Five provides my preunderstanding knowledge of the New Zealand 
public health system and the emergence of accountability issues.  This 
preunderstanding knowledge was derived from the review of documents 
which I conducted prior to the fieldwork. I disclose my thinking about health 
service reform by discussing the types of reform and how changes in the 
policy direction have affected accountability. This chapter serves as the basis 
for further exploration at the next stage of understanding which is presented 
in Chapter Six. 
 
Chapter Six: Understanding 
This chapter represents the interview findings which reflected my 
understanding of the New Zealand public health reforms and the 
accountability issues associated with them.  It provides a wide and varied 
range of the health managers’ experiences – including a series of paradoxes, 
confusions and conflicts – in dealing with reforms, policy changes and 
accountability.   
 
 
 
16 | P a g e  
 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
By summarising the key findings of the study and the main issues of the 
investigated phenomenon, this chapter provides a comprehensive 
understanding of each area. It explains them in the wider context of the 
accountability and public sector reform literature. This chapter highlights the 
suggested contributions of this study and reveals the limitations that 
appeared in the research project.  Then, recommendations for future 
research are offered before ending with final reflection of this study. 
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2 CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
There is an extensive body of literature relating to the research topic 
(accountability) and context (public sector reform) of this study.  The 
purpose of this chapter is to examine both topics, with the discussion being 
divided into three main sections.  The first section considers the concept of 
accountability.  It has been said that accountability is a vague and imprecise 
concept and so the review aims to understand the extant understandings in 
the literature from two perspectives: (i) normative accountability; and, (ii) 
mechanism accountability. The second section reviews the context of public 
sector reform, giving especial attention to the emerging models of NPM and 
NPS.  Finally, in the third section, I discuss the knowledge gap in the area of 
reform and accountability, before ending the discussion with the chapter 
summary.  
 
2.2 Defining accountability 
 
Although accountability has been widely used as a benchmark in assessing 
the standard and quality of organisations, defining accountability is 
challenging. The challenges arise because the ‘chameleon-like’ nature of 
accountability allows researchers to define and redefine it according to their 
beliefs, objectives and the time at which they conducted their research 
(Sinclair, 1995). Simultaneously, the setting in which accountability is 
practiced constantly changes in accordance with organisational motives. As a 
result, the discussions of accountability tend to go round in circles as many 
authors introduce their own definitions, concepts and frameworks for 
studying accountability (Bovens, 2010). However, these various definitions, 
concepts and frameworks are disconnected, and lack a consistent conceptual 
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framework. They, therefore, fail to provide conclusive findings to reduce the 
confusion (Bovens, 2010; Dubnick, 2005).  
  
The objective of this section is to provide a fundamental understanding 
rather than offer a new definition of accountability. To avoid confusion in 
defining accountability, I follow Bovens (2010) who suggests that 
accountability should be viewed from two different perspectives, namely, 
accountability as a normative and accountability as a mechanism. Bovens 
(2010) argues that both accountability perspectives “address different sorts 
of issues and imply very different sorts of standards, framework, and 
analytical dimensions” (p.948).  Therefore, looking at accountability from 
two different perspectives may help to solve at least some of the conceptual 
confusion, and may provide some foundation for comparative and cumulative 
analysis for the study of accountability. The next subsections discuss the 
concept of accountability from the perspectives suggested by Bovens (2010). 
 
2.2.1 Accountability as a normative concept 
 
From the normative perspective, accountability is easily understood as a 
word which is synonymous with many other terms such as responsibility, 
responsiveness, integrity, transparency, democracy, equity, justice, honesty, 
and good governance (Bovaird, 2004; Bovens, 2010; Koppell, 2005).  The 
various synonyms of accountability show that, over time, this word has been 
continuously reconstructed, and that developing processes have added more 
meanings and functions.  For example, the definition of accountability has 
been elevated from its primary meaning – “responsibility” -  to more 
challenging functions such as strengthening the process of governance (Day 
& Klein, 1987).  Although accountability has many definitions, all of these 
definitions involve a common characteristic i.e., they convey an image of 
moral order with strong emphasis on trustworthiness and transparency.   
 
The word accountability is often used in the policy context to indicate a 
desirable quality in an individual and desirable organisational behaviour 
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(Dubnick, 2005).  Symbolically, when accountability is used in policy 
documents to signal organisational means and ends, it implies the positive 
quality of organisations. In other words, accountability is used with the aim 
of increasing organisations’ charismatic images, because ‘being accountable’ 
is seen as a guarantee of implementing virtuous or normative actions 
(Bovens, 2010). This view is supported by Dubnick and Frederickson (2009) 
who regard accountability as a set of organisational promises made to 
shareholders and other stakeholders.  They include the promise of control, 
the promise of integrity, the promise of ethical behaviour, the promise of 
democracy, the promise of performance, and the promise of justice or equity 
(Dubnick & Frederickson, 2009).  For some people, organisational promises 
made to the public are almost always exaggerated; nevertheless, such 
promises increase the impression that an organisation has strong values.  In 
the long run, the accountability promises will enhance organisational 
credibility as well as increasing public confidence in the organisation 
(DiTomaso, 1993). 
 
Etzioni (1975) in his classic work on accountability has used such terms as 
“the symbolic uses of accountability” (p.279).  Strategically, when the word 
accountability is employed as a policy or organisational benchmark, it 
describes the actual usage of accountability in specific ways in particular 
settings.  For example, accountability is used as a standard for guaranteeing 
organisational and individual performance and also as an assessment of 
individual and organisational moral and ethical discipline (Kim & Lee, 2010).  
Accountability is often seen as providing solutions to a wide range of 
problems, and such accountability should result in greater organisational and 
policy achievements. For instance, governments have appeared to assume 
that accountability will be enhanced as a result of improved policy efficiency; 
as noted by Boston and Gill (2011), “a key premise on which the reform 
relied was that, with effective accountability systems in place, robust 
performance information would generate better performance” (pp. 224-225).  
This comment shows that as a word, ‘accountability’ appears to be a strong 
and popular rhetorical policy tool (Dubnick & Frederickson, 2009).   
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Although the meaning of accountability as a word sounds clear and 
understandable, Bovens (2010) claims that accountability in the sense of 
virtue or normative behaviour is hard to define substantively.  For instance, 
Behn (2000) states, “sometimes we know exactly what these responsibilities, 
obligations, and duties are.  Sometimes we have defined them very precisely.  
But too often we haven’t – or at least we aren’t all using the same definition” 
(p. 6). Difficulties in reaching a standard definition for accountability 
behaviour can be associated with its chameleon-like attribute: i.e., 
accountability is viewed and defined according to the perspective of 
participants (Sinclair, 1995).  Hence, too often accountability carries and 
conveys different meaning for different people, organisations, eras, roles and 
political perspectives.  
 
To date, accountability studies in normative perspectives have focused on the 
standard for accountability and the assessment of the behaviour of public 
organisations and public officials (Considine, 2002; Koppell, 2005), public 
sector performance (Dubnick, 2005; Dubnick & Frederickson, 2009) and 
individual accountability from ethical and moral perspective (McKernan, 
2012; Messner, 2009).  These studies have made contributions to explaining 
the usage of accountability, especially in public sector organisations.   
 
2.2.2 Accountability as a mechanism (or social) concept 
 
Accountability can also be approached from the stand point of specific social 
relations or social practices. This approach is also referred to as 
‘accountability mechanism’ because it links to the operation of accountability 
systems within organisations (Bovens, 2010; Roberts & Scapens, 1985).  In 
simple terms, Roberts and Scapens (1985) define accountability as “the 
giving and demanding of reasons for conduct in which people are required to 
explain and take responsibility for their actions” (p. 447).  This definition 
implies that the process of ‘being called to account’ involves regular face to 
face contact (Roberts & Scapens, 1985) between two parties known as the 
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‘account giver’ (accountor) and ‘account receiver’ (accountee) (Mulgan, 
2000).  The process of ‘being called to account’ has been accepted as a core 
definition for accountability by almost all scholars in the area of 
accountability (Mulgan, 2000).  Definitions provided by these scholars 
indicate that the notion of a mechanistic accountability is established through 
the way in which accountability is experienced by participants in a particular 
social practice. 
 
A number of scholars have agreed that the framework of accountability or 
the account-giving process was originally characterised by three core 
features (Bovens, 2010; De Vries, 2007; Haque, 2007).  The first feature 
concerns the reporting function (Parker & Gould, 1999), while, the second 
feature relates to social relations and interactions (Mulgan, 2000), and the 
third feature is connected to the moral order and legitimacy structure which 
defines rights and obligations, including the rights to hold others to account 
(Conrad, 2005).  Dubnick and Frederickson (2009) regard these three 
features as input, process and output.  These features are interrelated as they 
portray three phases in the process of giving account, namely, the 
information phase, judgement phase and consequence phase.  The process of 
giving account is implemented in a linear relationship with an emphasis on a 
systematic input-output process. Under this form of relationship, in the case 
of fraud, corruption or policy failure for instance, there will be a person who 
is held accountable and has to face the consequences of his or her action 
(Brandsma, 2007; Haque, 2007). Table 2.1 describes the features of 
accountability in the process of giving account in a particular social practice. 
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Table 2:1 The features of accountability in the process of giving account 
Features of accountability The process of giving account 
Reporting function 
(Input) 
Information phase. 
 At this stage the accountor is responsible to the 
accountee for accounting or answering for conduct or 
the discharge of a duty.  
Social interactions and 
relations 
(Process) 
Judgement phase 
 At this stage, the accountor has to meet certain levels of 
accountee’s expectations, which have previously been 
agreed by both parties.  
 The accountee can pose questions to get more detailed 
information and the accountor has to provide 
justifications and explanations. 
Moral order and 
legitimate structure 
(Output) 
Consequences phase 
 At this stage the accountee evaluates the conduct of the 
accountor by referring to the accountee’s justifications 
and explanations, and makes decisions regarding the 
sanctions or rewards to control the activities of the 
accountor.   
 The accountor has to accept the sanctions or rewards.  
Drawn from (Bovens, 2010; Conrad, 2005; De Vries, 2007; Haque, 2007; Mulgan, 
2000; Parker & Gould, 1999) 
  
 
Similar features to those presented above have been used to model the 
process of giving account or show how accountability is practised in specific 
social contexts such as public organisations. The traditional structure of 
public organisation was developed from the bureaucratic model. This model 
is characterised by the principal-agent relationship, which one party (the 
principal) hires another (the agent) to undertake a particular task in 
accordance with the interest of the principal  (Broadbent, Dietrich, & 
Laughlin, 1996). The principal-agent relationship typically involves the 
principal exerting strong control over its agents since the principal owns the 
legitimate power that allows it to manage the organisation’s diverse 
expectations by controlling and coercing the agent’s activities (Frink & 
Klimoski, 2004; Roberts & Scapens, 1985).  In other words, the relationship 
between the principal and the agent should be characterised by 
responsibilities and goals that have been agreed upon by both parties 
(Cordery, 2008).   
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The relationship of mutual responsibility between the principal and the agent 
reflects the existing accountability relationships between them.  For example, 
Day and Klein (1987) contended that “one cannot be accountable to anyone, 
unless one also has responsibility for doing something” (p. 5).  Thus, from the 
perspective of accountability, the responsibility relationship between the 
principal and the agent also implies the accountability relationship between 
the accountor (the agent) and the accountee (the principle).  Conventionally, 
accountability relationships between the principal and agent are known as 
hierarchical accountability.  Under this form of accountability, the principal 
(the accountee) reserves the rights to call the accountee to account, including 
demanding answers and imposing sanctions. 
 
However, the settings of any social practice are subject to change.  For 
example, in the mid-20th century, the traditional features of public sector 
accountability came under pressure following rapid changes in public 
bureaucracy (Halligan, 2007a; Siddique, 2006).  At this point in time, the 
growing division of labour expanded the role of the State in governing the 
system of government.  Simultaneously, the number of professionals in the 
public sector grew, which then reinforced the need to harness managerialism 
to political accountability.  To ensure the relevance of accountability in the 
context of organisational changes in specific social settings, accountability 
scholars (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; Sinclair, 1995; Stone, 1995) agreed that 
there was a need to enhance the concept of accountability.  
 
The process of giving account should be enhanced by acknowledging 
relationships, or the multiple ways in which accountability is experienced.  
Understanding accountability from the perspective of relationships helps to 
clarify the meaning of accountability because the forms of accountability 
usually change according to the social relationships context in which the 
policy actors are involved, and because, accountability is not only about 
formal requirements which involves top-down control but it is also about a 
matter of interpersonal relationships (Stone, 1995).  Table 2.2 shows the 
framework of accountability relationships developed by accountability 
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scholars.  It can be seen that the notions of accountability involves a wide 
range of relationship that increase according to the criteria of a particular the 
social practice. 
 
Table 2:2 The framework of accountability relationships 
Researcher(s) Types of accountability relationships 
Romzek and Dubnick 
(1987); Jonston and 
Romzek (1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduced four types of accountability: 
 
Hierarchical/bureaucratic  accountability  
 Formal and hierarchical accountability 
relationship between a superior and a 
subordinate.  
 Systems of accountability are based on 
standard operating procedure or clearly stated 
rules and regulations. 
 Basis of relationship is supervision. 
 
Legal accountability 
 Formal and hierarchical accountability 
relationship between a controlling party inside 
(an organisation’s management) and outside 
the organisations (law maker). 
 Basis of relationship is fiduciary. 
 
Political accountability 
 Relationships between representatives and his 
or her constituencies.   For example between 
elected official and citizen, agency head and 
general public or organisations and customers. 
 Basis of relationship is responsive to 
constituency. 
 
Professional accountability 
 The placement of control over organisational 
activities in the hands of expert employees. 
Basis of relationship is deference to expertise. 
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Sinclair (1995) 
 
Introduced five forms of accountability 
relationships.  
  
Political accountability 
 A direct line or chain of accountability links the 
public servant with public manager, in turn 
accountable to the Minister, to the executive or 
Cabinet, to parliament and hence to the 
electors. 
 The form of relationship is formal. 
 
Public accountability 
 Encompasses more informal but direct 
accountability to the public, interested 
community groups and individuals. 
 Involves answering, through various 
mechanisms from newspaper reports to 
hearings.  
 Is treated as complementary to public 
accountability. 
  
Managerial accountability 
 Is a formal and hierarchical relationship. 
 A superior calls to account a subordinate for 
the performance of delegated duties. 
 
Professional accountability 
 This accountability invokes the sense of duty 
that one has as a member of a professional or 
expert group which, in turn, occupies a 
privileged and knowledgeable position in 
society. 
 
Personal accountability 
 This refers to basic value such as respect for 
human dignity and acting in a manner that 
accepts responsibility for affecting the lives of 
others. 
 
Managing accountability relationships in specific organisational practices is 
challenging because the structures and types of relationships are different 
and subject to organisational change (Bovens, 2010).  Often the criteria of 
mechanistic accountability which related to the questions: ‘to whom is the 
accountability to be rendered’ and ‘what to render’ are difficult to answer 
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(Bovens, 2010).  As a result, the notion of postreform accountability has 
become increasingly ambiguous (Dubnick, 2005). 
 
According to Bovens (2010), difficulties in managing different types of 
relationship will lead to problems in accountability practices, called 
‘accountability deficits’ and ‘accountability overloads’. From a normative 
perspective, accountability deficit refers to inappropriate behaviour or bad 
governance which results from the inability of public officials or public 
organisations to respond to the public demand (Bovens, 2010). Meanwhile, 
the mechanism accountability defines the deficit from the standpoint of 
loopholes that emerge in the web of control mechanisms (Bovens, 2010). 
From the accountability deficit perspective, the main concern is the growing 
accountability gaps between policy and practice due to the growth of formal 
power and the complexity of organisations (Bovens, 2010).  Accountability 
overload is a term used by Bovens (2010) to denote the accountability 
problem that caused by overburdening accountability in terms of its 
obligations. This problem will result in a low return on accountability 
because overburdening accountability leads to the formation of various 
accountability problems, such as accountability dilemmas, paradoxes and 
traps. According to Bovens (2010), imposing evermore accountability 
arrangements, and being scrutinised more frequently and intensely do not 
necessarily produce better governance.   
 
Dilemma and deficit in accountability are signs of danger for two reasons. 
First, dilemma never give the correct solutions (Poulsen, 2009), and second, 
deficits in accountability will increase oversight activities in organisations 
(Bovens, 2007; Halligan, 2007a).  Furthermore,  dilemmas and deficits will 
also create the opportunity for practitioners to manipulate confusing 
situations, and thus escape being held accountable (Jones & Stewart, 2009; 
Klijn & Teisman, 2005). Although, there have been a considerable number of 
studies on accountability mechanisms (Budding, 2004; Day & Klein, 1987; 
Newman, 2004; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; Sinclair, 1995), insights into how 
dilemmas and deficits develop have not been sufficiently explained because 
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the effects of policy reforms on the notion of accountability and its practices 
have not received much attention.  As a result, Pettersen and Nyland (2011) 
called for future researchers to study the key actors’ interpretations in this 
context. 
 
In summary, accountability can be understood from its two basic concepts: 
normative accountability and mechanism accountability.  Normative 
accountability conveys the image of moral values while mechanism 
accountability is viewed as social relationship that can be utilised as an 
organisational instrument for achieving the objectives of accountable 
governance. Although these two concepts define accountability from 
different perspectives, they are complementary in practice, because 
accountability is about moral values and relationships (Bovens, 2010).  
However, mechanism accountability is more complex than normative 
accountability because it involves various types of relationships. The 
relationships of accountability are subject to organisational change, meaning 
that the types of relationships and the notion of account giver and account 
receiver will change according to changes in the organisational structures 
(Broadbent & Laughlin, 2002; Newman, 2004; Sinclair, 1995).  Changes in 
accountability relationships have led to problems in accountability practices, 
known as accountability dilemmas and accountability deficits (Bovens, 2010).  
 
It has become apparent to me that accountability is ideal in concept but 
complex in practices.  To help understand the notion of accountability and its 
practices in the context of public sector reform, the next section discusses the 
underpinning models of reform and their effects on accountability.  
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2.3 Understanding public sector reforms and changes in 
accountability 
  
Delivering quality services for citizens is a core mandate of a government.  
Unfortunately, however, realising the mandate is not a straightforward task 
as governments are always under socioeconomic and political pressures.  
These pressures require governments to rationalise the forms of service 
delivery through reform because reform has been perceived as the only way 
to ensure governments succeed in carrying out their initial mandates (Aucoin, 
1990; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004).   
 
According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) reform “consists of deliberate 
changes to the structures and processes of public sector organizations with 
the objective of getting them (in some sense) to run better” (p. 8).  Such 
deliberate changes are informed by specific sets of ideas which characterised 
by ideologies, frameworks, or standard of actions. In the 1980s, a new set of 
reforms rooted in neoliberal ideology was introduced in the public sector. 
This new ideology promised to assist in: 
1. making saving in the public expenditure 
2. improving the quality of public service 
3. making the operation of government more efficient 
4. increasing the chances of improving the effectiveness of 
implementing policy 
5. enhancing the governments’ accountability 
 
  (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004, p. 6). 
 
Since its introduction in the 1980s neoliberal reform has become the most 
popular reform model in both developed and developing countries (De Vries 
& Nemec, 2013; Goldfinch & Wallis, 2010; Haque, 2007; Hong, 2013; Hood, 
1991; Larbi, 1999; Mongkol, 2011; Sarker, 2006).  For the purpose of this 
study, two models of neoliberal reform, i.e., NPM and NPS have been 
reviewed. In order to understand the rationales for reform, the transition 
from the bureaucratic model to NPM, and then from NPM to NPS is presented 
prior to the discussion of each model of reform. Subsequently, the 
29 | P a g e  
 
discussions on the reform models extend to the effects of reform on 
accountability. 
 
2.3.1 From the Bureaucratic to NPM Model 
 
Before the 1980s, the framework of public service delivery was underpinned 
by the bureaucratic model.  Under this model, a government carried out 
extensive roles and responsibilities from maintaining law and order to 
providing new social services such as education, health, housing, social 
security, and transport.  The bureaucratic model, however, was regarded as 
economically inefficient because the size of the public sector grew and the 
administrative intervention appeared to be extensive.  A large and growing 
government was seen as not conducive to better economic performance as it 
caused high government debts, stagflation and low levels of economic growth 
(Mitchell, 2005; Regan, Smith, & Love, 2009).   
 
Prior to the neoliberal reform, most governments suffered from fiscal stress 
during the economic recession in the 1970s because the oil crisis hit different 
countries at different times and with different severity (Cendon, 2000; 
Loffler, 2003). During the recession, governments experienced declines in tax 
revenues and increases in public expenditure (Loffler, 2003).  At the same 
time, governments were pressured by groups of the public who became 
better informed and began to raise concerns regarding the quality and 
efficiency of service delivery that was received. Such pressures led to the 
substantial criticisms of the bureaucratic model which was seen by the users 
as too slow, inefficient, and unresponsive because it was driven by regulation 
instead of performance (Larbi, 1999; McDonald, Checkland, & Harrison, 
2009).  These situations also led to public arguments and disenchantment, 
and pressured governments to find alternatives for providing public goods 
and services (Mascarenhas, 1993).   
 
Therefore, governments both in developed and developing countries began 
to look for strategies, which would help them to improve the efficiency, 
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effectiveness and performance of public service delivery.  Market and 
business principles were seen as appealing substitutes to the bureaucratic 
model, because the principles were developed based on the fundamental 
economic theorem, and they were believed to create a competitive 
environment for better government performance (Blanchard et al., 1998; 
Box, Marshall, Reed, & Reed, 2001; Christensen & Laegreid, 2011a).  David 
and Gaebler (1992) rationalised the importance of adopting market-based 
reform as follows: 
. . . the bureaucratic model developed in conditions very 
different from today.  It developed in a slower-paced society, 
when change proceeded at a leisurely gait.  It developed in 
an age of hierarchy, when only those at the top of pyramid 
had enough information to make informed decisions . . . . 
Today all that has been swept away.  We live in an era of 
breathtaking change.  We live in the global marketplace, 
which puts enormous pressures on our economic 
institutions.  We live in an information society, in which 
people get access to information as fast as their leaders.  We 
live in a market-based economy, in which educated workers 
bridle at commands and demand autonomy. We live in an 
age of niche markets, in which customers here become 
accustomed to high quality and extensive choice. (p.15) 
 
In the view of David and Gaebler (1992), the bureaucratic model was no 
longer relevant for the public sector because the contemporary 
socioeconomic environment requires a different policy approach. Therefore, 
neoliberalism reform was seen as an attack on the bureaucratic model which 
operated in a closed system and centralised bureaucratic principles (Gauld, 
2009; Osborne, 2009).   
 
Furthermore, the resurgence of new-right politics in the US and the UK 
(during the era of Reganomics and Thatcherism) in the late 1970s and 1980s, 
and the growth of new information technologies, accelerated the adoption of 
market-based reform in the public sector (Larbi, 1999).  New-right politics 
suggested that the market and private sector would be able to make the 
public sector leaner and more competitive, would make it more responsive to 
citizens’ needs by offering value for money, choice, flexibility and 
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transparency (Loffler, 2003). The use of new information technology would 
speed up the achievement of the objectives of reform (Larbi, 1999).   
 
The rise of the market and business model around the world was marked by 
a wide implementation of four administrative megatrends namely, reducing 
public spending and staffing, adopting privatisation and quasi-privatisation, 
utilising information technology, and developing an international agenda 
focused on general issues of public management (Hood, 1991).  These 
megatrends were implemented for more than 15 years, before Hood (1991) 
coined the term NPM to describe these reforms.  According to Rhodes (1994), 
the term NPM does not refer to any one idea but a collective of ideas which 
became a fashionable global trend after being introduced in the early 1980s.   
 
NPM was seen by Van de Walle and Hammerschmid (2011) as a hybrid 
approach because it was derived from two different sets of ideas.  The first 
set of ideas consists of the philosophy of neoliberalism, rooted in three major 
theories related to market mechanisms, namely, public choice theory, agency 
theory, and, transaction cost analysis theory (Cartner & Bollinger, 1997).  The 
second set of ideas refers to the managerialist principles which focus on the 
need to establish the private managerial principles within the public sector 
(Aucoin, 1990).  Due to its hybrid character, NPM was described as a 
marriage of opposites (Hood, 1991).   
 
However, the NPM prescriptions for change were seen as offering a fresh 
approach to the public sector problems. NPM set three promising objectives 
that aimed to bring about this change.  They were:  
1. to improve public sector efficiency and the quality of services;  
2. to reduce public expenditure; and,  
3. to ensure the effectiveness of policy implementation.  
(Hood, 1991; 1995) 
 
The implementation of NPM largely emphasised an active and visible hands-
on approach to professional management in the public sector with explicit 
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standards of performance, greater emphasis on output control, increased 
performance, contracts, devolution, disaggregation of units, cost-cutting, 
financial reporting and mimicking of private sector management practices 
such as the introduction of corporate plans, missions and statements, and the 
concept of citizens as customers (Blanchard et al., 1998; Christensen & 
Laegreid, 2001; Larbi, 1999; Moynihan, 2009).  These strategies were 
expected to make public organisations more transparent and more easily 
accessible with regard to extensive evaluations (Nyland, Petterson, & 
Ostergren, 2009).  
 
To support such developments, there has been a demand for accounting 
information to help public organisations deal with market and business 
principles. Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) define the usage of accounting 
information as “accounting logic” (p. 19).  They argue that accounting 
information is a part of a steering mechanism and that applying the 
accounting logic in public organisations enhances the performance of the 
public sector. As a result of this change, the traditional values of public 
organisations such as equity, fairness and rule of law switched to managerial 
values adapted from the private sector, namely, effectiveness, efficiency, and 
analysis of costs and benefits (Norman, 2003).   
 
NPM also redefined the role of governments in the context of service 
delivery.  In order to improve the efficiency and accountability of public 
services, NPM required governments to change their role from ‘rowing to 
steering’ (Barlow & Rober, 1996; Rainnie, Firtzgerald, Gilchrist, & Morris, 
2012).  This concept was introduced by David and Gaebler (1992), based on 
their arguments that different sectors of economy i.e., public, private, and 
nongovernmental agencies should provide the goods and services in line with 
what each sector produces best separately or through collective efforts.  
Under this concept, governments were required to play the role of ‘facilitator’ 
as governments were best at steering policies directed to growth in the 
economy and which prevent discrimination in the social system.  
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Meanwhile, private sector and nongovernmental agencies are recommended 
to concentrate on rowing activities as these sectors are best at producing 
goods and services (David & Gaebler, 1992). Through these specialisation 
activities, governments are likely to be able to encourage a better quality of 
goods and services at lower costs.  These concepts brought the idea of the 
purchaser-provider split into the public sector.  The public sector led the 
planning and monitoring of services, while the responsibility for delivering 
services was contracted out to experts from private or voluntary 
organisations. As a result, the management of the public sector and service 
delivery became fragmented and increasingly governed by contractual 
relationships (Barlow & Rober, 1996).  
 
In summary, public sector organisations during the reforms were reclassified 
as commercial businesses and citizens were redefined as customers (Parker 
& Guthrie, 1993). As public sector organisations came to be seen as 
commercial entities, the public managers were required to be more 
responsive to their customers through the recognition of private managerial 
principles. These principles advocate granting greater autonomy to 
managers, reducing regulation, and focusing on results (Cejudo, 2008).  
Consequently, there was a move from qualitative to quantitative thinking and 
acting (Parker & Guthrie, 1993).  This move not only brought active and 
visible hands-on professional management into the public sector, but also put 
a greater emphasis on accounting calculation concerning explicit standards of 
performance, and output controls, including cost-cutting and public 
budgeting. Furthermore, various private sector managerial strategies which 
did not require structural changes were introduced into the public sector.  
These strategies included: quality innovation, performance management, 
corporate plans, missions and statements, and the concept of citizens as 
customers (Blanchard et al., 1998; Christensen & Laegreid, 2001; Larbi, 1999; 
Moynihan, 2009).  Overall, the NPM strategies appeared to be promising and 
attractive solutions for governments to deal with the problems of inefficiency 
in the public sector. 
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2.3.2 A critique of NPM and the formation of New Public Service 
 
Although NPM was expected to lead to better performance in the public 
sector, some evidence indicated that it was not always able to achieve the 
expected result.  The implementation of NPM-related reforms resulted in 
reports of: 
1. an increase in a ‘democratic deficit’, due to a serious loss in public 
accountability (Atreya & Amstrong, 2002);  
2. the creation of difficulties in attaining social equilibrium among 
citizens or customers (Eagle, 2005);  
3. the undermining of democratic and constitutional values such as 
fairness, justice, representation and participation because of a high 
emphasis on market and managerial value (Denhardt & Denhardt, 
2000);  
4. the fragmentation of service delivery because of distinct tasks, 
purposes and conditions within the public and private sectors 
 (Mongkol, 2011; Rhodes, 1994).   
 
From a managerial perspective, the implementation of NPM was seen as a 
‘new red-tape’ for output and outcome due to its highly centralised approach 
and highly specified controls through contracting-out, performance 
evaluation, and accountability mechanisms (Goldfinch & Wallis, 2010).  
Meanwhile, the objective of reducing the costs of public provision seemed to 
remain as difficult to achieve as previously, despite the refocus from service 
provision to control through accrual accounting, auditing and external 
evaluation (Olson, Humprey, & Guthrie, 2001). 
 
De Vries and Nemec (2013) provide analyses of the trend of GDPs, revenues, 
and debts in developed countries between 2003 and 2015 (projection).  They 
reveal that public deficits in almost all countries are high, with a fast growth 
in public debts. De Vries and Nemec (2013) conclude that: 
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The dramatic decline in GDP, public revenues and 
stabilization expenditure reveal the urgent problems that 
many countries face. It is in those circumstances that 
industry, banks but also common people turn to their 
governments and demand solutions, which cannot be 
provided for by the market nor by a minimalistic public 
sector. It is not sufficient just to increase taxes and to 
implement cross-sectoral general cuts. In such a severe 
situation it becomes obvious that the one-size-fits-all 
solution of minimizing the influence of government has 
serious drawbacks and that the ideology behind NPM has 
reached its limits (p. 8). 
 
As the NPM-related reforms were perceived as reaching their limit, 
governments introduced more holistic strategies using a social democratic 
approach. This approach stresses both ‘society’ and ‘democracy’, requiring 
the State to develop a robust and caring society (Gauld, 2009).  This idea 
became a backbone of public policies in many Western nations, including the 
US (under the leadership of Bill Clinton, 1993 - 2001) and the UK (under the 
leadership of Tony Blair, 1997 -2007). Under this approach, a government is 
responsible for ensuring that social services such as education, health and 
housing are freely and universally available to citizens.  This approach to 
public policy encourages the development of the welfare state in accordance 
with interventionist Keynesian economics (Christensen & Laegreid, 2011a). 
 
The social democratic strategies referred to ‘networks’, ‘joined-up 
government’ and ‘whole-of-government’.  These strategies were developed 
on the basis of public sector values and the assertion of central control over 
agencies (Goldfinch & Wallis, 2010; Larner, 2000). In particular, Lodge and 
Gill (2011) note that these strategies blend the previous principles of neo-
Weberian and NPM features which aimed to overcome the perceived NPM-
generated weaknesses produced by specialisation, fragmentation, and 
marketisation.  Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) label these strategies as the 
New Public Service (NPS), while Goldfinch and Wallis (2010), term them in a 
number of different ways: the ‘third way’, ‘new governance’, ‘public 
governance, ‘new public governance’, ‘public value creation’ and ‘post-NPM’.   
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NPS is rooted in three main theories, including the theory of democratic 
citizenship, models of community and civil society, and organisational 
humanism and discourse theory (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000). Halligan 
(2007b) states that NPS is driven by two main objectives: renewing the 
public sector to improve capacity; and, refocusing the core public services to 
increase performance.  Interestingly, governments retain their roles as policy 
players, but they are no longer in charge of policy delivery.  The 
responsibility for delivering public services is assumed by centralised 
collaboration and a network which consists of diverse actors, including the 
private sector (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000). Digital technologies have been 
used as mechanisms to facilitate the reintegration and coordination of 
service delivery (Christensen & Laegreid, 2011b) 
 
The collaboration between governments and their networks demonstrates 
that NPS has moved away from market values towards democratic values. 
The role of the State under NPS is more about serving than steering the 
citizens. Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) propose that “the primary role of the 
public servant is to help citizens articulate and meet their shared interests 
rather than attempt to control or steer society” (p.549).  Following this 
argument, Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) claim that public servants are no 
longer responsive to constituents and clients (under the bureaucratic model) 
nor to customers (as under NPM) but to citizens. 
 
The changes from the bureaucratic model to NPM, and more recently to NPS, 
have required developments in public sector management.  The functions of 
the public sector have not changed, but, according to Broadbent and Guthrie 
(2008), the assumption that the public sector organisations involved in 
providing services to the public are publicly funded, owned and operated is 
no longer relevant.  They further argue that the ‘public sector’ is best 
renamed as ‘public services’.  Public services no longer require direct 
government ownership, although they often continue to receive some 
government funding.  With regard to this development, public services 
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become a more complex service-providing and policy-developing institution 
(Gill, Pride, Gilbert, Norman, & Mladenovic, 2011; Raadschelders, 2011).  
 
Both NPM and NPS models have generated significant effects on the 
governance and structures of the public sector. Although these models are 
rooted in neoliberal principles, they are driven by different names and 
strategies. The following section describes the implementation of neoliberal 
reforms in the context of public sector accountability.   
 
2.3.3 The effects of NPM on accountability  
 
Accountability is a core value of public governance and management (Cendon, 
2000; Day & Klein, 1987). It has long been seen as an essential key 
component for the proper functioning of a democratic political system (Glynn 
& Murphy, 1996) but one which is highly subject to political persuasion 
(Parker & Gould, 1999).  The concept of accountability has a direct 
relationship with the framework of service delivery and the model of the 
State (Cendon, 2000). In the context of public sector or service delivery, the 
concept of accountability was characterised by matters of responsibility 
(Olson et al., 2001). Thus, as the structure of the public sector responsibility 
was enhanced, notions of accountability were altered.  Before the discussion 
of the effects of NPM on accountability is presented, it is worth reviewing the 
notions of accountability from the former bureaucratic perspective, so that 
the changes in the accountability concept in the age of neoliberal reform can 
be better understood.      
 
According to Day and Klein (1987), the notion of accountability under the 
bureaucratic model is simple as it refers to the expectation that those in 
government should be held responsible for carrying out tasks on behalf of 
their fellow citizens. Theoretically, traditional accountability involves a linear 
relationship between two parties: “who can call for an account, and who 
owes a duty of explanation” (Day & Klein, 1987, p. 5).  The relationship 
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between these two parties is formal, where the accountor has the authority 
to assign or negotiate with the accountee regarding the expectations of 
responsibility and the standard of performance (Mulgan, 2000).   
 
The accountor reserves the right to call for account, including demanding 
answers and imposing sanctions. Hence, in the case of fraud, corruption or 
policy failure, for instance, one person is held accountable and has to face the 
consequences of his or her action (Brandsma, 2007; Haque, 2007).  According 
to Bovens (2007), the consequences can be highly formalised, such as fines, 
disciplinary actions and penal sanctions, or can also operate on unwritten 
rules, such as calling for the minister’s or senior executive officers’ 
resignation.  The form of relationship indicates that traditional accountability 
was built on a hierarchical structure involving answerability and 
enforceability (Samaratunge, Alam, & Teicher, 2008).   
 
The operation of the traditional public sector was designed along 
bureaucratic principles which ensured accountability but required excessive 
rules and precontrol (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000).  Consequently, the 
framework of public sector accountability was characterised by hierarchical 
relationship in which the measurement of accountability was based on a set 
of rules and regulations flowing from public law and the system of control 
was considered rational and legal (Pfiffner, 2004).  Under the bureaucratic 
model, financial accountability became a measurement criterion for judging 
or justifying actions or decisions taken by the politicians or government 
servants responsible.  However, Day and Klein (1987) stress that financial 
accountability is regarded as an independent form of accountability because 
it is only part of administrative law, regulation or agreement, and is highly 
concerned with the financial control. Due to its independency, financial 
accountability was institutionalised as an audit, using neutral expertise, 
which plays important roles in controlling the process of political 
accountability (Day & Klein, 1987).  
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However, hierarchical accountability is seen as too rigid when it comes to 
practice (De Vries, 2007).  The problems of rigidity arise from the 
weaknesses of the principal-agent relationship which allows domination of 
power by the principal over the agent. Therefore, the rights to call for 
account, demand answers and impose sanctions are seen as a “product of 
authoritarian [ism]” (Parker & Gould, 1999, p. 116) that generates fear and 
destroys trust among individuals in organisations (Harber & Ball, 2003).   
Behn (2000) has equated this form of accountability with punishment.  
According to Behn (2000), “when people seek to hold someone accountable, 
they are usually planning some kind of punishment” (p.4). 
 
However, with the adoption of NPM, the traditional concept of accountability 
was expanded and went beyond rendering an account of the resources used 
(Glynn & Murphy, 1996). Accounting has become a key element in this new 
conception of accountability (Hood, 1995). In particular, the adoption of 
accounting logic is expected to enhance the transparency of public 
organisations as it has the power to shift patterns of organisational visibility 
(Broadbent & Laughlin, 2005). For instance, budgeting and costing systems 
have created a form of visibility and transparency at the organisational level.  
With the enhancement in transparency, the new system of accountability is 
believed to increase public trust in governments (Jacobs, 2000). To match 
with managerial principles, market mechanisms, and the new system of 
accountability, NPM focuses primarily on “managerial and downward 
accountability and less on traditional political and upward accountability” 
(Opedal & Rommetvedt, 2010, p. 194).   
 
Overall, the system of accountability has shifted from process accountability 
(based on input control responsibility, bureaucratic procedure, rules and 
standards) to accountability for results (with an emphasis on quantitative 
measures that can assess the efficiency and effectiveness of policy 
implementations) (Cendon, 2000; Mulgan, 2000). As the role of 
accountability in the context of NPM is to ensure the efficient use of resources 
and the effectiveness of policy decisions,  the control system of accountability 
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has come to focus more on quality assurance and overall performance 
management rather than on the scrutinisation of individual actions (Kluvers, 
2003).   
 
In relation to the above changes, Mulgan (2000) concludes that the core of 
accountability, or the process of giving account, is contestable on the ground, 
and has increasingly been extended beyond the notion of “giving an account”.  
Simultaneously, NPM has led to the rise of horizontal accountability in the 
public sector. Horizontal accountability is a condition where agencies report 
to others who are not their principals, such as peers, clients and other 
stakeholders (Schillemans, 2010; Willems & Van Dooren, 2012).  This type of 
accountability emerged because the framework of service delivery under 
NPM invited professionals and organisations outside the government to 
deliver public services. According to Schillemans (2008), horizontal 
accountability is not a replacement for hierarchical accountability but is 
rather an essential extension to hierarchical accountability. This structure 
allowed accountability to be demanded by a range of stakeholders from 
inside and outside the public sector, including politicians, public officials, 
citizens, and private partners.  
 
In further arguments, Mulgan (2000) states that the traditional 
accountability feature “leads to questions about different channels of 
accountability and their relative merits, about the balance between 
accountability and efficiency, and about distinctions between political and 
managerial accountability” (p. 556).  Previously, Sinclair (1995) too had 
already noted similar limitations in treating accountability as a fixed and 
objective feature of structures and positions.  Hence, the core accountability 
features in the form of the principal-agent relationship are seen to be no 
longer relevant in the context of their practices (Dubnick, 2005; Dubnick & 
Frederickson, 2009; Mulgan, 2000; Sinclair, 1995).  These scenarios indicated 
that changes in organisational structure and governance have significant 
effects on accountability.    
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2.3.4 The effects of NPS on accountability  
 
The emergence of NPS in the early 2000s bore witness to the changing values 
in the public services.  As noted earlier, the market values of NPM resulted in 
specialisation and fragmentation in the public service. NPS attempts to 
correct such problems by promoting democratic values through networking 
and cooperation between political and managerial structures (Bourgon, 2008; 
Durose & Rummerry, 2006).  Networks are complex links between 
individuals and organisations, driven by the interests of parties and their 
recognition of the value of working together (Southon, Perkins, & Galler, 
2005).   
 
Under NPS, the government becomes a part of a network which is 
conceptualised as mutually dependent on other actors, although the 
government may have superior access to resources and other participants 
(Gill et al., 2011; Rhodes, 1994).  The primary role of the government is to 
help citizens articulate and achieve their shared interests rather than attempt 
to control or steer society (Maesschalck, 2004).  While entrepreneurialism 
and authority are the mechanisms applicable to NPM and traditional public 
administration, trust appears as the equivalent control mechanism for the 
network (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000).   
 
Collaboration and networking strategies have a major impact on 
accountability. New systems of accountability have been institutionalised 
through the use of performance indicators and performance management 
(Broadbent & Guthrie, 2008).  Thereby, managers have a role in enhancing 
the legitimacy of the organisation and its outputs. Accountability is delivered 
managerially through performance and setting financial management 
objective targets through formal conventions of parliamentary accountability 
via ministerial responsibility (Gains & Stoker, 2009).    
 
Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) claim that accountability under the NPS 
strategy is more complex than it was in the NPM era.  Indeed, accountability 
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under NPS has been described as multifaceted.  As NPS is built on democratic 
values, public services are not only accountable to the government and its 
private partners (the businesses and voluntary organisations) but also to 
statutory and constitutional law, community values, political norms, 
professional standards and citizens’ interests (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000). 
The accountability of politicians may become unclear and ambiguous in some 
senses (with the exception of their personal behaviour), and other forms of 
accountability relationships (i.e., those that are ministerial, parliamentary, 
managers/professional, financial, legal) are also ambiguous.  For these 
reasons, “the lines of accountability remain blurred and now perhaps more 
uncertain and confusing to citizens than in the past”(Gains & Stoker, 2009, p. 
446).  
 
The above discussions highlight how changes in the framework of reform 
have led to a shift in the notion of public service delivery and the 
accountability approach.  The summary of the relationship between these 
changes is reflected in Table 2.3 
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Table 2:3 The frameworks of reform and the forms of accountability 
The 
framework of 
reform 
The framework of service delivery 
Accountability 
approach Responsive 
to 
Underpinning 
values 
Actor(s) 
Bureaucratic Clients and 
constituents 
Controlling the 
use of resources 
Government 
and public 
sector 
Hierarchical, highly 
focused on the 
principal-agent 
relationship 
NPM Customers Entrepreneurial; 
market; price 
Government 
and public 
sector, private 
sector, 
voluntary 
organisations 
Mixture of 
hierarchical and 
horizontal 
accountability 
relationships; highly 
focused on legal and 
contractual 
relationships 
NPS Citizen Social; 
democracy 
Government 
and public 
sector, private 
sector, 
voluntary 
organisations 
Mixture of 
hierarchical and 
horizontal 
accountability 
relationship; high 
emphasis on 
collaboration and 
trust 
 
2.4 Accountability and reform: The knowledge gap 
 
This research was prompted by a desire to investigate accountability in the 
context of public sector reform. The adoption of NPM and NPS models of 
reform brought a new dimension to the role of the State and the framework 
of public service delivery.  With the objective of improving efficiency in terms 
of cost and quality of public service delivery, private sector, and 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) have been invited to be the public 
partners in providing public goods and services. Following these changes, 
service delivery has evolved from a political activity to a technical issue, with 
greater emphasis placed on technical information such as accounting, 
budgeting, and performance measurement (Kluvers & Tippett, 2012).  In 
relation to this development, the use of private institutions and management 
techniques was strongly promoted in the public sector.  
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Although these techniques have improved certain levels of efficiency, there 
are risks associated with these approaches, especially in relation to 
accountability (Aucoin, 1990; Barberis, 1998; Blanchard et al., 1998; 
Christensen & Laegreid, 2011a; Goldfinch & Wallis, 2010; Mongkol, 2011; 
Peters & Pierre, 1998; Rhodes, 1994).  The existing research concludes that 
reforms appear to have only a limited ability to improve accountability 
(Dubnick, 2011) Indeed, in many instances, reforms have often been 
accompanied by declines in accountability (Jones & Kettl, 2003; Lodge & Gill, 
2011; Peters & Pierre, 1998).  Greitens (2012) associates limitations in 
improving accountability with the failure of policy actors to understand two 
important issues: first, the notions of accountability in terms of the context in 
which it has been practiced and; second the challenges of dealing with the 
complexity of multiple accountabilities in public organisations. Greitens 
(2012) concludes that accountability is strongly emphasised but rarely 
understood. Therefore, Greitens (2012) urges researchers in the area of 
accountability to question the meaning, purpose and value of accountability 
in the public sector because such questions are desperately needed to enable 
understanding of the failure of accountability.  
 
Digging deeper into the existing literature related to public sector reform, 
accountability and the New Zealand public health system has led to a number 
of conclusions.  The literature on accountability and reform has developed 
over many years through the work of scholars from various disciplines such 
as political science, public administration, management and accounting.  This 
body of research seems to reflect the growing importance of the issues of 
accountability and reform in public sector. In this study, most of the 
literature stems from public administration, and accounting disciplines. 
However, those literatures are quite separate because the disciplines have 
concentrated on different research interests and have different focuses. From 
the public administration perspective, the existing studies have focused on 
the effects of reforms on mechanism accountability (see Lupson, 2007; 
Newman, 2004; Schillemans, 2010; Sinclair, 1995) and normative 
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accountability (see Considine, 2002; Dubnick, 2005; Dubnick & Frederickson, 
2009; Koppell, 2005). 
  
The extant research (as mentioned above) has explored accountability 
understanding among public managers and interviewed heads of public 
sector agencies which are responsible for varied functions and scope of 
services and examined the notion of accountability from a large public sector 
perspective. However, rather than concentrating on one specific State sector, 
the studies on mechanism accountability focused on various State sectors 
and regarded them as one large sector. Table 2.4 shows the summary of 
empirical research on accountability in the public sector. It also shows that 
the various public agencies from which the participants in the studies were 
recruited.  
 
Previous research (as indicated in Table 2.4) has recognised the emergence 
of various accountability relationships in public organisations and the 
conflicts between them.  In my opinion, the existing studies, however, have 
not offered much insight into how policy actors from a specific public sector 
understand accountability and how the level of understanding affects the 
accountability practices.  As noted in Chapter One, public sector is not 
uniform in nature and each sector appears to adopt different reform 
strategies. Indeed, the existing literature has confirmed that accountability is 
a fluid concept as the meaning of accountability changes in line with changes 
in its environment, including types of organisation (Greitens, 2012; Newman, 
2004; Sinclair, 1995). Therefore, I argue that the existing findings may be 
insufficient to explain the meaning of accountability for a specific public 
sector, for example, the public health service, education, or public utilities. 
For these reasons, this study suggests that there is a need to clarify the 
meaning of accountability in an explicit State sector.   
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Table 2:4 The summary of accountability research in public sector 
Author(s) (year)/Title Research Question(s)/Research Objective(s)/Participant(s) 
Sinclair, A. (1995) 
The chameleon of 
accountability: forms and 
discourses 
 
 
Research Objective 
1. To investigate how CEOs establish their accountability 
to themselves and to others. 
Participants 
15 Chief of Executives of Australia public sector 
organisations. 
Newman, J. (2004) 
Constructing accountability: 
network governance and 
managerial agencies 
 
 
 
 
Research Objective 
1. To examine the implications of the New Public 
Management (NPM – the shift from bureaucratic ethos 
to managerial regime) for the concept of 
accountability.  
Participants 
35 senior staff from government office (various sector) 
who closely involved in implementing modernising 
reform. 
Lupson, J. (2007) 
A phenomenographic study 
of British Civil Servants’ 
conception of accountability 
 
 
Research Question 
1. What are individual Senior Responsible Owners’ 
(SROs) subjective understandings of their 
accountabilities? 
Participants 
38 British civil servants.  
Schillemans, T. (2008) 
Accountability in the 
shadow of hierarchy: The 
horizontal of accountability 
agencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Questions  
1. What forms of horizontal accountability are on rise? 
2. What are they actually contributed to the 
accountability of agencies? 
3. How are we to understand the role of new 
arrangement in the accountability regime of agencies? 
Participants 
70 respondents from 13 large Dutch agencies: 
1. Agencies manager and senior official, 
2. Members of Executive Boards, 
3. Clients, 
4. Other stakeholders, and 
5. Senior official from parents departments. 
Schillemans, T. (2010) 
Redundancy accountability: 
The impact of horizontal 
and vertical accountability 
on autonomous agencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Questions 
1. Is accountability regime in practice redundant in the 
sense that agencies have to account for the same 
aspects of their behaviour towards vertical and 
horizontal accountability forum? 
2. If found to be the case, does redundant accountability 
then have advantages identified in the redundancy 
literature? 
Participants 
1. Executives and central staff, 
2. Members of boards, commissioners, and supportive 
staff, 
3. Members of evaluation committee and supportive staff, 
and 
4. Senior civil staff from parent department. 
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In contrast to the public administration perspective, the accounting discipline 
literature on public sector reform and accountability from has placed a 
greater focus on managerial or management accounting issues (see 
Broadbent et al., 1996; Broadbent & Guthrie, 2008; Broadbent & Laughlin, 
2005; Hodges, 2012; Kelly, Doyle, & O'Donohoe, 2015; Olson et al., 2001; 
Roberts, 2010; Roberts & Scapens, 1985).  Therefore, rather than examining 
the notion of accountability, accounting researchers tended to analyse how 
the accounting logic influences the level of public sector efficiency. This 
tendency arose because neoliberal reform is designed on the basis of 
accounting logic, and therefore, the notion of accountability is understood 
from an efficiency perspective. A similar pattern of emphasis can be 
identified in the context of the New Zealand public health system (see 
Cordery, 2008; Cordery, Baskerville, & Porter, 2010; France, 2001; Jacobs, 
1997; Lawrence, 1999, 2005; Lawrence, Alam, Northcott, et al., 1994).  The 
researchers in this area acknowledged the rise of accountability issues 
resulting from reforms but gave insufficient attention to the meaning of 
accountability in the context of reform.  
 
There are strong disagreements from public administrative scholars 
concerning whether accountability is about efficiency. For instance, 
Christensen and Laegreid (2011a) argue that improved accountability and 
improved performance are two different things and do not necessarily pull in 
the same direction.  Meanwhile, Jones and Kettl (2003) contend that reform 
per se is insufficient to ensure accountability, as reform is needed only to 
strengthen the governments’ institutions and management.  Consequently, 
the adoption of a new policy strategy with the objective of improving 
efficiency and accountability may not be achieved, as claimed by 
governments, because these two objectives are different.  
 
At the same time, there is limited understanding of the challenges in 
practising postreform accountability. It has, however, been understood that 
the adoption of neoliberal reform has led to the formation of new forms of 
institutional arrangements for the public health system such as contracting-
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out, joint commissioning, and centralised performance measurement. 
According to Hodges (2012) these new organisational arrangements require 
new interpretations for accountability because the traditional forms of health 
delivery and accountability have changed significantly.  
 
Moreover, the existing research related to accountability generally, and in the 
context of New Zealand public health reform specifically, has focused on a 
specific stage of reform.  For instance, Lawrence (1999, 2005) and France 
(2001) analysed the implementation of radical market-based reform 
between 1993 and 1999, whilst Cordery (2008) examined accountability 
relationships during the DHBs and PHOs system between 2000 and 2008.  
Although Gauld (2012) and Cumming (2011) studied post-2008 reform, their 
research did not include discussions of accountability. The research related 
to reform and accountability in the New Zealand public health system seems 
limited, and the question of how accountability is understood and practised 
within a health care system experiencing continuous reform, therefore, 
remains unanswered.  Although Bovens (2010) suggests accountability 
should be defined from its normative and mechanistic concepts, the effects of 
reform on accountability meaning and practices in the context of reform 
remains unclear.  
 
According to Du Gay (2000), understanding basic administrative concepts 
such as accountability is important for policy actors because that 
understanding will influence the actions of policy actors in organisations.  
Newman (2004) also suggests that the ability of policy actors to interpret and 
construct concepts of accountability will support achieving policy results.  In 
relation to the gaps in our understanding of accountability, this study 
proposes to identify how accountability is understood and practised in the 
context of continual public health reforms.  To address the knowledge gap, 
this study asks the following research question: 
What does “accountability” mean in the ever-changing New 
Zealand health system?   
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2.5 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter discussed how the idea of this research were generated and 
developed.  The chapter began with a review of current understandings of 
accountability concepts and its practices.  The meaning of accountability is 
underpinned by two basic concepts known as normative accountability and 
mechanism accountability. These concepts define accountability from 
different perspectives but they are complementary in practice.   The problem 
of accountability is embedded in its underpinning concepts. For this reason, 
the notion of accountability is ideal in concept but complex in practice. The 
chapter then moved further to a discussion of the underpinning models of 
reform i.e., NPM and NPS. These models are rooted in the concept of 
neoliberal reforms, but are each driven by different strategies. The shift from 
NPM to NPS resulted in constant changes in the public sector and 
accountability. Studies related to accountability and public sector reform 
were discussed in terms of research interests and focus. Although Bovens 
(2010) defined accountability from normative and mechanistic perspectives, 
the existing studies are inadequate in explaining the notion of accountability 
in the context of public health reform.  
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3 CHAPTER THREE 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the research concepts that underpin 
the method employed in this study. In order to develop phenomenological 
insights about the meaning of accountability in the context of policy reform, 
this study adopts a qualitative methodology as the research design, and a 
critical hermeneutics approach as a strategy of inquiry. The discussion begins 
with a review of what we already appear to know about the accountability 
concept, and justifications for employing a qualitative methodology as the 
philosophical orientation for this study. The next section describes the 
rationales for adopting interpretive enquiry and a hermeneutic approach as a 
basis of research inquiry. I then provide some explanation of the 
hermeneutics approach, its concepts, and its application in this study before 
concluding the chapter with a brief summary.   
 
3.2 Knowledge claim 
 
Although there has been considerable research in the area of accountability, 
the meaning of accountability remains difficult to define. Chapter Two 
revealed that the implementation of active and diverse reform approaches 
has increased the degree of accountability complexity which, as a 
consequence, reduces the original functions and roles of accountability in 
organisations.  However, the extent to which accountability is experienced, 
especially in any given State sector, seems difficult to explain. I argued, 
therefore, that the meaning of accountability in a particular State sector 
needs clarification because each sector has adopted different types of reform. 
Therefore, the meaning of accountability across State sectors may be 
different because as Sinclair (1995) claims the meaning of accountability will 
change according to “ideologies, motifs and language of our times” (p. 221).  
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Furthermore, there is a call to investigate accountability in the context of the 
New Zealand public health system further because the existing research has 
focused on a managerial accountability perspective rather than on how 
accountability is understood in the context of reforms (see Boston & Gill, 
2011; Brandsma, 2007; Broadbent & Guthrie, 2008; Christensen & Laegreid, 
2011a; Haque, 2000, 2007; Mulgan, 2000). The New Zealand public health 
system has experienced an ongoing series of policy changes since 1984, and 
these changes have had significant effects on accountability conceptions and 
practices (see Cordery, 2008; Cordery et al., 2010; France, 2001; Jacobs, 1997; 
Lawrence, 1999, 2005; Lawrence, Alam, Northcott, et al., 1994). This study 
aims to provide some understanding of how accountability is understood and 
practised in the context of the New Zealand public health reforms.  As such, 
the central research question is: what does accountability mean in an ever-
changing New Zealand health system. 
 
According to Dew (2007), the research aims will determine the 
methodological approach to be taken and the forms of data collection and 
analysis to be deployed because research aims are influenced by particular 
ontologies and epistemologies. Ontology is a set of assumptions or beliefs 
about the existence of different worldviews regarding the phenomena under 
study (Chua, 1986; Morgan & Smircich, 1980). Cresswell (2003) describes 
epistemology as theory or knowledge embedded in the theoretical 
perspective that informs a researcher on ways of obtaining knowledge. To 
identify an appropriate methodological approach, I conducted an extensive 
literature review to understand the worldview and knowledge claim of 
accountability.   
 
Much of the existing research reported that accountability is embedded in the 
area of subjective reality (Cordery, 2008; Messner, 2009; Mordaunt, 2006; 
Mulgan, 2000; Newman, 2004; Sinclair, 1995); that accountability is 
intangible, and its conception is continually constructed and is based on 
individual’s subjective meanings of their own personal experiences (Cordery, 
2008; Newman, 2004);  and, that accountability evolves as an organisation or 
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a country moves forward (Kim, 2009; Sinclair, 1995).  The ontological views 
on accountability indicate that the reality of accountability is subjective in 
nature because it can be viewed differently by different people and from 
different situational context. The subjective reality of accountability indicates 
that the epistemology of accountability is acquired and analysed through, for 
example, the experience of public health managers who are involved in 
dealing with reforms and policy changes. Therefore, based on these positions, 
a qualitative methodology was considered the most appropriate research 
design for this study.   
 
A qualitative methodology was chosen because this methodology emphasises 
the collection of first-hand materials in a natural setting (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2013; Llewellyn, 1993; Malterut, 2001; Silverman, 2005).  It was seen as the 
most accessible mode of entry for a study searching for a holistic, rich, and 
contextualised understanding and critique of lived experiences, social 
settings, and behaviours from a “micro perspective” (Parker, 2012, p. 55).  
Furthermore, this methodology is characterised by its aims, which relate to 
understanding some aspect of social phenomena which can be expressed 
through a number of media such as conversations, and written texts; and in 
visual forms including images, videos, and music (Grossoehme, 2014; Patton 
& Cochran, 2002).  Dobuzinskis (1997) claims that these advantages make a 
qualitative methodology one of the best ways to understand how individuals 
create meanings through their experiences. 
 
However, qualitative-based research consists of a set of complex interpretive 
practices because it has no theory or paradigm that is distinctly its own 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2013).  According to Denzin and Lincoln (2013) the choice 
of research strategy and method “depends upon the questions that are asked, 
and questions depend on their contexts, what is available in the contexts and 
what the researcher can do in that setting” (p. 8).  Based on the research gaps 
identified in Chapter Two, the main research question set for this study was: 
what does “accountability” mean in the ever-changing New Zealand health 
system? In particular, this study was interested to understand: first, how 
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reforms shaped the meaning of accountability and its practices in the 
contexts of reforms; and secondly, how the experience of dealing with 
reforms, policy changes, and accountability was understood by policy actors.  
In order to understand the experience of policy actors, a hermeneutics 
approach was adopted as the research inquiry strategy. Hermeneutics is 
designed for researchers who are interested in studying what an experience 
means to a particular group (Byrne, 2001; Rinnie, 2012).  The following 
section discusses further the hermeneutics approach as the strategy of 
inquiry for this research.  
 
3.3 Hermeneutics as the strategy of inquiry 
 
According to Denzin and Lincoln (2013), “all research is interpretive, guided 
by a set of beliefs and feelings about the world and how it should be 
understood and studied” (p. 29). Interpretative inquiry offers a major 
advantage when studying a complex phenomenon because it not only has the 
capacity to describe events but can also help the researcher to understand 
how and why the same events are interpreted differently by different 
stakeholders (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Sofaer, 1999).  
 
Interpretive inquiry differs from positivism which sees the researcher and 
research as an independent subject and object. Interpretive inquiry, by 
contrast, believes in a close relationship between researchers and their 
research. Closeness in the relationship between the researcher and 
researched is important because it contributes to intrinsically meaningful 
research (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Indeed, having this type of relationship is 
an advantage as researchers will often attempt to address the connection 
between themselves and their research objects, and between meanings and 
practices (Llewellyn, 1993). 
 
Interpretive inquiry allows researchers to learn about the reality of 
accountability from the experience of social actors who engage in a specific 
social context (Blaikie, 2007; Crotty, 1998). According to Blaikie (2007), this 
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strategy allows social reality to be discovered from the ‘inside’ rather than 
‘outside’ as the meaning or the truth of social reality is developed and 
transmitted within an essentially social context.  The challenge for 
interpretive researchers is to understand the meaning of texts rather than to 
measure, generalise and predict outcomes from the data (Walker, 1996). 
 
Hermeneutics is one of the available strategies of inquiry for interpretive 
research. The history of hermeneutics began in Germany in the 17th century 
around the time of the Protestant Reformation in Europe (Prasad, 2002). 
Protestant scholars tried to identify the literal meanings of the Torah and so 
engaged in biblical exegesis in order to provide explanations that could 
address the theological controversies that were emerging at that time 
(Blaikie, 2007; Byrne, 2001).  This approach came to be recognised as a 
method of [biblical] interpretation because it provides new information that 
‘enlightens’ a person's rationality in a specific situation.  According to Blaikie 
(2007), in its early development, hermeneutics aimed “to understand texts 
written in radically different times and situations” (p.117).    
 
The tradition of hermeneutics is located under the overarching interpretative 
paradigm and is closely related to the qualitative methodology (Arunachalam, 
2010; Gummesson, 2003; Laverty, 2003; Llewellyn, 1993; Patterson & 
Williams, 2002). The goal of hermeneutics is human understanding: i.e., 
understanding what people say and do, and why (Myers, 2013, p. 182). 
Hermeneutics is also seen as an attempt to discover meanings and to achieve 
understandings of a particular context, along with ways of being and  practice 
in lived experience (Blaikie, 2007; Wilson & Hutchinson, 1991). As a theory of 
interpretation (Gummesson, 2003; Phillips & Brown, 1993), hermeneutics 
concentrates on the historical meanings and development of people’s 
experience and texts, in addition to considering their effects on individuals in 
a specific social context  (Laverty, 2003; Myers, 1994; Prasad, 2002).   
 
In practice, hermeneutics provides systematic approaches which enable the 
researcher to investigate the multiple and complex meanings of texts by 
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extending the meaning of any human action, product of expression, or 
institution that can be treated as text (Balfour & Mesaros, 1994; Lejano & 
Leong, 2012). By analysing textual evidence such as policy documents, 
interview transcripts, and archival information, researchers are able to 
derive narrative interpretations and illuminate issues that better reflect 
“situated agencies” (Hay, 2011, p. 175).  The process of analysing focuses on 
the author’s point of view regarding the texts and the context in which the 
texts were produced. Hermeneutic interpreters are guided by a dialectic 
process, called the hermeneutic circle which requires a constant dialectic 
between the understanding of the text as a whole and the interpretation of its 
parts. The aim of dialectic process is to make the studied object clearer and 
sensible (Myers, 2013), and the study is presented as “people’s detailed 
stories” (Wilson & Hutchinson, 1991, p. 25).  
 
Hermeneutics has developed over time and changed from “recovery of 
meaning” to “interpretation of meaning” (Llewellyn, 1993, p. 235).  These 
distinctions can be traced through the three-fold classification of 
hermeneutics, namely, classical hermeneutics, philosophical hermeneutics, 
and critical hermeneutics (Prasad, 2000).  In the following subsections the 
three categories of hermeneutics methodology are discussed.  
 
3.3.1 Classical hermeneutics 
 
The history of classical hermeneutics was influenced by the work of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (1768-1834), the father of modern hermeneutics, who 
introduced hermeneutics as a general theory of interpretation (Prasad, 2002).   
According to Schleiermacher, “hermeneutics is a part of the art of thinking, 
and is therefore philosophical” (Osborne, 2011, p. 70). However,  
Schleiermacher’s theory of interpretation provided a set of tools and 
techniques for understanding parts or passages of a text that may be difficult 
to understand (Prasad, 2002).    
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For Schleiermacher, a text has fixed meanings, and, therefore the goal of 
classical hermeneutics is to recover the authors’ original intended meaning 
by re-experiencing the author’s original intention (Chenari, 2009; Prasad, 
2002).  In order to achieve that goal, the interpreter has to enter the world of 
the author (Osborne, 2011). In this sense, interpreters must put themselves 
both objectively and subjectively in the position of the author and 
reconstruct every part of the expression in a way that captures the author’s 
perspective (Chenari, 2009).  Sitting in the author’s position allows the 
interpreter to understand the original meaning of the text and helps the 
interpreter to produce a better understanding of the original author 
(Osborne, 2011). 
 
The process of interpretation involves two strategies which Schleiermacher 
called ‘grammatical interpretation’ and ‘psychological interpretation’.  The 
grammatical interpretation strategy draws upon the lexicon of the language, 
and seeks to root the text in a particular historical and cultural context 
(Mallery, Hurwitz, & Duffy, 1987). Specifically, Osborne (2011) explains  this 
strategy as follows: “ It gives primacy to the language of the original author 
and original audience . . . and, every word in a given location must be 
determined according to it being-together with those surrounding it” (p. 70).  
Schleiermacher believed that the interpretation using a language mechanism 
develops a rich understanding of a social phenomenon because the 
grammatical interpretation corresponds to the linguistic aspect of 
understanding (Thompson, 1981).   
 
However, using the grammatical interpretation alone will lead to 
‘quantitative misunderstanding’ especially when interpreters deal with 
poetry or allegory (Osborne, 2011). Therefore, Schleiermacher suggests the 
use of the psychological or technical interpretation strategy to support a 
grammatical interpretation technique. According to Schleiermacher, the 
personality behind the text or the style of the author is important in the 
process of interpreting because it helps the interpreters to understand the 
discourse according to the author’s presentation of thoughts (Osborne, 2011; 
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Rinnie, 2012).  In other words, this strategy requires the interpreter to seek 
out the personality of the author so as to enable the interpreter’s better 
understanding of the text.  
 
Schleiermacher stressed that the interpreter can never attained complete 
knowledge using either the grammatical or the psychological strategy alone 
as no rules specify how to do so. These two strategies must be employed 
together as they complement each other.  Interpreters are advised to 
repeatedly consider and reconsider the relationship between the whole and 
its parts.  This process is called the ‘Schleiermacher circle’ (Osborne, 2011).   
Schleiermacher stressed that in working through this circle, interpreters 
must employ ‘divinatory knowledge’ and ‘comparative knowledge’. On the 
one hand, Schleiermacher regarded divinatory knowledge as ‘feminine 
principles’ since the process of understanding includes empathy (projective 
introspection) and intuitive linguistic analysis (Mallery et al., 1987). The 
practice of divinatory knowledge enables the interpreter to assimilate the 
mental universe of another person (the author) (Arunachalam, 2010; 
Osborne, 2011). On the other hand, comparative knowledge was known as 
‘masculine principles’ because the process of understanding involves 
analysing and comparing the knowledge.  According to Gadamer (2006), 
Schleiermacher’s conception of hermeneutics establishes a foundation of 
hermeneutics at a deeper level than existed before. Schleiermacher 
transformed hermeneutics from a technique to a general theory for 
regulating the process of understanding and interpreting texts (Prasad, 
2002).  
 
The legacy of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics was then continued by Wilhelm 
Dilthey (1833-1911). Dilthey enhanced Schleiermacher’s psychological 
strategy by introducing the concepts of ‘human individual’ and ‘lived 
experience’ (Osborne, 2011). Consequently, the concepts of human individual 
and lived experience became new grounds for a psychological strategy as 
they led to the distinction between expression and meaning. According to 
Dilthey, while natural science aims at explanation, human and social sciences 
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focus on understanding as all social phenomena arise from human 
externalisation or objectification of individuals’ feelings and experiences 
(Prasad, 2002). Since experience can be seen in the historical context, Dilthey 
stressed that interpretation of historical documents needs to be done in the 
context of history (Tan, Wilson, & Olver, 2009). 
 
Hence, in Dilthey’s view, the task of interpretation was depicted as “an 
emphatic grasping, reconstructing, and re-experiencing by one human mind 
(namely, the interpreter’s) of the mental objectifications (e.g., texts, legal 
structures, historical processes, etc.) produced by other human minds” 
(Prasad, 2002, p. 15). In his later work, Dilthey recognised five sources of 
understanding which are derived from the historical and social context of the 
authors, namely, language, literature, behavioural norms, art, and religion 
(Tan et al., 2009). With this recognition, Dilthey expanded the concept of 
hermeneutical interpretation for understanding ancient and biblical texts to 
encompass human’s experiences and actions. However, he retained the 
objectivist approach in the process of understanding. Dilthey also extended 
the application of Schleiermacher’s general theory of interpretation to other 
social studies, such as legal or economic systems and the like (Prasad, 2002).  
In relation to this development, hermeneutics was recognised as an 
interpretive art in the human sciences. 
 
3.3.2 Philosophical Hermeneutics 
 
Philosophical hermeneutics is related to the work of Martin Heidegger 
(1889-1976) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002).  This hermeneutics 
category is not a continuity of classical hermeneutics, but rather a contrast as 
it emphasised a different concept and strategy (Mallery et al., 1987; Prasad, 
2002). For instance, classical hermeneutics is concerned with creating 
perspective theories for regulating interpretive practice, whilst with 
philosophical hermeneutics the emphasis is more on the philosophical issues 
surrounding the interpretation (Prasad, 2002).   
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The history of philosophical hermeneutics started with Heidegger’s definition 
of the concept of understanding. Heidegger was trained by Edmund Husserl 
(1859-1938), a philosopher, mathematician and founder of phenomenology 
in the area of phenomenological intentionality and reduction. Heidegger, 
however, disagreed with Husserl regarding the issue of exploring lived 
experiences. Consequently, Heidegger dissociated himself from Husserl’s 
work and developed his own concept of understanding based on the 
interpretation of human lived experience (Gadamer, 2006; Laverty, 2003). In 
his work, Heidegger was more interested to identify “what kind of being is it  
whose being consists of understanding?” (Geanellos, 2000, p. 113) 
 
Heidegger introduced the concept of ‘dasein’ which literally means ‘being-in-
the-world’ (Mallery et al., 1987). Dasein is an ontological concept of 
hermeneutics which developed from the nature of human existence called 
‘the mode of being human’ or ‘the situated meaning of a human in the world’ 
(Laverty, 2003; Prasad, 2002). For Heidegger, understanding is a basic form 
of human existence, and interpretation is significant to the process of 
understanding (Jahnke, 2012; Laverty, 2003). Heidegger argued that dasein 
consists of both historical and finite criteria because in one’s real life, things 
are perceived according to individuals’ experiences (Mallery et al., 1987; 
Thompson, 1981).   
 
In explaining the ontology of dasein, Heidegger introduced the concept of 
‘understanding’ (Prasad, 2002).  For Heidegger, understanding is about “the 
way we are” and not about “the way we know the world” (Laverty, 2003, p. 
24).  Thereby, understanding can be reached through a repetitive 
interpretation process called the ‘hermeneutics circle’, (Koch, 1996). 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle involves two main stages, namely 
preunderstanding and understanding (Dobrosavljev, 2002; Koch, 1996; 
Laverty, 2003). Heidegger argued that “any interpretation which is to 
contribute understanding, must already have understood what is to be 
interpreted” (Spanos, 1976, p. 462).  Thus, understanding is considered as 
happening when there is a change in the mode of understanding i.e., from the 
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preunderstanding stage (a part of the experience) to the understanding stage 
(the whole part of the experience) (Dobrosavljev, 2002; Koch, 1996; Laverty, 
2003).       
 
For Heidegger, as a part of understanding, preunderstanding is critical 
because all interpretations are derived from this stage. However, the 
preunderstanding knowledge of interpreters differs as it is primarily 
influenced by the individual's own background, culture and experiences 
(Laverty, 2003). The application of Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle in the 
process of interpreting meanings or understanding in a particular social 
phenomenon is largely influenced by the individual’s history and experiences. 
Heidegger argued that without preunderstanding knowledge, it is difficult to 
form understanding (Tan et al., 2009).   
 
Heidegger’s conception of understanding changed the fundamental concept 
of hermeneutics from a theory of interpretation to a theory of existential 
understanding (Mallery et al., 1987). Heidegger’s work was further extended 
by another philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer. Based on Heidegger’s 
ontological structure of being human, a more systematic approach to 
hermeneutics was introduced by Gadamer (Schmidt, 2006). However, the 
work of Gadamer has centred mainly on epistemological understanding and 
is concerned with the experience of truth or how understanding happens 
(Chenari, 2009; Jahnke, 2012; Svenaeus, 2003).   
 
Gadamer (1996) claimed that the task of hermeneutics is to clarify the 
interpretive conditions in which understanding takes place.  However, a 
definitive interpretation according to Gadamer is difficult to reach as 
understanding and interpretation are bound together (Laverty, 2003). 
Understanding is more likely to happen if the process of interpretation 
involves participation or interaction between interpreters and their 
researched texts or objects. Gadamer regarded such a process as ‘productive’ 
for the interpretation in understanding texts (Chenari, 2009). The adoption 
of a productive interpretation process would result in the fabrication of new 
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meanings rather than reproduce the overall original intents (Arunachalam, 
2010; Chenari, 2009; Jahnke, 2012).   
 
Gadamer (1975) argued that interpretations can never reproduce the 
author’s original meanings because by nature, interpreters have their own 
preunderstanding or prejudice knowledge which is formed within their own 
history and tradition. Consequently, interpreters always understand the 
‘same thing’ differently. Gadamer (1975) defined prejudice as “a judgment 
that is given before all the elements that determine a situation have been 
finally examined” (p. 240). Gadamer (1975) does not conceive of prejudice as 
a negative or a false judgement. Rather, he proposes that it can be considered 
as a part of an idea that has both a positive and a negative value.  Since 
prejudice is something that is unavoidable, Gadamer (1975) suggests that 
interpreters identify “true prejudices” through justification of rational 
knowledge (p. 242). 
 
In principle, Gadamer agreed with Heidegger that the process of 
interpretation starts with a preunderstanding or prejudice. However, in a 
productive interpretation, dialogue is an essential process in coming to an 
understanding (Austgard, 2012). According to Gadamer (1975), an event or a 
truth occurs when interpreters understand the concept of the text. As 
understanding can be found only in its application, and not in any original 
meaning of the text, Gadamer introduced the concept of a ‘fusion of horizons’ 
which is also known as a dialectical interaction between the interpreter and 
the text (Chenari, 2009; Dobrosavljev, 2002; Gadamer, 2006; Kinsella, 2006).  
This concept was shaped by three factors, namely, the effect of history, the 
tradition of cultural practice and the language (Chenari, 2009; Gadamer, 
1975).   
 
For Gadamer, because interpreters are nurtured by their own experiences 
and traditions, they usually possess their own unique horizon of 
understanding (Chenari, 2009). Gadamer (1975) defined a horizon as “the 
range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular 
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vantage point” (p.269).  Interpreters usually speak in a narrow horizon, and 
therefore, horizons must be expanded by opening up new horizons through a 
continuous dialectical process among interpreters, and between interpreters 
and texts.  Gadamer (1975) portrayed horizons as below:  
 
The horizon is rather something into which we move and 
that moves with us.  Horizons change for a person who is 
moving.  Thus the horizon of the past, out of which all human 
life lives and which exists in the form of tradition, is always 
in motion.  It is not historical consciousness that first sets 
the surrounding horizon in motion. But in it this motion 
becomes aware of itself (p. 271). 
 
The process of expanding the horizon of understanding is also known as the 
hermeneutics circle. The circle involves a process which moves back and 
forth movement of the entire text, to its parts, and back to the entire text 
again.  The back-and-forth movement in the dialectical process not only 
refers to the entire text and parts of the text but also involves communication 
between people and texts. For Gadamer, understandings can never be  
absolute knowledge nor ever be fully satisfied, as self-knowledge is subjected 
to “self-renewal and self-activation through the rediscovery and restoration 
of one’s relationship to tradition” (Colburn, 1986, p. 371).  Therefore, the 
process of interpretation in the hermeneutic circle should be practised in a 
continually unfolding interaction or dialogue between the texts and 
traditions 
 
Similar to Heidegger, Gadamer also was concerned about the importance of 
language, especially in the process of expanding the horizon of understanding.  
According to Chenari (2009), Gadamer believed that history and tradition are 
expressed within language as language is viewed as a fundamental medium 
through which we understand the world. Language not only refers to the 
texts in which knowledge is documented but also involves conversation 
because understanding comes to exist in dialogue.  Therefore, the language in 
the context of hermeneutics acts not just a ‘fact’ but as a ‘principle in the 
process of interpretation because all human knowledge of the world is 
63 | P a g e  
 
linguistically mediated (Gadamer, 2006).  While reading a text, an interpreter 
continues to read with the aim to understand the text. The process of reading 
also permits the interpreter to experience the text and to understand the 
language of the text in light of the prejudices brought by the interpreter into 
the text.   
 
The work of Heidegger and Gadamer emphasised the subjective approach as 
they rejected the assumption of classical hermeneutics that texts have 
definite meanings.  In order to produce a productive meaning, Heidegger and 
Gadamer offered a model of interpretation, called the hermeneutics circle, 
and provided explicit explanations about the concept and the process of 
understanding.  Since the process of interpretation is believed to happen in 
the subjective world, distinctions between understanding and interpretation 
are no longer maintained under the philosophical hermeneutics and these 
concepts were used interchangeably (Prasad, 2002).    
    
3.3.3 Critical Hermeneutics 
 
Despite the increasing use of critical hermeneutics in various disciplines, 
including education (Ghasemi, Taghinejad, Kabiri, & Imani, 2011), nursing 
(Geanellos, 2000; Koch, 1996), communications (Phillips & Brown, 1993),  
and, information systems (Myers, 1994), a systematic definition of critical 
hermeneutics remains difficult to unearth due to the dearth of studies on this 
concept (Roberge, 2011). Critical hermeneutics seeks to integrate 
explanation and understanding in a constructive dialectics which is noted in 
texts (Thompson, 1981).  It has been recognised as an innovative strategy of 
enquiry resulted from the polemics between Hans-George Gadamer and 
Jurgen Habermas during the 1960s and 1970s (Myers, 1994; Roberge, 2011).   
 
The criticism by Habermas of the work of Gadamer revolved around three 
major issues which related to the limitation of philosophical hermeneutics in 
the context of critical theory.  First, philosophical hermeneutics was criticised 
because of a lack of critical values as it takes interpretation at a face value 
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(Myers, 1994).  As discussed earlier, the original function of hermeneutics 
focused on describing the process of recovery of meanings.  As hermeneutics 
developed, the original function of hermeneutics changed from recovery of 
meanings to the interpretation of meanings (Llewellyn, 1993).  The changes, 
however, were concerned only with improving the process of understanding 
a text in terms of the text itself.  For instance, the implementation of the 
hermeneutic circle, according to Colburn (1986), affords only the opportunity 
of self-renewal and self-activation through the recovery and restoration of 
one’s relationship to traditions but is unable to produce any new meanings 
which may hide in the texts.   
 
Secondly, Habermas acknowledged the usefulness of Gadamer’s 
methodological standpoint in the context of social sciences.  However, 
Habermas argued that the functions of Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics are limited within the framework of critical theory, especially 
when dealing with society’s emancipatory, ideology and communication 
issues (Colburn, 1986; Roberge, 2011).  For Habermas, interpretation should 
be implemented not only in the context of the history or tradition of the texts 
or participants but it should also be extended in the context of social 
structures which enables the formation of meaningful understanding (Myers, 
1994).  Habermas believed that the process of understanding would be more 
meaningful if interpreters were to critically evaluate the totality of 
understanding in a specific situation (Myers, 1994).  Debates on this issue 
resulted in the insertion of emancipatory concept in the process of 
interpretation. Adapting this concept in critical hermeneutics enables 
researchers to make known the lived experience of a person.  
 
Specifically, Habermas disagreed with Gadamer on the issues related to 
tradition and culture and the influence of these factors in the formation of 
prejudice (Prasad, 2002). For Habermas, tradition or culture is not something 
that is naturally created because Habermas believed that they are actively 
constructed by people through critical self-reflection (Mendelson, 1979; 
Prasad, 2002). Habermas agreed with Gadamer that prejudice is an 
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unavoidable factor in the process of interpretation. Yet, interpreters should 
not accept all prejudices as legitimate prejudices since the individual’s self-
reflection will filter and alter all the prejudices according to the interpreters’ 
backgrounds and histories (Prasad, 2002).  Critical hermeneutics research 
requires researchers to be familiar with the historical context of the text or 
phenomenon that being investigated.  However, to generate independent and 
critical understanding, researchers must first differentiates between 
productive prejudice and unproductive prejudice using self-reflection (Davey, 
2015). 
 
Thirdly, Habermas recognised Gadamer’s views on the importance of 
language in the process of interpretation. Habermas agreed with Gadamer 
that language plays a central role in the process of interpretation as it has the 
ability to connect all social institutions. However, Habermas believed that 
interpretation could be influenced by the forces of ideology because critical 
theorists view language as an “ideological infection” (Jacobs, 2014, p. 306).  
Habermas claimed that the language structures continually altered and 
inevitably  became “a medium of domination, deception and social power” or 
“sedimented violence” due to the influence of an interpreter’s ideology 
(Prasad, 2002, p. 22).  For this reason, the results of the interpretation will 
not be genuine (Jacobs, 2014).  To limit the influence of individual ideologies, 
Ricoeur introduced the concept of ‘distanciation’ (further discussion is 
offered in the next paragraph). 
 
The Habermasian and Gadamerian debates lasted for nearly a decade. 
However, most scholars regarded this series of debates as ‘a family quarrel’ 
because the source of the tensions was apparently rooted in differences in 
the worldviews and knowledge claims of Habermas and Gadamer (see Prasad, 
2002; Roberge, 2011).  Under the influence of the insights of Habermas and 
Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) formulated some propositions to 
address their debates.  Ricoeur believed that critical theory and philosophical 
hermeneutics are mutually dependent. He argues that critical theory is 
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necessary as philosophical hermeneutics requires critical values to deepen 
the understanding (Mootz, 2006; Ricoeur, 1974; Roberge, 2011).  
 
Ricoeur reconciled Habermasian and Gadamerian debates through 
propositions called the theory of interpretation. This theory has transformed 
hermeneutics from a narrowly defined method to a broad epistemology and 
philosophy of understanding (Prasad, 2002). Ricoeur believed that 
hermeneutics has to remain its focus on textual interpretation but the 
process of understanding should develop with explanation which takes into 
account the influence of language, reflection, understanding and the self 
(Geanellos, 2000; Thompson, 1981).    
 
This new form of interpretation theory has been regarded as critical because 
the changes proposed by Ricoeur involve a number of radical moves. Firstly, 
Ricoeur removed the principle of the authorial intent – “the idea that the 
meaning of a text resides only with its author” (Geanellos, 2000, p. 113).  
According to Ricoeur, “a text takes on a life of its own” (Myers, 2013, p. 187), 
meaning that a text is autonomous, objective, and independent from its 
original author.  This principle allows researchers to move from text rigidity 
and provide interpretation beyond the notion that only one understanding is 
meaningfully correct (Tan et al., 2009). To enable interpretation beyond one 
understanding to happen, Ricoeur acknowledged the concepts of textual 
plurality and multiplicity, and, therefore, he believes that texts have many 
meanings and that interpreters may interpret the same text differently 
(Myers, 1994).  
 
Secondly, to support the autonomisation principle, Ricoeur emphasised the 
concept of distanciation: a process whereby the researcher objectifies the 
text by “freeing it from the author’s intentions and giving it a life of its own 
(Geanellos, 2000, p. 113).   In other words, researchers are recommended to 
interpret historical data through their own lenses.  The principle of 
distanciatian is important as it is believed to increase researchers’ 
appropriation (Geanellos, 2000, p. 114).  Philosophically, appropriation has 
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its foundation in Gadamer, where it refers to “the concept of making 
something one’s own” (Geanellos, 2000, p. 114).  Ricoeur expands Gadamer’s 
concept of appropriation by defining it in this way: “the interpretation of text 
culminates in the self-interpretation of a subject, who thenceforth 
understands himself better, understands himself differently, or simply begins 
to understand himself” (Tan et al., 2009, p. 8).  Thus, appropriation means 
that interpreters can only understand the meaning of texts which they are 
engaging or appropriating for themselves. Ricoeur believes the inclusion of 
the appropriation concept will possibly enhance one’s understanding of 
oneself.  
 
Thirdly, to enable deeper understanding, Ricoeur extended the concept of the 
hermeneutics circle.  For Ricoeur, the process of interpretation involves not 
only continual movement between the parts of and the whole understanding, 
but also includes interpretation of expressed and unexpressed information.  
Ricoeur’s idea related to his arguments that social actions and situations 
should be considered as texts which can be used for interpreting social 
meanings (Butler, 1998).  However, spoken words are found to be inadequate 
for expressing meanings because the story tellers (interviewees) sometimes 
use inappropriate words to describe their experience (Eilifsen, 2011). In 
detail, Eilifsen (2011) states: 
 
Words allow us to express our thoughts, meanings, feelings 
or dreams, so that other people can learn to know the truth 
about us.  Words can also hide or express the wrong 
meanings and sometimes we do not have the right words in 
mind (p.1).   
 
Therefore, interpretation of expressed and unexpressed information is 
believed to generate a deeper meaning (Myers, 2013).  In this process, 
interpretive understanding is generated in a continual movement between 
the parts and the whole until a larger and deeper understanding is 
established (Geanellos, 2000).  Combining the hermeneutics circle with 
interpretation of expressed and unexpressed information resulted in three 
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stages of understanding process, namely preunderstanding, understanding 
and comprehensive understanding.  
 
Ricoeur’s propositions contribute to the development of contemporary 
hermeneutics called critical hermeneutics. Although there is no definite 
definition for critical hermeneutics, it has been perceived as an integrative 
theoretical framework combining philosophical hermeneutics and critical 
theory (Myers, 1994).  In other words, critical hermeneutics goes one step 
further than traditional hermeneutics and critical theory. However, the 
interpretive act for hermeneutics scholars is one that never reaches an end 
because there is always a possible alternative interpretation that could 
emerge during self-critical reflection (Davey, 2015; Myers, 2013).  
 
3.3.4 Summary of hermeneutics approach 
 
Table 3.1 summaries the criteria for each hermeneutics classification: 
classical, philosophical and critical based on discussions of hermeneutics 
development in section 3.3. From the summary, it can be observed that the 
three-fold hermeneutics classification was underpinned by different 
interpretation goals, and methods but the process of interpreting and 
understanding the meaning of texts can employs the same hermeneutics 
concepts. For example, to understand the present situation of a research 
phenomenon, hermeneutics approach requires researchers to review the 
history of their research phenomenon.  Reviewing historical facts of a 
research phenomenon is important because it helps researchers to build 
their preunderstanding knowledge that can be used to assist for the next 
level of understanding.  However, classical hermeneutics reviews the history 
of a research phenomenon from the authors’ points of view whilst 
philosophical and critical hermeneutics require researchers to understand 
the history through individuals prejudice (the influence of language, culture 
and experience). Nevertheless, because critical hermeneutics aims to 
generate independent and critical understanding, researchers are demanded 
to filter their prejudice between productive and unproductive ones.   This is 
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because unproductive prejudice will not be able to enhance understanding 
(Prasad, 2002). It can be observed that the process of interpretation using 
different hermeneutic methods will generate different levels of 
understanding. 
 
Table 3:1 Summary of hermeneutics classifications and criteria 
Criteria Classical 
hermeneutics 
Philosophical 
hermeneutics 
Critical 
hermeneutics 
Scholars Friedrich 
Schleiermacher 
(1768-1834) 
 
Wilhelm Dilthey 
(1833-1911) 
Martin Heidegger 
(1889-1976) 
 
 
Hans-Georg Gadamer 
(1990-2002) 
Paul Ricoeur (1913-
2005) 
Goal To recover the 
author’s original 
meaning 
To understand 
something differently 
To integrate 
explanation and 
understanding  
Techniques Schleiermacher’s 
circle of 
interpretation that 
based on: 
 Grammatical 
 Psychological  
 emphasised on 
historical-based 
interpretation   
Hermeneutics circle 
based on: 
 preunderstanding’ 
 understanding 
 emphasised on the 
effects of prejudice, 
dialogue and fusion 
of horizon 
Interpretation is 
based on the three 
stages of 
understanding: 
 Preunderstanding 
(emphasised on 
history but 
concerns only 
with 
valid/productive 
prejudice)  
 Understanding 
 Advanced 
understanding 
 
Concept Historicity 
 
‘Schleiermacher 
circle’ 
Prejudice (history, 
experience, culture) 
 
Hermeneutic circle 
(dialogue, fusion of 
horizon)  
Recognise all 
hermeneutics 
concepts: history, 
prejudice,  
hermeneutic circle; 
but link the process 
of interpretation 
with distanciation, 
and appropriation 
principles 
Contribution  Creating theories 
for regulating 
interpretation 
Identifying 
philosophical issues 
surrounding 
interpretation 
Introducing 
‘emancipatory’ term 
– to make known the 
lived experiences 
and personal voices 
of the persons  
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As a guideline for interpretation process, Table 3.2 presents a general 
summary of all hermeneutics concepts and their criteria. 
 
Table 3:2 A Summary of hermeneutics concepts 
Hermeneutics 
Concepts 
Criteria 
Historicity 
 
 
 
 
Understanding cannot be approached from a neutral 
position. It develops from the history of researchers’ 
contexts of studies. History helps researchers to inform the 
present.  As history evolves over times, it can never be 
correctly interpreted.   
The hermeneutics 
circle 
 
A constant interaction between researchers, and texts or 
their studied objects. The aim of the dialectic is to clarify 
understanding. 
Prejudice 
 
 
 
 
 
Prejudice or preunderstanding is developed from prior 
knowledge that is established in the earlier process of 
understanding.  Prejudice can be considered as an 
exploratory stage, where hermeneutics researchers 
attempt to understand the nature of their studied objects. 
Autonomisation 
and distanciation 
 
 
In order to perceive a new meaning, researchers are 
suggested to distance themselves from their 
preunderstanding (including their own prejudices) and 
interpret the texts according to their own lenses. 
Therefore, researchers should make the text autonomous 
(by removing the authorial intent) and open to unlimited 
reading and understanding. 
Appropriation and 
engagement 
The process of creating new meanings through 
autonomisation and distanciation will make researchers 
interact reflexively with the texts.  Such interactions will 
take researchers to the next level of interpretation called 
appropriation and engagement and generate new 
meanings for the under study phenomenon. 
 
In conclusion, the hermeneutics concepts and classifications will help 
researchers to understand a complex and contradictory phenomenon 
because the process of interpretation is perceived as being able to lead to in-
depth analysis. However, in practice, it is not necessary for researchers to 
employ all the hermeneutics concepts because the possibility of using 
hermeneutics inappropriately and simplistically is relative high (Myers, 
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2013).  Therefore, Myers (2013) suggests hermeneutics researchers match 
their research objectives with any hermeneutics classifications, and 
implement the process of interpretation using relevant hermeneutics 
concepts.   
 
3.4 The application of critical hermeneutics in this study 
 
To answer the main research question in this study: what does accountability 
mean in an ever-changing New Zealand health policy, I adopted critical 
hermeneutics as a strategy of inquiry. Critical hermeneutics was chosen 
because the method offered by this approach was seen as appropriate for this 
study enquiry into how public health managers understand the notion of 
accountability and its practices in the context of constant policy changes.   
 
The process of constructing knowledge in this study employed three 
concepts of hermeneutic, namely historicity, autonomisation and 
distanciation, and appropriation and engagement.  These three concepts 
were chosen because they call for both active engagement and critical 
reflection during the process of understanding meanings. The three 
hermeneutics concept were implemented within Ricoeur’s three stages of 
understanding: preunderstanding, understanding and advanced 
understanding. Each stage of understanding was driven by different research 
questions and complemented by different methods, namely document review 
and interview.  Figure 3.1 shows the ways in which hermeneutics concepts 
were applied in developing my understanding about accountability in the 
context of public sector reform. 
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Figure 3.1 The application of hermeneutics concepts 
 
 
 
Stage 1 aimed to answer the first research question: what changes in the 
public health system have taken place over the last four stages of reform and 
what were the rationales for them in terms of accountability? In particular, 
this stage was set to develop my preunderstanding knowledge about the New 
Zealand public health system and reforms.  However, since I had a limited 
understanding of the New Zealand public health system at the beginning of 
this research project, my prejudice or judgement of public health reform in 
New Zealand was pretty much influenced by the information that I found 
during the research process. This study began with a review of the New 
Zealand public health reform history.  The historical search was guided by 
the first research question, and therefore, this stage focused on collecting 
evidence related to the reasons for and formats of reform. I employed the 
concept of historicity in reviewing relevant documents with the aim to 
familiarise myself with the historical context of the New Zealand public 
health system.  
 
The critical hermeneutics approach however, requires hermeneutics 
researchers to identify only valid (productive) prejudices in developing their 
understanding by distancing between researchers and their own prejudices.  
Stage 3: Comprehensive understanding 
Method:decomposition 
Linking the preunderstanding and 
understanding knowledge   
Stage 2: Understanding 
Method: interview 
Autonomisation and distanciation; 
appropriation and engagement 
Stage 1: Preunderstanding 
Method: document review 
Historicity; autonomisation and distanciation; 
appropriation and engagement 
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Therefore, throughout the research process, I positioned myself as an 
outsider, and employed the concept of autonomisation and distanciation; and, 
appropriation and engagement in the process of examining the historical 
background of New Zealand health. These concepts enabled me to 
understand fundamental issues, such as factors that shaped the public health 
system, reasons for implementing reform, and formats of reform through my 
own lens. However, the knowledge gathered at this stage provided only 
partial understanding of the whole. This knowledge was then used as a basis 
for further exploration in the second stage of understanding.   
 
Stage 2 was designed to enhance my preunderstanding knowledge. This 
stage aimed to answer the second research question: what are challenges 
related to constant policy changes, and how do health managers feel about 
dealing with the changes in the public health system?; and the third research 
question: what are the public health managers’ conceptions of accountability 
after encountering the succession of organisational changes? In particular, 
this stage was designed to uncover the participants’ experiences of and 
beliefs about public health reform and their experiences in dealing with 
accountability requirements in the context of frequent policy change. This 
stage also attempted to provide some understanding of how accountability is 
understood and practised in the context of New Zealand public health reform. 
The hermeneutics concepts of autonomisation and distanciation; and, 
appropriation and engagement were applied when analysing interviews.  
 
Knowledge generated from preunderstanding and understanding however, 
contributes only to the construction of knowledge from the contexts of text 
and interpreter because such knowledge is based on apparent meanings.  To 
construct deeper meanings, researchers must adopt the third stage of 
interpretation, called decomposition (this concept is discussed in Chapter 
Four). In particular, the third stage aimed to address the main research 
question: what does accountability mean in an ever-changing the New 
Zealand public health system. Combining information gathered from both 
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preunderstanding and understanding stages was expected to establish 
deeper understanding of health service reform and accountability. 
 
3.5 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter presents a detailed description of the research orientation that 
underpinned this study.  Since the subject of accountability was viewed as 
intangible and embedded in a subjective reality, this study took an 
interpretative paradigm and qualitative methodology as its research 
approach.  In particular, the hermeneutics approach was used to address the 
objective of this study: to understand accountability meanings and practices 
in the context of constant policy changes. The data were analysed using the 
critical hermeneutics approach. My use of the hermeneutics approach in 
collecting, analysing and interpreting data recognises the stages of 
preunderstanding, understanding, and comprehensive understanding.    
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4 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
     RESEARCH METHOD 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the methods used for gathering, analysing and 
interpreting the research evidence.  As noted in Chapter Three, this study 
adopts a hermeneutics approach and employs the critical hermeneutics 
concepts of historicity, autonomisation and distanciation, and appropriation 
and engagement when analysing data. The discussions of this chapter are 
arranged as follows. In the first section, I describe the process of gathering 
and interpreting data using document review; in the second section, I discuss 
the process of collecting and analysing data through interview. Next, to 
establish the validity and reliability of the research process, I describe the 
data gathering and interpreting processes in detail.   
 
4.2 Document review 
 
According to Merriam (2009), documents are a ready-made source of data 
which involve a wide range of written, visual, digital and physical material 
relevant to the researcher’s area of investigation.   Documents are held to be 
evidence for past and current realities, as well as for future plans. Documents 
take a variety of forms, including advertisements, agendas, attendance 
registers, minutes of meetings, manuals, background papers, books, and 
various public records (Bowen, 2009; Gray, 2009). Document review was 
identified as an appropriate method for this study because it helps to develop 
the researcher’s preunderstanding of the New Zealand public health system. 
 
This method proved helpful in gaining historical insights into past events and 
policies in the New Zealand public health system. Furthermore, it also 
provided not only a useful way of tracking changes and developments in the 
public health system, but also a means of obtaining a clear understanding of 
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how New Zealand health services have progressed over time.  Compared to 
other qualitative methods, documents analysis can be considered as an 
efficient method because it is less time-consuming and requires only data 
selection, instead of data collection (Bowen, 2009).  Most of the documents 
used in this study were retrieved through online searches of the University of 
Waikato Library, the Ministry of Health Library, websites and the New 
Zealand government’s official website, known as beehive.govt.nz.  In order to 
ensure the efficiency of future tracking, the relevant documents were 
classified and recorded according to their historical background and stages of 
reform. 
 
While historical information is believed to inform the present, adopting the 
document review method was challenging.  In my experience, due to my 
limited understanding, reviewing New Zealand public health history and 
reform was frustrating initially. I could not understand the meaning of those 
documents and why the information in written policy documents focused on 
particular issues, such as distribution of health care, the State’s role in health 
care, efficiency and effectiveness of health delivery. Indeed, I did not really 
understand why the private sector, especially general practitioners, appeared 
to be so influential in health policy decisions (see section 5.2 for further 
information). Moreover, in the early stages, I could not understand the 
political perspectives of and the ideological competition between the Labour 
and National Parties in public health policy documents. Everything appeared 
unclear, mixed and complicated to me as I come from a different country that 
practices a different political and public health system. Therefore, the 
possibility of arriving at inaccurate interpretations was high.  
 
Nevertheless, this method had several other advantages which helped me to 
limit the possibility of producing inaccurate interpretation. First, documents 
in many instances are not affected by a research process due to the special 
nature of their being: stability, exactness, and coverage or what Cresswell 
(2003) terms unobtrusive or nonreactive.  Hence, written documentation has 
a high level of stability because the researchers’ presence does not alter what 
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is being studied, which makes them suitable for repeated reviews (Bowen, 
2009).   In this study, all relevant documents were reviewed several times so 
as to ensure the accuracy of the discussions. Secondly, the documents used 
for this study, included policy documents and academic journals, sources 
which are known to have a high exactness value because of the way in which 
these documents are published, which guarantees the accuracy of the 
information they contain (Bowen, 2009).  Therefore, the authenticity and 
credibility of documents used for this study were reasonably high.  
 
Gray (2009), however, warns that researchers who use this method will often 
find that vital data are missing.  This situation arises because documents may 
sometimes be irretrievable or be difficult to retrieve. The possibility to face 
such difficulties in this research was high because historical reviews required 
me to investigate the New Zealand public health reform for the last 30 years, 
and therefore, I had to ensure that I could get access to all relevant 
documents that covered the period of analysis (details of this process were 
discussed in section 4.2.2). The following subsections discuss the process of 
selecting and analysing documents. 
 
4.2.1 Selecting documents 
Management of data sourced from documents began with the selection 
process.  For the purpose of this research, documents used were academic 
journal articles in the area of New Zealand public health development, reform, 
and policy; government publications, including green and white papers; 
commission reports, both printed and electronic; annual reports of public 
health agencies; newsletters; Parliamentary Hansards; and, websites of the 
Ministry of Health and other public health bodies.   
 
The process of selecting documents was guided by the objective of 
identifying the changes in the New Zealand public health system since the 
1984 reform, and their effects on the accountability arrangements.  However, 
in order to improve my understanding, I found that I had to read literature 
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beyond the scope of this research on, for example, the New Zealand political 
and governmental system, the history of the New Zealand public sector 
reform, and specific health programme research on area such as rheumatic 
fever, the breastfeeding programme, and health targets.  
 
The selected documents were recorded in two ways.  First, documents were 
categorised into three classifications, namely material from academic 
journals, policy documents (including all related government publications), 
and websites (including the Ministry of Health and relevant public health 
institutions and agencies).  Secondly, in order to assist the process of 
developing a preunderstanding narrative, the documents in every category 
were arranged in line with the stages of reform to which they related.   
 
4.2.2 Analysing documents 
 
Mining data from documents has a long tradition in qualitative research 
(Cortazzi, 2002).  Similar to other analytical methods in qualitative research, 
document analysis requires data to be examined and interpreted in order to 
elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge.  
According to Silverman (2005), the process of analysing documents is more 
concerned with whether texts depict ‘reality’ rather than whether texts 
contain true or false statements because in many instances, documents are 
produced and used for a variety of organisational purposes (Gray, 2009).   
 
In analysing documents, this study drew upon the three hermeneutics 
concepts of historicity, autonomisation and distanciation, and appropriation 
and engagement. As a means of establishing my preunderstanding, the 
process of analysing the data commenced with a review of the historical 
background of the New Zealand public health system.  According to Kelly and 
Maynard-Moody (1993): 
 
We can only understand the actions of others if we 
understand this conception of narratives and their historical, 
embedded character.  We can only make sense of what we 
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attempt to study – be it the effects of particular public 
policies or the specific actions of members of an 
organizational unit, or anything else – if we explore the 
history of our subject (p.137). 
 
To assist the next level of analysis, I adopted the concepts of autonomisation 
and distanciation.  These concepts allow researchers to free themselves from 
the principle of authorial intent.  Thus they help to limit the influence of the 
original author in the process of interpretation, while enabling researchers to 
engage with and make appropriate meanings from the text.  In my experience, 
adopting these hermeneutics concepts granted me the freedom to determine 
the direction and formation of the preunderstanding knowledge. I developed 
the preunderstanding knowledge by reviewing the historicity of New Zealand 
public health reform from its early setting to the present day.  The stages of 
reform were identified through the Parliamentary Library Research Paper 
(2009) which briefly describes the stages of reform in the New Zealand 
public health system between 1938 and 2000.  The paper summarises the 
significant policy changes and lists the significant policy documents which 
relate to the implementation of health policy reforms at each stage of reform.  
 
My understanding, at this stage, was enhanced by reading relevant policy 
documents.  At the beginning, these documents were difficult to understand 
as I was not familiar with the context of reform.  To overcome this problem, I 
read relevant academic journals and books.  Again, the application of these 
hermeneutics concepts was helpful. The iterative process of reading, thinking 
and writing, as suggested by the hermeneutics approach, enabled me to 
develop my interpretive preunderstanding knowledge. Employing the three 
hermeneutics concepts in analysing these documents helped to establish rich 
and deep insights into the history of public health reform in New Zealand. 
During this process, the research question was kept in mind in terms of the 
changes that had taken place in the public health system over the last two 
decades, and how those changes had affected accountability.  The material 
was organised in line with these key areas in order to ensure the formation of 
preunderstanding knowledge.  I found that my understanding level improved 
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as I extended and repeated the process of reading, writing and thinking 
several times.     
 
However, discussions of reform covered by the Parliamentary Library 
Research Paper (2009) focused only on the early stages of reform i.e., those 
that took between 1984 and 2000.  Therefore, to enhance my understanding 
and extend the discussion, I supplemented this information with recent 
material published in academic journals.  Gauld (2012) and Cumming (2011) 
were the main authors who wrote on post-2008 health reform in New 
Zealand.  Gauld (2012) provided an overview of the post-2008 period by 
discussing the establishment of new health institutions in the public health 
system.  Following the establishment of new health organisations such as the 
National Health Board (NHB), the National Health IT Board, and Health 
Workforce New Zealand, and also the announcement of initial plans to reduce 
the number of PHOs, Gauld (2012) expected that the public health system 
would become more complex in the future.  Meanwhile, Cumming (2011) 
discussed the potential of New Zealand to have an integrated health system 
after the 2008 reform.     
 
However, because the papers were written during the early phase of the 
2008 reform, the discussions appeared to be limited as reform was still in the 
planning stage.  In my opinion, the implementation of reform became more 
aggressive after the National Party gained another mandate to lead the 
government in the 2011 election.  A number of changes were introduced to 
support the initial reform plan introduced in 2008.  Charting the progress of 
the plan allowed me to create an extensive discussion of the post-2008 
reform that encompassed all the changes in the public health system 
(including both changes in primary and secondary care) between 2008 and 
2013.  Thus, this process of exploring and establishing an understanding of 
the public health reform through the concept of historicity helped in the 
engagement in and appropriation of the data.  
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To ensure the quality of my interpretations, a peer debriefing technique was 
employed in the process of analysing and interpreting documents. Peer 
debriefing refers to “someone who is familiar with the phenomenon being 
explored” (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 129).  One of the members of my 
supervisory panel has had research experience in the field of the New 
Zealand public health system and thus was able to provide not only support 
in terms of knowledge related to my topic but also as a reviewer of the study 
process and the congruency of emerging findings and interpretations 
(Merriam, 2009).   
 
4.3 Interview 
 
The interview is the most commonly employed method in qualitative 
research (Britten, 2006; Bryman & Bell, 2007).   Maykut and Morehouse 
(1994) define an interview as a conversation with a purpose,  while  Kvale 
(1996) describes an interview as a “construction site of knowledge”(p.42) 
which must be understood in terms of five features of information. These 
have been categorised as conversation, narrative, language, context, and, the 
inter-relationship between interviewer and interviewee. Britten (2006) 
views an interview as a collaborative enterprise, where both interviewer and 
interviewee are engaged in the business of constructing meaning.  Thus, 
Rubin and Rubin (2005) suggest that interviewees in qualitative research 
should be regarded as partners in the research enterprise rather than as 
subjects to be tested or examined.   
 
Since this study was also aiming to capture perceptual information related to 
the effects of public health reform on accountability, the interview was seen 
as a valuable method to adopt.  The document review method was efficacious 
in tracking changes and development of reforms in the New Zealand public 
health system.  However, data derived from this method are unable to 
provide detailed information, such as understanding people’s behaviour and 
feelings and interpreting people’s worlds in relation to specific subjects 
(Merriam, 2009).  Interviews not only enable immediate follow-up and 
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clarification, but are also helpful in forming understanding of the meaning of 
the daily routines of selected participants (Marshall & Rossman, 2006; Rubin 
& Rubin, 2005).  I found that interviews provided opportunities for health 
managers to voice their life situations in their own words, a possibility 
mentioned by Kvale (1996).  Data derived from this method also helped me 
to understand how health managers perceived public health reform and 
accountability practices in the health services. 
 
The interview provides at least three options for researchers in gathering 
perceptual information (Britten, 2006; Merriam, 2009).  The options are 
structured, semistructured and unstructured interviews.  However, in this 
study, the structured interview was dismissed as an option due to its 
standardised and rigid criteria.  The development of a structured interview 
begins with a list of themes, issues, problems and questions to be covered 
(Qu & Dumay, 2011).  The lists are derived from a review of the literature and 
thoughts of the experts.  Then, the standardised questions are formulated in 
such a way as to generate the conditions for generalisation across 
populations (Barbour & Schostak, 2011; Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2003).  
The problem of using highly structured interviews in qualitative research is 
that rigid adherence to predetermined questions may not allow qualitative 
researchers to access participants’ perspectives and understandings of the 
world (Merriam, 2009).   
 
Although both unstructured and semistructured interviews enable 
researchers to access participants’ views, I opted for semistructured 
interviews in collecting perceptual information for this study. The 
semistructured interview was chosen because this type of interview provides 
some structure through a list of issues to be investigated.  In other words, it 
allows researchers to use a general research framework for preformulating 
interview questions, while permitting researchers to pursue any new lines of 
inquiry that might emerge during the course of the interview (Myers, 2009).  
This flexibility enables interviewers to capture unexpected issues and 
information which may arise during the data collection process.   
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According to Merriam (2009), the unstructured interview is open in nature 
because it aims to help researchers who have limited information about their 
research phenomenon to ask relevant questions.  Researchers usually have 
no prior list of interview questions as the questions will emerge during the 
interview sessions because an unstructured interview is grounded in the 
views the participants offer in response to each question.  It would, therefore, 
have been not only difficult but also inappropriate to apply unstructured 
interviews in hermeneutics research because the hermeneutics approach 
requires researchers to develop their preunderstanding knowledge before 
forming their understanding knowledge. In my experience, preunderstanding 
knowledge significantly influenced my views on New Zealand’s public health 
reform which later led to the formation of interview questions. 
 
4.3.1 The process of selecting participants 
 
The process of selecting suitable participants for this study was determined 
through the application of hermeneutics principles.  According to Laverty 
(2003), hermeneutics researchers should aim to select participants “who 
have lived experience in the context of study’s focus, who are willing to talk 
about their experience, and who are diverse enough from one to another to 
enhance possibilities of rich and unique stories of a particular experience” (p. 
29).  For the purpose of this study, I set the following criteria as the basis for 
selecting participants.  The participants should have: 
1. knowledge about the New Zealand health policy reform 
2. experience in managing change at different levels of health delivery 
3. the willingness and ability to serve as a key informant for this study.   
 
The above criteria indicated that a key set of relevant actors for this study 
should be selected on the basis of their work positions and experiences.  
According to Christensen and Laegreid (2007), reform efforts are primarily 
undertaken by people who are in leadership positions.  Hence, in this study, I 
aimed to interview participants who were in senior positions and had 
experience in dealing with health policy changes resulting from the adoption 
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of reforms. In my opinion, this group of people could be considered as 
experts because they had detailed and up-to-date knowledge on reform and 
policy changes.  I also believed that only those who had gone through 
different stages of reform could share their views, experiences and opinions 
about the need for reform and the challenges in dealing with constant 
reforms in the public health system.   
 
Although the positional and seniority criteria provided a clear guideline for 
recruiting participants, I nevertheless found the process of recruiting 
participants itself was a challenge.  Reaching a sufficiently large group of 
potential participants who met the positional criteria of the study proved 
difficult because no background and work experience of health managers is 
made publicly available.  Therefore, I decided to employ a snowball technique 
or participant-driven sample, in this study.  This technique enables 
researchers to use participants to contact other respondents (Heckathorn, 
1997; Streeton, Cooke, & Campbell, 2004).  The process of selecting 
participants started with identifying a ‘champion’ or a key informant for this 
study.  The champion is someone who is capable of gaining access to ‘hidden’ 
or ‘hard-to-reach’ populations (Streeton et al., 2004).   
 
A member of the Department of Accounting helped me to identify a potential 
champion. I sent an email to this contact, a senior manager of a DHB, whom I 
named Manager One. In the email, I briefly introduced myself and my 
research. I asked Manager One to suggest someone from his organisation 
who might be able to help with my research. Manager One was able to 
introduce me to another senior manager from the Planning and Funding 
division.  I named this manager Manager Two.  According to Manager One, 
Manager Two has reasonable experience in public health planning and 
funding and also has a good relationship with other managers at the primary 
health level.  For these reasons, I decided to appoint Manager Two as a 
champion for my sampling purposes. I approached Manager Two by 
providing details of my research and specifying my research requests. 
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Manager Two took several weeks before agreeing to become a champion for 
this study. 
 
Once agreement was obtained from Manager Two, I invited her to an initial 
meeting.  This meeting was used as a platform to brief Manager Two about 
the research project and to highlight the research needs and expectations. 
Manager Two then named several potential participants, and provided their 
contact details.  Manager Two also allowed me to use her name when 
approaching possible participants.  Manager Two held the champion position 
only at the beginning of research access. As interviews progressed, the 
number of referred participants increased and some of them became new 
champions.  The new champions then referred me to their contacts by 
introducing me and my research. This snowballing or participant-driven 
sampling technique was not only convenient but also helped in reaching the 
targeted participants through the process of referral from one participant to 
the next.  I was introduced to at least 20 potential participants who had 
reasonable experience in dealing with policy changes and reforms in the New 
Zealand public health system.   
 
Nevertheless, the process of recruiting participants in this study was still 
very challenging for several reasons.  First, the New Zealand public health 
system itself was experiencing a major reform during the period of data 
collection for this study.  After the 2011 election, one of the reform strategies 
set by the National Government was to reduce the number of PHOs from 82 
to 32, so as to encourage regional and national collaboration through the 
establishment of new regional and national health boards. This reform 
strategy significantly changed the roles and positions of the existing health 
managers and these changes affected my research study as they led to the 
withdrawal and rejection of some of the targeted participants.   
 
Secondly, the targeted participants in this study included top managers, most 
of whom had a hectic work schedule following the adoption of new reform 
strategies.  Although agreements to participate in this research project had 
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been obtained, in theory, at an early stage, the scheduling of the actual 
interview sessions with participants remained unconfirmed, in practice, and 
was, therefore, still uncertain.  A number of follow-up contacts, both through 
emails and phone calls, had to be made and it was hard to obtain immediate 
responses from participants.  In fact, I had to wait an average of about 2 to 4 
months before an interview took place.  There were cases where my requests 
for interview were put off for several months just because managers could 
not decide a date for an interview. Although frequent follow-up was made, 
some interviews were cancelled because managers suddenly decided to leave 
their organisations.  Some managers who got promoted to other positions 
later changed their minds and decided to withdraw from this study because 
their new positions were no longer relevant to the interests of the study.  The 
following are examples of withdrawal and rejection emails from those 
approached in relation to the above issues:  
 
Dear Azizah, 
Apologies for not responding earlier. Unfortunately, I am not 
in a position to now participate in or organise (the name of 
the PHO) participation in your current research.  
 
The level of activity across the organisation has significantly 
increased with a number of key personnel fully committed 
to those activities and would not be available for interview 
in regard to your research. 
 
Again, my apologies that we are not able to assist any further. 
(Personal communication, June 15, 2012) 
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Kia ora Azizah, 
 
Thank you for your invitation to participate in your research. 
Unfortunately this primary health organization will be 
disestablished at the end of the year as we have joined with 
other coalitions.  All the best for your research.  
 
(Personal communication, October 3, 2011) 
 
Despite such setbacks, I managed to conduct 15 interviews with 13 
participants between April 2012 and November 2013.   
 
I was aware that the snowball sampling technique would lead to a potentially 
collective view of the phenomenon under investigation because a sample 
derived from this technique includes members of a specific network as a 
result of the tendency of participants to suggest others with whom they share 
similar characteristics.  To compensate for this possibility, I had to ensure 
that the participants in this study were recruited from diverse positions and 
organisations.  Each time I was introduced to new potential participants by 
the champion, I asked the champion for some brief information on the 
potential participant with regard to their experience and to the organisations 
for which they worked to ensure their backgrounds were related to my 
research needs.  Although such information was limited in identifying what 
types of stories I might get from the referred participants, I found it was 
useful, especially in ensuring the voice of participants covered both primary 
and secondary care.   
 
Table 4.1 summaries the summary of the participants’ positions, work 
organisations and total work experience in the public health system.  In total, 
13 participants from both primary and secondary care, who had more than 
10 years’ work experience in managing public health services, were 
interviewed.  All participants were in leadership positions and had different 
management and clinical backgrounds; 4 had started their careers as 
clinicians before taking on management responsibilities, while the remaining 
9 participants had top level management backgrounds in various fields, 
including finance, communication and aviation.  Hermeneutics values the 
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various participants’ backgrounds and experiences as unique in their time, 
place and personal history (Walker, 1996).  The advantage of interviewing 
experienced participants lay in their ability to present their lived experiences 
of dealing with reforms, experiences which allowed them to provide more 
insights into the implementation of reform.  
 
 Of the 13 participants, 8 were managers of PHOs, and 5 were managers of 
DHBs.  Only 3 female managers participated in this study while the remaining 
10 were male.  In order to ensure the participants’ anonymity, pseudonyms, 
such as P01 and P02 were used for the participants when reporting the 
findings. The length of their service in the health sector ranged from 10 to 31 
years.  Overall, the participants in this study had considerable experience in 
the New Zealand health service reforms (see Appendix 1, p.278 for details).     
 
Table 4:1 The summary of participants’ positions, work organisations 
and total work experience 
Position 
 
 
PHOs 
(years of  service) 
 
DHBs 
(years of service) 
 
Regional DHBs  
(years of service) 
Board member P02 (26 years) P13 (12 years)  
CEO 
P01 (15 years) 
P03 (22 years) 
P06 (18 years) 
  
Senior Manager 
(management experience) 
P04 (31 years) 
P05 (27 years) 
P09 (25 years) 
P012 (21 years) 
 
Senior Manager  
(clinical experience) 
P07 (16 years) 
P11 (13 years) 
P08 (16 years) 
 
P10 (10 years) 
Total (13) 8 4 1 
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4.3.2 Conducting interviews 
 
The process of conducting interviews followed the ethical guidelines for the 
study which had been approved by the Ethics Committees of the Waikato 
Management School. Since the list of targeted participants was based on the 
snowball technique, the process of approaching participants started soon 
after I was introduced by the champions to potential participants or after 
receiving participants’ contact details from the champions.   
  
The initial communications between me and targeted participants began 
through email.  In the introductory emails to targeted participants, I attached 
three documents, namely, a participant information sheet, an interview 
protocol and an informed consent form.  These documents were used to 
facilitate the participants’ full understanding about the research area and 
how they could contribute to my study. In the participant information sheet 
(see Appendix 2, p. 281), I introduced myself and my study by informing 
participants about the objectives of the study, the expected outcomes and the 
benefits of this study to the research area.  Before issuing an invitation to 
participants, I highlighted how their experience and knowledge are valuable 
for this study. I also assured participants about the level of confidentiality by 
explaining how the participants’ identities would be protected and how the 
output from the participants would be used and disseminated.  
 
In the interview protocol (see Appendix 3, p. 282), I provided an opening 
statement by thanking the participants for their willingness to take part in 
my study.  In order to make participants feel comfortable with the interview 
process, I repeated my assurance on confidentiality. A list of possible 
questions to be asked during the interview was also provided.  In sending the 
interview protocol I wished to signal to the participants that they were 
expected to familiarise themselves with and prepare themselves for the 
interview questions.  I also used the consent form to inform them about their 
rights during and after interviews (see Appendix 4, p. 285).  In that form, I 
stated the right to ask any questions, the right not to answer any interview 
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questions and the right to withdraw from the study.  The participants who 
signed the consent form were treated as having provided their consent to 
take part in this study. 
 
According to Laverty (2003), the interview process in the hermeneutics 
tradition should take place in a safe and trusting environment.  Laverty (2003) 
defines such an environment as a situation in which an interview is 
conducted within the context of a relationship. The formation of 
preunderstanding knowledge using the document review method reduced 
the distance between me and the research field.  Despite struggling at the 
beginning, I slowly developed my understanding about the New Zealand 
public health system.   
 
Nevertheless, the interview process was still demanding as I had to manage 
the distance between me and the participants.  In order to minimise this gulf, 
after being granted access, I made initial visits to the organisations and talked 
to the potential participants.  During the visits, I explained my study and 
what was expected from participants. I also informed the potential 
participants that I might be asking naïve questions due to my limited 
understanding about the New Zealand health sector.  Being concerned about 
my familiarity with the knowledge, one of the participants gave a 
presentation about the Maori culture and general health setting in New 
Zealand.   The presentation was very useful as I learned new things which 
helped me to understand why the New Zealand public health system was 
designed in the way that it was.  In addition, I was invited by another 
participant to sit in on a PHO weekly executive meeting.  That was a valuable 
opportunity for me because I was introduced to other managers, which later 
enhanced my contacts. Although I had been granted access since January 
2012, the first interview took place only in April 2012. 
 
However, due to the hectic work schedules of some managers, initial visits 
were made only with eight participants.  I communicated with the remaining 
five participants via emails prior to their interviews, informing them about 
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my research with and my expectations. While this technique broke the ice 
between me and the participants because it made the interview process go 
smoothly, at this stage, it was hard to establish a clear understanding of the 
participants’ knowledge and their interests in the study.  In my opinion, the 
snowball sampling technique provides limited opportunities for researchers 
to appraise the level of knowledge, experience, and interests of a wider group 
of participants.  As samples are referred by champions, researchers tend to 
accept these referrals without much questioning of whether or not the 
proposed participants have the ability to provide required information. As a 
result, some participants provided limited information during interviews 
because their experience, knowledge, and interests provided only a limited 
fid with this study. 
 
All interviews were conducted in an informal manner in the participants’ 
workplaces. The interviews lasted from 45 to 90 minutes and were digitally 
recorded.  Before starting the interview, I read the opening statement to the 
participants to acknowledge their participation and to remind them of their 
rights in terms of confidentiality and their participation in this study.  
Participants were informed that my interest was in their experience of 
managing health. After reading the opening statement for themselves, 
participants were given a consent form to sign. I began the interview by 
gathering background information on the participants such as the title of 
their position (designation), their roles and responsibilities, and the number 
of years they had worked in the health context. Identifying the participants’ 
background helped me to ask relevant questions related to their 
organisational and situational contexts.   
 
Since I was adopting a semi-structured interview approach, I already had a 
list of preplanned questions covering the participants’ views on reforms and 
accountability.  However, this list of questions was used only as a guideline.  
In some circumstances, I dropped or added new questions if I found the 
participants were telling a really interesting story which was relevant to my 
research.  Furthermore, if I found any of the participants struggling to 
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respond to my questions (due to different terminology or understanding), I 
immediately reframed the question to make it more relevant to the 
participants’ context.  I also kept the conversation between me and the 
participants as open as I could to enable the participants’ experiences speak 
to me. Although the interviews were digitally recorded, I made brief notes on 
a separate form which I named as ‘Interview Guide with Field Notes’ (see 
Appendix 5, p. 286). In this form, I wrote the key points or drew simple 
diagrams to help me during the transcription and writing up of the findings.  
 
I transcribed the interviews as soon as I finished each interview session.  I 
adopted a denaturalised method in preparing the transcript.  According to 
Mero-Jaffe (2011) the denaturalised method enables researchers to prepare 
interview transcripts free from noises such as coughing, moans, stutters, 
involuntary sounds, pauses in speech, grammatical errors, body language, 
and so on. I chose this method because all the interview transcripts were sent 
back to the participants for their feedback. If the interviews had been 
transcribed using a naturalised method, the participants might well have felt 
embarassed as this method retains all recorded interview details, including 
interview noises.  According to Mero-Jaffe (2011), naturalised transcripts can 
leave interviewees feeling their speeches were unrefined. 
 
Hagens, Dobrow, and Chafe (2009) warn that the sending back of interview 
transcripts to the participants has certain risks, although the technique has 
been approved as useful in helping researchers to validate their data.  The 
risks according to Hagens et al. (2009)  are related to the issue of bias and the 
possibility of losing some valuable data because some participants may ask 
for the deletion of or a change to certain information.  In this study, I decided 
to send the interview transcripts back to the participants.  Here, my concern 
was not only to improve the quality of the transcripts but also to help in 
clarifying certain information about which I was unsure.   
 
93 | P a g e  
 
I was aware that all participants had a busy work schedule. In order to help 
the participants deal with the transcripts, I provided several supporting 
documents along with the original transcript. The documents were: 
 
1. A summary of the interview transcript  
This summary comprised two sections. In the first section, I presented a 
summary of the participants’ background information by highlighting 
their pseudonymous identities, their positions and a summary of their 
roles, responsibilities and experiences. I asked participants to pay 
attention to this section because that was how I was going to present 
them in my research.  If participants were unhappy with the way in 
which I had presented their background, I encouraged them to provide 
further suggestions to me.  In the event, all the participants accepted the 
way in which I presented their background information as no one came 
back and asked for changes. A sample of the summary is attached in 
Appendix 6 (p. 289).   
 
In the second section, I provided a summary of the interviews by 
highlighting the important points that I had learned from the participants 
during the interviews. I informed the participants that the key-point 
summaries included only the important points derived from the 
interview data.  I also advised them that those key points should be seen 
as raw data only, as the process of interpretation had not yet started.  
 
2. Table of clarification 
A table of clarification was developed with the purpose of helping me and 
the participants to track previous conversations which needed further 
clarification.  The interview transcripts produced in this study were 
between 12 and 34 pages in length.  It might have been difficult for some 
participants to read all the recorded conversation as they were busy 
professionals.  In order to help the participants and me to track a specific 
conversation that was required for further clarification, I provided a 
table of clarification. The table made the revision process easier for both 
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parties.  Under the “what to clarify’ column, I included any interview 
extracts which required further clarification from participants and linked 
these to specific questions for the participants.  The table allowed the 
participants to refresh their memories of the overall content of the 
conversations, and they could easily track the full conversation by 
returning to the transcript at the pages indicated in the table. The 
participants could provide the specific clarification by writing it under 
the “clarified” column.  Table 4.2 shows an example of the table of 
clarification used in this study. 
 
Table 4:2 Table of clarification 
Page No What to clarify? Clarified (Responded by P09) 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extract from the interview 
 
“What is the problem with that is 
primary sector is an aging 
workforce.  Rural populations 
find that hard to get GPs, this 
DHBs certainly has that problem 
in Tokoroa and Taumarunui”. 
 
My question(s): 
Could you please explain about: 
a. Why the primary care was 
considered as an aging 
workforce? 
b. Why people in rural areas 
find that is hard to see a 
GP? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rural populations are finding it harder 
to get GPs to work and live in their 
communities.  Remote and rural GPs 
have demands upon them greater than 
urban GPs and it’s harder for rural GP 
practices to work collectively (time and 
distance issue) so attracting GPs to 
rural towns is quite difficult.  As a 
consequence the workforce in these 
rural areas is aging as younger 
professionals prefer the urban lifestyle 
or make choices not to work rurally 
while they are bringing up young 
families – i.e., they make choices about 
better schools, more exposure to sports 
and alternative activities etc. (less 
available in rural towns).  As a 
consequence of GPs becoming harder to 
recruit and retain in rural settings GPs 
are closing off their enrolments making 
access difficult for populations to see 
GPs. This in turn places demand on 
smaller rural hospitals, or people wait 
longer to see the GP. 
 
(Personal Communication, October 30, 2013) 
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Although not all participants’ responded to my requests, I found the 
clarification process was helpful for those managers who did want to raise 
concerns as well as state opinions.  In fact, clarification was useful for me as it 
improved the quality of transcripts and created ongoing cooperation 
between the participants and me.  In terms of data management, I found this 
approach provided an easy way of tracking and managing data for this study.  
The examples below illustrate some of the feedback received from the 
participants:    
 
Hi Azizah, 
 
I have made several changes/edits to this as my thick 
Scottish accent must have been difficult to tune into. 
 
Thanks for the opportunity – I really enjoyed talking with 
you and I hope your studies go well and you are very 
successful. We need your type of thinking in our system. 
 
 (Personal communication, July 23, 2013) 
 
Hello Azizah, 
 
Sorry for the delay. I have been on the road for a few weeks 
and got back from Christchurch yesterday so I have been 
catching up on everything.  
 
A few requested alterations in relation to your key points’ 
document: 
 
Yes I did work in both public hospitals and primary care.  
For point 1 -views on accountability I would add that a point 
to the end around additional administration to meet the 
targets (as you could always discharge and readmit a patient 
to make it look like they meet the indicators).  
 
A point to the second document: 
Question 2 - medically veins are called vascular  
I hope I have been helpful and again sorry for the delay.  If 
you have any other questions please feel free to get in touch.  
 
 (Personal communication, November 14, 2013) 
 
96 | P a g e  
 
4.3.3 Analysing interview 
 
Data analysis proceeded by way of a long process of writing and descriptive 
analysis. I started the process of analysing data by examining the interview 
transcripts and field notes. The transcripts and field notes were analysed as 
progressively.  I began my analysis by reading and rereading the transcripts 
to get a general sense of the participants’ recalled experience and  
summarised my initial understanding in a standardised format, known as ‘A 
Summary of Interview’ as discussed in Section 4.4.2.  
 
Then, I extracted the data by coding them manually with coloured pens. The 
coding process helps researchers to reduce or deconstruct data through the 
process of grouping and subgrouping all the relevant codes.  According to 
Tan et al. (2009), the process of coding and grouping relevant codes is a 
mechanical process which does not involve any interpretative activities. The 
process of interpretation begins only after researchers have created linkages 
between deconstructed lived experience and activities within the context in 
which the activities took place.  According to Van Maanen (1990), the process 
of interpretation in hermeneutic research involves a consistent process of 
thinking, writing, rethinking, and rewriting.  
 
The initial coding and the process of thinking, writing, rethinking and 
rewriting did not work well at the beginning of my analysis.  I found the 
stories provided by participants were fragmented, and themes were unlikely 
to emerge due to significant differences in their responsibilities, work 
experiences, and work organisations. My experience was reflected in the 
work of Wilson and Hutchinson (1991), who reported that data collected 
from hermeneutics approach cannot be broken into small units because in 
doing so, researchers will lose important aspects or meanings.  To deal with 
such issues, I followed Patterson and Williams (2002), whose advice to 
hermeneutic interpreters to provide a holistic and insightful interpretation 
and not simply to identify themes.  They advise this course of action because 
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the objective of hermeneutics is to understand and explain the 
interrelationship among themes.   
 
In order to produce a holistic and insightful interpretation, I adjusted the 
process of analysis for this study by rearranging the analysis process. I made 
this decision because Anfara, Brown, and Mangione (2002) state that there is 
no right way to analyse qualitative data, as the aim of the analysing process is 
only to make sense of the qualitative information. Based on earlier interview 
summaries, I adjusted the process slightly by grouping the participants’ 
responses around two main issues: first, the views and experiences of public 
health managers on reform; and secondly, the views and experiences of 
public health managers on accountability. I also linked the participants’ 
responses with their roles and responsibilities, work experiences, and work 
organisations.  At this stage of analysis, the findings attempt to explain the 
research evidence of what, why and how certain events happened. I, 
therefore, started to engage and familiarise myself with the texts.  However, 
these findings provided only parts of the whole understanding, as the stories 
in these categories were not integrated and reflected a wide variety of 
participants’ experiences.  
 
To reconstruct the research findings into a more holistic understanding, this 
study adopted a second level of analysis in critical hermeneutics called 
‘decomposition’. Decomposition also represents the third stage of 
understanding (or Stage 3, see Figure 3.1, p. 72). In particular, the term 
decomposition was introduced by Phillips and Brown (1993), and it refers to 
the process of interpreting and the reinterpreting parts of the understanding 
as a means of integrating them into the whole understanding.  At this level of 
analysis, decomposition requires researchers to creatively combine parts of 
the understanding of the historical context with interview analysis, and to 
continually revise the interpretation of these parts (by contrasting the data 
with issues raised by relevant literature) before producing an interpretation 
for the whole text (Myers, 1994; Patterson & Williams, 2002; Phillips & 
Brown, 1993).   
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Additionally, decomposition requires researchers to interpret the expressed 
and unexpressed information. According to Geanellos (2000), the 
interpretation of these types of information will allow understanding to be 
enlarged and deepened.  Therefore, in an attempt to tease out the deepest 
levels of meaning from my data, I made not only a comparison of the 
document and interview data but also contextualised them with the theory of 
reform and the concept of accountability (see Chapter Two). 
 
In order to make sense of preunderstanding and understanding findings, I 
compare the historical background of the public health system with the 
participants’ lived experiences within the neoliberal reform frameworks: 
NPM and NPS, and with accountability typology and relationships (Romzek & 
Dubnick, 1987; Sinclair, 1995).  At this stage, I noticed that differences in 
participants’ background such as their work training and experience had 
influenced their views on reforms and accountability.  For instance:    
  
As a person who was in DHB and with a public 
administration background, I did a lot of looking at public 
accountability, particularly around government 
accountability . . . – (P01, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
I can tell you, I have been working in the commercial side of 
health now since August 1998 . . . – (P08, a senior manager of 
a DHB) 
 
These examples show that the participants established their credibility as 
informants by highlighting their experiences before sharing their views or 
making claims on a particular issue. 
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4.4 Chapter summary 
 
In summary, this chapter sets out the detailed process for collecting, 
analysing and interpreting research evidence followed in this study. The 
hermeneutics approach was employed to illustrate the meanings of 
accountability in the context of constant public health reforms.  The methods 
of collecting data involved reviewing documents and conducting interviews.  
The data were analysed using critical hermeneutics to enable independent 
interpretation.  The validity and reliability of this study were assured 
throughout each of the steps in the process of research.   
 
The study’s findings, which were generated from document review and 
interviews are presented in the next two chapters: Chapter Five and Chapter 
Six.  Chapter Five presents the historical background of the public health 
system. It provides the basis for my preunderstanding of the New Zealand 
health systems.  In Chapter Six the health managers’ experiences in dealing 
with reforms, policy changes and accountability are described. These lived 
experiences helped me to develop a fuller understanding of accountability in 
the context of reform. 
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5 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
PREUNDERSTANDING  
THE NEW ZEALAND HEALTH REFORMS AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate my initial knowledge or 
preunderstanding of health service reform and the emergence of 
accountability issues in the New Zealand public health system.  This initial 
knowledge represents the first stage of understanding (or Stage 1, see Figure 
3.1, p. 72) of the research issue. The knowledge is demonstrated through the 
narrative of health service reform which was developed using a review of 
documents collected from various academic journals, the government’s 
websites, policy documents and reports.  My aim in this preunderstanding 
chapter is to disclose my thinking about health service reform. Specifically, 
this preunderstanding stage addresses the first research question: what 
changes in the public health system have taken place over the last four stages 
of reform and what were the rationales for them in terms of accountability?   
 
In this study, my preunderstanding of health service reform in New Zealand 
serves as the basis for the next stage of understanding, which is presented in 
Chapter Six.  The narrative of my preunderstanding knowledge is divided 
into two main sections. In the first section, I discuss the background of the 
New Zealand health system, and the pressure factors for reforms.  The 
discussion covers the initial setting-up of a nation-wide New Zealand health 
system from the 1930s and concludes with the recent stage of reform in 2014.  
In this section, I identify two important pieces of information: firstly, the 
drivers of reform and formats for reform, which describe the important 
changes made at every stage of reform.  Secondly, I reveal the emergence of 
accountability issues in the public health system 
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5.2 The initial setting-up of the New Zealand public health 
system 
 
In the late 1930s, the Labour government proposed and then implemented 
the Social Security Act 1938 with the aim of protecting the New Zealand 
public from the economic hazards resulting from the Great Depression of the 
early 1930s.  Social security strategies proposed to support this act was to 
provide a  universal health care system that would be free at the point of use 
to all New Zealander (Ashton, 2005; Morgan & Simmons, 2009).  The 
government of the day believed that health was a fundamental right for every 
citizen and, therefore, services should be universally available regardless of 
individuals’ ability to pay (The Government White Paper, 1974). 
 
However, the proposal to provide free, universal health care for all New 
Zealander was never completed because it was strongly opposed by local GPs 
who were members of the New Zealand branch of the British Medical 
Association (Jacobs, 1997). GPs regarded a fully-funded health system as a 
threat to their individual business interests. GPs rejected the idea of being 
employed as part of the government’s health workforce. They asked the 
government to respect their rights as private medical professionals, 
especially in the determining of fees to be paid to a doctor (Gauld, 2008; 
Jacobs, 1997; Mays & Devlin, 2005; Starke, 2010).  After a three-year debate 
with GPs, the government finally agreed to subsidise GPs by reimbursing the 
full cost of their fee per consultation, while permitting GPs to levy patients for 
copayments (Ashton, 2005; Gauld, 2008). The government’s consent was 
seen as a turning point in the history of the New Zealand health sector as it 
created institutional arrangements that persist to this day (Gauld, 2001).   
 
As a result of the government consent in 1941, a ‘dual system’ of funding 
emerged in the New Zealand public health system under which two 
contrasting allocation methods between primary and secondary health care 
were applied (Barnett & Barnett, 1997; Barnett & Barnett, 2004; Starke, 
2010).  A nationalised or fully-funding system in the New Zealand health 
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system was genuinely applied for secondary care, whilst partial subsidy was 
applied for primary care and medication prescription (Ashton et al., 2005; 
Howell, 2005).  This dual funding system has enabled the government to have 
full control over secondary care but a limited influence in primary care 
(Morgan & Simmons, 2009).  
  
The dual funding method had a profound impact on the New Zealand public 
health system. This method separated the health care system into different 
sectors with clear distinctions between public and private, and primary and 
secondary care (Ashton, 2005; Cumming, 2011; Gauld, 2001). The distinction 
not only created the problem of separation between primary and secondary 
care but also influenced the allocation of public funding for the development 
of health care.  For instance, because the government funded, owned, and 
operated public hospitals, most of the public funding went to secondary care.  
As a result, public hospitals were equipped with the latest technology and 
facilities and the standard of hospital care has continued to be high (Gauld, 
2001).  Meanwhile, as primary care was privately owned by GPs, its 
development remained limited until the late 1990s (Starke, 2010).      
 
Under the partial subsidy system, GPs were granted the right to maintain 
their status as independent private practitioners, which gave them a higher 
level of autonomy and greater control over primary care than the 
government had.  For example, GPs were allowed to determine the location 
they would use to provide services and the price they would charge to their 
patients.  Consequently, a doctor could charge the patient over and above the 
subsidy if he or she felt the service warranted doing so (Richards, 1981).  At 
the same time, GPs could claim the subsidy from the government that 
covered about two-thirds or 66% of their total consultation fees (Cumming, 
Stillman, & Poland, 2009).   
 
The partial subsidy was seen as an open-ended budget system because the 
government did not put a limit on what could be claimed.  Basically, the 
government paid GPs on a claim basis according to the number of patients a 
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GP saw and drugs they prescribed (Jacobs, 1997).  Since the level of 
government control over primary care was limited, the rate of copayment 
was fully determined by GPs.  During the tough economic times, most of the 
GPs tended to increase the patients’ copayment rate in order to sustain their 
businesses.  For instance, as a result of the oil crisis in the 1970s,  the rate of 
copayment reached almost one-third of total GP fee-for-service charges and 
many patients expressed their dissatisfaction with the doctors’ fees (Barnett 
& Barnett, 2004).   
 
The increase in copayment charges caused patients with financial difficulties 
to delay seeking care and obtaining medication (Barnett & Barnett, 2004).  
Without consistent health care treatment at the primary care level, the 
chances of the public getting further treatment at the secondary care level 
decreased slightly because GPs were gatekeepers to secondary care.  The 
prerequisite to getting treatment at the secondary care level is that patients 
must obtain a referral letter from a GP (Jacobs, 1997; Mays & Devlin, 2005).  
In other words, patients with a limited opportunity to see a GP because of 
financial difficulties would be automatically denied access to secondary care.  
Consequently, the problem of health disparities in New Zealand grew 
(Barnett & Barnett, 2004). 
 
In summary, the foundations of the New Zealand public health system were 
laid through the Social Security Act of 1938. However, the initial aim of the 
Act was never fully realised.  Due to the strong opposition from the GPs, the 
Act enabled New Zealand to adopt a dualism structure in its public health 
system. Although this system of dualism was formed by accident, and 
resulted in a fragmentation, the Act continues to underpin the present public 
health system and has remained unchanged since first being introduced. 
 
5.2.1 The call to reform the health sector 
 
The world economic recession in the mid-1970s, which was caused by the oil 
crisis, put considerable pressure on governments around the world to change 
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the way in which they managed the State sector, primarily because 
governments were experiencing declines in tax collection and increases in 
public expenditure (Loffler, 2003).  As a result, most governments suffered 
from fiscal stress during the recession, as the oil crisis hit different countries 
at different times and with different severity (Cendon, 2000; Loffler, 2003).   
New Zealand also faced strong economic pressures caused by massive public 
sector deficits, external trade imbalances and high overseas borrowing 
during the 1970s’ economic recession (Grafton, Hazledine, & Buchardt, 1997).  
For instance, during the oil crisis, New Zealand trade fell by nearly half in a 
year; and this resulted in a steady rise in the inflation and unemployment 
rates.  As a result, in 1984, the annual budget deficit was $3 billion and the 
public overseas debt was above $4 billion (State Services Commission, 1998).  
 
Prior to the 1980s reform, the way in which the New Zealand public sector 
operated was seen as a major source of financial inefficiency; and New 
Zealand health services were identified as being amongst the least efficient 
parts of the State sector (McKinlay, 2000; Prince, Kearns, & Graig, 2006). For 
example, the practice of cash accounting in the government financial 
management system became an issue because nobody knew the true cost of 
public sector activities. Department budgets were constructed on the basis of 
inputs (the cost of production), rather than outputs (the quality or value of 
the product) (McKinlay, 2000). Furthermore, the central control of inputs 
substantially limited to the capacity of public sector managers to manage. As 
a result, the New Zealand public sector was perceived as inefficient (Hughes 
& Smart, 2012).  
 
In relation to the situation outlined above, in the 1970s and 1980s there were 
debates about the need for cost containment, for better access to services, 
and for better coordination of different areas in health care (Starke, 2010).  
According to Fougere (1994) the situation had forced the government to 
rationalise the health care system so that it could deliver more with the same 
input of resources.  As a result, the government began looking for a system 
that would help to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and performance of 
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the health services. The history of reform began when the Labour 
government proposed a grand design for health administration through its 
White Paper: A Health Service for New Zealand 1974 (Martin & Salmond, 
2001).  This proposal aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness in 
health care delivery.  
  
Although the Labour government was defeated in the 1975 election, some of 
Labour’s proposals were later implemented by the National government.   
For instance, the National government enacted the Area Health Boards Act 
1983 and decided to pilot the AHBs system, that had been designed by 
Labour, in the Northland and Wellington regions before proceeding with the 
full plan (Gauld, 2001).  A new health funding system, called population-
based funding was also introduced in 1983.   
   
Labour was back in office after the 1984 election and decided to implement 
the full AHBs system throughout the country. Commencing from 1984 
onwards, the New Zealand public health system has experienced at least four 
stages of reforms, including minor and radical changes under both left- and 
right-wing governments.  Table 5.1 shows the timelines of major reform in 
the New Zealand public health system from 1984 to the present. 
 
Table 5:1 The timelines for the stages of reform in the New Zealand 
public health system from 1984 to the present 
 Year(s) Stages and Types of reform 
1984 - 1992 The beginning of reform 
The Area Health Boards (AHBs) system 
1993 -1999 Radical market-based reform 
1993 – The Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) and Crown 
Health Enterprises (CHEs) system 
1997 – The Health Funding Authority (HFA) and Hospital 
Health Services (HHSs) system 
1999 - 2008 More planned and community-oriented reform 
The District Health Boards (DHBs) system  
2008 to present Moves towards a unified model of care (post-2008 reform) 
The Integrated DHBs (National Health Board, Regional 
Health Board and District Health Boards) and Primary Care 
Network 
Source: (Gauld, 2003b, 2012; NZ Parliamentary Library, 2009) 
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The following sections discuss the stages and types of reform in the New 
Zealand public health system from 1984 to the present day.  
 
5.3 The beginning of reform: The AHBs system (1984-1992) 
 
5.3.1 Issues prior to reform 
 
Following the 1938 legislation and the adoption of the dual funding method, 
the public health system became increasingly complex (Gauld, 2003b).  
According to the government, in the 1970s, the failure to coordinate health 
services between primary and secondary care affected the ability of the 
system to provide an efficient and cost-effective health service delivery, and 
established the problem of equity in terms of access to services for all New 
Zealanders (The Government White Paper, 1974).  In practice, operating the 
dual health system significantly increased the government expenditure.  
Gauld (2001) notes that “over the period 1935-1945, the state’s 
contributions virtually doubled, from 39 percent of the total health 
expenditure to 73 percent and by 1980 stabilised around 80 percent of the 
total” (p. 23).  Due to the ever-increasing growth in health expenditure, the 
capacity of the government to sustain this upward trend in health 
expenditure came into question (Martin & Salmond, 2001).  The situation 
became critical when the first oil crisis began to hit the New Zealand’s 
economy in 1973/74.  In response to the situation, the government decided 
to adopt some new managerial strategies in the public health system.  
 
5.3.2 The formats of reform and their challenges 
 
Based on Labour’s proposal, the National government introduced a modest 
health restructuring through the passage of the Area Health Boards 
Accountability Act 1983 and the establishment of the AHBs system in 
Northland and Wellington regions as a pilot study (Ashton, 2005).  When 
Labour returned to office in 1984, the original plan of the AHBs system was 
implemented: 30 local Hospital Boards and Health Development Units were 
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gradually restructured into 14 Area Health Boards (AHBs).  The AHBs system 
was fully realised in 1989.  Similar to the older hospital board system, AHBs 
were responsible for secondary and tertiary care in their area with the 
coverage populations for each AHB varying according to geographical 
locations: the smallest covered 35,000 people in total, while the largest 
catered for 900,00 people (Starke, 2010).  Under the AHBs system, board 
members were elected; they appointed their own chief executives.  This 
practice showed that the communities were given important roles in 
managing health services.   
  
AHBs received budgets from the government on the basis of population 
criteria (principally, on the basis of the patients’ ages). Starke (2010) 
revealed that the population-based funding marked the introduction of a new 
emphasis on cost containment in providing health services. The government 
introduced a moderate NPM reform through the implementation of 
systematic planning and result-oriented reporting, finite budgets and 
informal contracts between AHBs and the Minister of Health (Barnett & 
Barnett, 1997). Each AHB was required to sign a performance-oriented 
accountability agreement with the Minister of Health based on the health 
goals and targets described by the New Zealand Health Charter 1989 (NZ 
Parliamentary Library, 2009).  According to Barnett and Barnett (2003), the 
introduction of contractual relationships between the Ministry of Health and 
AHBs involved business principles and a management approach that 
included accountability and performance monitoring. These changes 
reflected the adoption of NPM strategies in health services.  
 
Unlike secondary care, the primary care services continued to be separately 
funded and provided (Ashton & Tenbensel, 2010; Gauld, 1999, 2003a).  
However, the primary care subsidy continued to grow at around 6% per 
annum  and patients’ copayment also increased, in process becoming 
amongst the highest in developed countries (Starke, 2010). High copayment 
charges created barriers to regular preventive care.  As a result, there was a 
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growing inequality in access, especially in isolated areas where people could 
not normally afford the GPs’ service fee (Barnett & Barnett, 2003). 
 
In the early 1990s, further dissatisfaction with New Zealand’s health care 
system arose.   Despite evidence of positive improvement shown by the AHBs 
system, such as declining average length of stay in hospitals and little growth 
in the health spending as a percent of GDP between 1980-1990, the system 
was found to be inadequate to resolve the problems of financial 
accountability (Barnett & Barnett, 2003; Starke, 2010).  Fragmentation of 
services between primary, secondary and tertiary care, along with different 
funding and accountability arrangements, led to costs shifting and tensions in 
health delivery management (Ashton et al., 2005; Barnett & Barnett, 2003).  
The AHBs system was reported to be inefficient and poorly managed, 
exceeding its budget and severely eroding assets in public hospitals (Mays & 
Devlin, 2005).   
 
According to Maani, Yeoh, and Wallence (1998), the AHBs’ problems arose 
due to several factors such as: lack of incentives for efficiency on the part of 
AHBs; inadequate monitoring by the government; and the dual accountability 
of AHBs to their elected representatives (to their community that elected 
them) and to the government that provided the funding (Ashton et al., 2005; 
Cumming & Mays, 2002).  Moreover, Cumming and Mays (2002) suggest that 
the funding system for health populations was criticised for being unrelated 
to local population needs; making it difficult for the central government to 
contain costs; and for fragmenting health care services. Consequently, the 
waiting lists in public hospitals continued to grow whilst public confidence in 
the health system started to decline (Morgan & Simmons, 2009). These 
perceived problems pressured the government to look for other forms of 
reform.  
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5.4 Radical market-oriented reform: The RHAs and CHEs 
system (1993-1999) 
 
5.4.1 Issues prior to reform 
 
Following the election of the National government in October 1990, a number 
of radical changes in the delivery of social services, including health, were 
announced. The changes in health were announced through the passing of 
the Health and Disability Services Act 1993.  This Act was guided by a quasi-
market approach and rooted in neoliberal ideology. Hence, the Act was highly 
concerned with the principles of “fairness, self-reliance, greater personal 
choice, and efficiency” (Gauld, 1999, p. 56).   
 
Health changes were led by the Treasury which itself was already being 
influenced by the idea of market mechanisms and competition.  Barnett and 
Barnett (2003) names three reports which influenced the Treasury decisions 
in directing new reforms.  They were: 
1. Alain Enthoven’s works: Enthoven is an American professor who 
introduced the idea of an internal market in health care through a 
concept called ‘managed care–managed competition’. His publications 
on this area, especially around 1970s and 1980s inspired the British 
health care reform in the late 1980s.  Since New Zealand has a close 
relationship with Britain, the adoption of reform in Britain 
significantly influenced the direction of reform in New Zealand   
2. The CS First Boston Company report: The CS First Boston was 
commissioned by the New Zealand Business Roundtable to provide a 
report on delivering and financing health care in New Zealand. The 
report published in 1991, was authored by Patricia Danzon, a visiting 
American Professor for the CS First Boston, a company that provided 
consultation to the National Party.   
3. The Gibbs Report: This was a review of hospitals and related services 
provided by a government-appointed taskforce.  The taskforce was led 
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by Alan Gibbs, a New Zealand prominent businessman who strongly 
supported free-market views.  This report was published in 1988. 
 
According to Treasury, the level of health service efficiency could be 
improved if the health sector opened a way for private sector involvement 
(Ashton et al., 2005; Starke, 2010).  The Treasury believed that resources 
could be better used through a system of managed competition (Alam & 
Lawrence, 1994).  The decision to adopt the quasi market reform in health 
services was made by the National government in 1991 (Gibbs, Scott, & 
Fraser, 1988). The announcement surprised the New Zealand public because 
the adoption of that model demanded a ‘big bang’ implementation process, 
and subsequently reconfigured the whole New Zealand public health system. 
 
This reform decision was widely criticised because it was made on the basis 
of how the government perceived health services rather than on the basis of 
a systematic evaluation of the health system (Lawrence, 2005).  The 
announcement of health reform was seen as an abrupt decision from the top 
aimed at reducing government expenses.  Even more surprisingly, there were 
no discussions or requests for submissions from interested parties prior to 
the introduction of legislation to implement this approach to reform.  Some 
critics claimed that the government had shown its authoritative voice with 
regards to the reform decisions (Ashton, 1995), while Alam and Lawrence 
(1994) claimed that “the Government’s ‘real’ motive was to reduce health 
spending either by reducing the cost or shifting some of the burden to users” 
(p. 42). 
 
5.4.2 The formats of reform and their challenges 
 
Through the quasi market-based reform, the government aimed to achieve 
two main objectives: “to focus public funding on the most important 
treatments and the neediest patients; and to improve the efficiency of 
hospital systems” (Morgan & Simmons, 2009, p. 31).  In order to achieve 
those objectives, the government abolished AHBs and elected representation, 
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and introduced separate organisations which would be responsible for 
purchasing and provisioning health services (Ashton et al., 2005; Thompson 
& Gauld, 2001).  Four new purchasing agents, called Regional Health 
Authorities (RHAs), were established as purchasers for their populations.  
The role of RHAs was to assess the health service requirements of their 
populations and to purchase services as necessary from the most cost- 
effective providers (Ashton, 1995). 
 
Meanwhile, the service delivery arms of AHBs were transformed into 23 local 
Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs). As publicly owned, limited liability 
companies, CHEs were to be run on a commercial basis by making them – 
including private hospitals – compete against each other for a contract with 
RHAs (NZ Parliamentary Library, 2009; Starke, 2010).  The government 
appeared to assume that the competition would force CHEs to improve the 
quality of their services and to reduce the costs of health provision by 
between 24% and 32% (Gibbs et al., 1988; Morgan & Simmons, 2009). 
Therefore, public hospitals were required to be run as efficient businesses 
with the aim of earning high investment returns for the government.   
 
Running public hospitals as business entities, however, appeared to be 
difficult for several reasons. First, the injection of competing values into 
hospitals eroded the spirit of cooperation which, in turn, undermined the 
potential for New Zealand to have a ‘national health system’.   Morgan and 
Simmons (2009) reported that the conceiving of public hospitals as business 
entities discouraged CHEs from sharing health innovations and information.  
Health innovations and new health information were regarded as strategic 
business tools by each CHE and these business tools were treated as CHEs’ 
confidential documents.  In principle, CHEs had the right to keep their 
strategic tools confidential since they were protected by the Commerce Act 
1986.  However, from the public perspective, such protection denied the 
wider public its right to benefit from any innovations developed by any 
individual hospital.  
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Second, the introduction of Financial Management Reform (FMR) with the 
objective of improving economic efficiency and accountability, eroded the 
quality of health services (Lawrence, 2005; Mays & Devlin, 2005).  FMR was a 
part of the New Zealand public sector reform, and was backed by three 
legislative changes: The State Owned Enterprise Act 1986, The State Sector 
Act 1988, and the Public Finance Act 1989 (Lawrence, Alam, & Lowe, 1994).  
The implementation of FMR was driven by three main objectives: efficiency, 
effectiveness, and value for money, which led to major changes in public 
sector accounting, including the health sector.  In order to achieve those 
objectives, costs were used by health providers as the basis of health service 
provisions.  This approach meant that providers would provide health 
services only if the services achieved the required efficiency level. Efficiency 
was described in the following terms: 
1. the overall health expenditure gets maximum benefit from the 
resources used. 
2. choices of expenditure are the best that could be made and no change 
in priorities among categories of public or private spending would 
improve overall welfare.   
(Scott, Fougere, & Marwick, 1986, p. 11). 
 
Although the concept of health efficiency was clearly defined, Scott et al., 
(1986) argued that the concept of efficiency is hard to apply, especially in a 
narrower context such as identifying the most efficient way of giving health 
treatment, because individual health conditions differ. Furthermore, 
measuring curative services is tricky because a cause and effect relationship 
between spending additional money and gaining further improvement in 
health status is hard to identify. 
 
The search for efficiency in health through market-based reform led to a 
major transformation in the New Zealand public health system.   According to 
Lawrence, Alam and Lowe (1994), “the recent reforms in NZ are intended to 
be sweeping and to change the culture of health care providers by 
increasingly infusing management with the conceptual language of business, 
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economics and of accounting rather than medical services” (p. 69).  This 
intention can be seen through the breaking down of an integrated hospital 
into a number of ‘profit centres’, in which each centre is urged to use 
accounting information in controlling clinical costs and allocating resources 
(Lawrence, 2005).  
  
To support the operation of profit centres, public hospitals were required to 
link the service output with funding.  Furthermore, to realise this 
requirement, public hospitals were encouraged to adopt a more commercial 
approach in managing health care provision (Lowe, 2001).  In relation to this, 
public hospitals developed a casemix system and institutionaled Diagnosis 
Related Group (DRG) framework. The casemix and DRG framework “is an 
attempt to manage and regulate medical practice in relation to the 
consumption of resource” (Lowe, 2001, p. 85). This framework, which is 
rooted in accounting information technology, is used as the basis of managing 
clinical activities by linking patients’ information (diagnosis, age and 
treatment) with resource allocation. The use of this framework was expected 
to enhance efficiency and effectiveness, as well as accountability in public 
hospitals because information generated from the DRG system will facilitates 
clinicians to limit unnecessary procedures and improve treatment protocols 
(Lowe, 2001).   
  
However, being overly concern about cost efficiency as well as value for 
money in measuring health efficiency resulted in difficulties for patients in 
receiving health treatment.  For example, Lawrence (2005) contends that the 
patients’ illnesses were no longer treated by a single centre but by a number 
of related centres.  The breaking down of an integrated centre into small and 
independent profit centres created difficulties for patients in obtaining health 
treatment.  In many instances, patients were moved backwards and forwards 
from one centre to another just to meet the centres’ costing procedure.  Such 
processes were seen as potentially affecting the quality of health services 
adversely. Similar results were identified in the casemix and DRG framework.  
The work of Lowe (2001) revealed that the case mix and DRG coding system 
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had, in practice, proved to be rather difficult due to inability of the health 
actors to commit with the system. 
 
Furthermore, being overly concern about the costs and value for money 
issues has negative implications on patients.  For instance, the rights of the 
public to receive health treatments were denied, especially when the cost of 
treatments was high.  The case of Rau Williams, who was denied health 
treatments because of their high estimated cost, was a classic example 
(Lawrence, 2005; Manning & Paterson, 2005; Morgan & Simmons, 2009).   
Williams, a 63 years old man with diabetes was in the end-stage of renal 
failure. Northland Health refused his admittance to the End Stage Renal 
Failure programme (Feek et al., 1999). The decision was made on the basis of 
the access guidelines for entry into end-stage renal failure programmes.  
Three criteria were used as the indicators: age of the patient must be below 
75 years old, patients must have no other serious diseases, and the cost of 
services must fall within a capped budget. Feek et al. (1999) argued that 
these guidelines were based on resource issues because patients with end-
stage renal failure will often die if they do not receive renal replacement. 
Consequently, another renal treatment will not improve renal patients’ 
health status.  In other words, investment in renal treatment will not provide 
a good return in terms of health status.  
 
In relation to the above case, the media reported the public health system as 
“the hapless, faithfully taxpaying Kiwi condemned to die by heartless 
bureaucrats because the lifesaving treatment she or he needs is deemed too 
expensive” (Morgan & Simmons, 2009, p. 32).  Hospital management’s lack of 
sensitivity to the needs of patients, compared to the costs of treatment, also 
increased the length of waiting lists.  Within the first 3 years of the 
implementation of the quasi market-based reform strategy, the waiting lists 
continued to grow, increasing numberically from 64,000 in 1993 to over 
94,000 in 1996 (Morgan & Simmons, 2009). 
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Third, public health is a public good and, therefore, commercialising the 
public good is challenging (Barker, 1996). In fact, in most cases, 
commercialising the public good with the aim of improving efficiency always 
ends in disappointments (Gilson, Doherty, Loewenson, & Francis, 2007).  This 
failure to improve efficiency can be seen from the growing cost borne by 
governments and patients as a result of unexpected market conditions.  For 
instance, CHEs were established with the objective of improving efficiency 
and effectiveness in health delivery.  However, the reality indicated that CHEs 
inherited and continued to post deficits, and none returned any profits to the 
Crown (Mays & Devlin, 2005).  For instance, by the end of the 1996/7 
financial year, the 23 CHEs were carrying debts of NZ$219.3 million, 
representing a negative return on equity of close to 12% and the predictions 
of financial improvement for 1997/8 were not achieved (Gauld, 1999). 
 
The above  situations show that the result of quasi market-based reform in 
public health appeared to produce the reverse of the government’s earlier 
objectives. Rather than decreasing, health expenditure grew significantly 
following the implementation of the market-based strategy.  According to 
Easton (2002), the reform was expensive, with total estimated costs ranging 
from 2% to 10% of the total annual health budget.  The cost increased 
because the government had to bail out hospitals which overspent their 
budget (Fougere, 2001). In relation to such situations, Lawrence (2005) 
described the quasi market-based reform in the New Zealand public health 
system as a case of “iatrogenic disorder” (p. 4) that is, the remedy prescribed 
by the government for the treatment of public illness turned out to be more 
harmful than the illness itself.  
 
Public health is not like other sectors, in which efficiency can be measured 
through the ‘input and output process’.  In health services, the quality of 
services is much more important than efficiency (Lawrence, 2005).  Although 
economic efficiency may be achieved, it might not appear to be something 
that patients need the most.  For these reasons, the quasi market-based 
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reform in the public health system was sharply criticised, in particular by 
providers and health care workers (Lawrence, 2005). 
 
In response to such situations, the next coalition Government, which was 
established in 1996, decided to reduce the market element by introducing 
more centralised control (Starke, 2010).  The four RHAs were combined into 
a single national government purchasing agency, called the Health Funding 
Authority (HFA), which was responsible for the purchase of all public health 
and social care services in all regions, whilst CHEs were reconfigured as not-
for-profit Crown-owned companies called Hospital and Health Services 
(HHSs) (Ashton et al., 2005).  Despite the fact that the for-profit objective of 
health provision was removed, providers were still required to operate in a 
business-like manner (Gauld, 1999). 
 
Meanwhile, unlike reform at the secondary care level, the implementation of 
health service reform at the primary care level was limited to management of 
the funding system.  For example, in 1991, the government revised the 
primary health funding system and replaced the universal funding formula 
with a system targeted according to patients’ income and level of use of the 
service (Mays & Devlin, 2005).  The government believed that by targeting 
subsidies to lower income groups, it would improve the access of these 
groups to health services. To reduce the financial barriers, the Community 
Service Card (CSC) and High Use Health Care Card (HUHC) were introduced 
to the targeted populations (Cumming et al., 2009).  The CSC card was made 
available for low-income households, whilst HUHC was designed for those 
who regularly used a primary health service (Cumming et al., 2009).  
According to Starke (2010), the changes in subsidy criteria marked a new 
emphasis on cost containment in New Zealand public health. 
 
As a result of the above changes, health services continued to be a national 
issue during the 1999 election campaign. The introduction of a new booking 
system which replaced the waiting list system was found to be unreliable 
(Morgan & Simmons, 2009).  Under the new booking system, a patient who 
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was on the waiting list could be entered into the booking system if he or she 
could be given a date for surgery within the coming 6 months.  If patients 
failed to obtain a date within that period, their name would not be recorded 
officially and would automatically drop off the waiting list (Lawrence, 2005; 
Morgan & Simmons, 2009).   
 
Meanwhile, it was found that the targeted subsidy system introduced in 
primary care struggled to achieve its initial objectives.  Mays and Devlin 
(2005) point out that under the targeted subsidy system, the GPs’ 
consultation fees increased for lower income adults but decreased for higher 
income adults.  In addition, while the quality of New Zealand primary health 
care services was rated well against international comparisons, studies on 
the accessibility of primary care showed the reverse (Mays & Devlin, 2005).  
   
The Labour Party criticised the government “for its narrow focus on the 
production of services rather than the improvement of health, for having 
fragmented a public service, for fostering commercial behaviour, for 
increasing transaction costs, and for lacking local democratic input” (Starke, 
2010, p. 501).  The market-based approach in health was seen as having 
failed to convince the New Zealand public and this failure helped to bring 
Labour back into office, after the 1999 general election.  The new Labour 
government introduced a new approach in the public health system with the 
aim of balancing the previous health policy objectives of efficiency, 
effectiveness and economy with equity, which is a traditional value of the 
welfare state (Lawrence, 2005).  The adoption of equity value indicated the 
government reform strategy in the New Zealand public health system moved 
from NPM to NPS framework. 
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5.5 More planned and community-oriented reform (1999 - 
2008): The DHBs system 
 
5.5.1 Issues prior to reform 
 
The quasi market-based reform in New Zealand health services in the 1990s 
cost the government around $270 million (Morgan & Simmons, 2009).   The 
government spent the money on reorganising health services through the 
establishment of new agencies and also through paying the government-
appointed health consultants.  The newly established health agencies were 
required to operate in a competitive business model with a strong emphasis 
on contracts and tenders, and price and quality (Gauld, 2005).   
 
The introduction of market-based reform replaced the triumvirate system, an 
old management system that based on consensus between three main three 
executives, namely a doctor, a nurse, and an administrator with a new system 
that separated the management from professional operations (Gibbs et al., 
1988).  In other words, the old triumvirate system was divided into two 
divisions, namely health services and health management. According to 
Matheson (2013a), under the separation system “a doctor’s got to do what a 
doctor’s got to do. Money was passed over for the provision of General 
Medical Services”(p.4). Matheson’s statements indicate that health services 
were led by the health professionals, whilst health management was directed 
by professional managers who were accorded a distinct and relatively high 
status.   
 
The market-based reform can be viewed as marking a tragic moment in the 
history of health service reform in New Zealand. The market model was 
criticised as unhealthy because the competitive tendering led to fragmented 
services, and lacked democratic values without accountability both to the 
government and local communities (Ashton et al., 2005; Gauld, 2005).  
Labour was trying to overhaul the system by reversing the market-based 
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strategies to community-based approaches. This new approach brought 
health services into yet another round of change. 
 
5.5.2 The formats of reform and their challenges 
 
In 2000, once again, a new sketch of New Zealand health care system was 
being drawn following the introduction of a new policy direction by the 
Labour-led coalition government. In this round of restructuring, the policy 
direction contrasted with the previous policy path as it fostered cooperative 
rather than competitive models of service provision (Barnett & Barnett, 
2004; Starke, 2010).  Changes were implemented through the passing of The 
New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act (NZPHDA) of 2000. The aims of 
this Act were to improve the health of the population, to reduce health 
disparities, and to ensure access to quality services by providing greater 
public input into health decision making (Barnett et al., 2009).   
  
In order to achieve the aims of the new Act, the government focused on two 
main strategies: re-reforming the key organisations of the health sector, and 
strengthening primary health care, including the subsidy system (Starke, 
2010).  The Ministry of Health then became the principal agency responsible 
for policy advice, funding and monitoring of the health and disability sector 
(NZ Parliamentary Library, 2009).  The single health funder, the HFA, was 
abolished and its functions were transferred to the newly restructured 
Ministry (Ashton et al., 2005).  The government reintroduced 21 regional 
health funding agencies called District Health Boards (DHBs) to replace 
HHSs. DHBs took responsibility for the purchase and provision of health 
services in their districts, including contracting with communities and 
primary care providers (Manning & Paterson, 2005; Morgan & Simmons, 
2009; NZ Parliamentary Library, 2009; Starke, 2010).  DHBs are governed by 
11 board members, 7 of which are locally elected while the remaining 4 are 
ministerially appointed.   
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The implementation of the NZPHDA very much resembled the AHB system 
which had been legislated in the 1980s and scrapped in 1993; however, the 
main difference lies in the fact that the 2000 Act recognises DHBs as Crown 
entities whose boards, both elected and appointed, are responsible to the 
Minister of Health (Ministry of Health, 2010).  In recognition of the Crown’s 
relationship with Maori, each board has to include at least two Maori 
members to ensure a minimum level of Maori representation on boards 
(Cumming & Mays, 2002).  Unlike the AHBs system, DHBs are the principal 
providers of primary, secondary and tertiary care (Ashton, 2005; Ministry of 
Health, 2010).   
 
This arrangement shows that DHBs are responsible for developing local 
health services that integrate all levels of health care. Simultaneously, the 
introduction of elected board member system reflects the effort of the 
government to democratise the health care governance by increasing public 
participation in health care planning and the decision making process (Gauld, 
2005).  Nevertheless, although DHBs do not have a role in formulating policy, 
they do have important roles in implementing policy.  Specifically, DHBs are 
responsible for planning, prioritising, and purchasing from an appropriate 
range of providers for their population (Gauld, 2005). 
 
The most interesting aspect of this stage of reform is that the NZPHDA 
recognised the role of primary care in improving the health status and 
reducing health disparities among New Zealand’s populations.  After being 
separated for nearly 60 years, primary care was finally being included as a 
part of the national reform strategy under the NZPHDA.  The government 
showed its efforts to strengthen primary health care through the passing of 
the New Zealand Primary Health Care Strategy (NZPHCS) in 2002.  Uniquely, 
rather than providing a detailed implementation plan for the primary care 
system and overall health sector, the NZPHCS is full of new visions for 
developing the primary care system.  This point is clearly made in the 
NZPHCS document which states:  
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The Strategy [NZPHCS] outlines a new vision for primary 
health care.  It does not contain details of implementation, 
which will involve evolutionary change to protect the gains 
already made.  Involvement and collaboration with the 
primary health care sector will be a key feature of the 
implementation process in the coming months and years.  
This is crucial to ensure that all issues are considered in 
developing the new arrangements.  
(Ministry of Health, 2001, p. ix). 
 
Under the NZPHCS, the government aims to create a strong primary care-
focused health system aligned with the principles of the Alma-Ata 
Declaration of the World Health Organisation (WHO), which New Zealand 
signed in 1978 (OECD, 2009).   Specifically, the primary care reform created 
two main instruments: a new primary health model, which involves 
community participation in improving the health of people; and, an alteration 
in the method of paying primary care subsidies (OECD, 2009).  Howell (2005) 
considers that “the primary care reform under the NZPHCS fundamentally 
rewrites the ‘social contract’ between taxpayers, the government and general 
practitioners, with consequent changes in responsibilities and cash flows in 
the sector” (p. 6).    
 
Through the NZPHCS, the government introduced a new form of primary care 
called Primary Health Organisations (PHOs).  Basically, PHOs consist of 
“networks of different health care providers – and not just, as IPAs usually 
were, a GP network – and are supposed to be community owned and 
governed” (Starke, 2010, p. 503).  Under this model, the PHOs are recognised 
as the DHBs’ vehicles with responsibility for providing essential primary 
health care services to their enrolled populations.  The following are the 
criteria of a newly formed PHO as outlined by the government: 
1. PHO will be funded by DHBs for the provision of a set of essential 
primary health care services to those people who are enrolled. 
2. At a minimum, these services will include approaches directed 
towards improving and maintaining the health of the population, as 
well as first-line services to restore people’s health when they are 
unwell. 
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3. PHOs will be expected to involve their communities in their governing 
process. 
4. All providers and practitioners must be involved in the organisation’s 
decision-making, rather than one group being dominant. 
5. PHOs will be not-for-profit bodies and will be required to be fully and 
openly accountable for all public funds that they receive. 
6. While primary care practitioners will be encouraged to join PHOs, 
membership will be voluntary.   
(Ministry of Health, 2001, p. 5) 
 
The formation of the PHO model was also seen as an effort on the part of the 
government to downplay the role of GPs in primary care (Barnett & Barnett, 
2004).  The previous health reform (1993-1999), which focused on the 
competition among CHEs for RHAs contracts, led to the establishment of 
Independent Practitioner Associations (IPAs) (Starke, 2010). IPAs were 
comprised of GPs and other health providers, both large and small, with the 
main aim of this amalgamation being to give the GPs a better position from 
which to negotiate contracts with the purchasing bodies in the quasi market 
system (Gauld, 2008; Starke, 2010). For example, Barnett and Barnett (1997) 
stated that “IPAs were viewed as vehicles for protecting the status of general 
practice in the face of considerable uncertainty in GP relations with RHAs” 
(p.56).  As a new organisational model, IPAs spread very quickly in the 1990s 
and by 1999 over 80% of GPs belonged to an IPA (Starke, 2010).   
The dominant position of IPAs in primary care indicated that they had a 
strong influence in controlling the rate of copayments.  Too frequently, the 
rate of copayments was increased by the IPAs-GPs without concern for the 
ability of the vulnerable groups to pay (Starke, 2010).  As a result, the 
problem of health disparities widened among these groups due to the issues 
of limitation of access.  In response to such a problem, the government tried 
to minimise the role of IPAs in health service delivery by increasing 
community involvement as proposed through the new PHO model.  Howell 
(2006) regards the new PHO model as the intention of government to replace 
the “old isolated ways of working” with a “new collaborative model” (p. 3). 
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To improve the format of health service delivery, the government also 
introduced a new funding system called capitation.  The capitation system 
was seen as an effort to reduce the cost barrier which deterred some people 
from seeking care (Ashton, 2005).  Through this system, the government 
aimed to reduce copayments for all populations by providing extra funding in 
order to ensure a reduction of out-of-pocket expenditure for the most 
vulnerable groups (Cumming & Mays, 2002; Starke, 2010).  Specifically, the 
vulnerable groups were determined according to geographical location, age, 
ethnicity and chronic health condition.  The identified vulnerable groups will 
receive the higher funding rate (Starke, 2010).   
 
The bulk government payment to PHOs was determined by two alternative 
capitation formulas, namely, the access formula and the interim formula 
(Ashton, 2005).  According to Ashton (2005), the access formula applied only 
for PHOs in which 50% of their enrolled populations were either Maori or 
Pacific, or living in a deprived area.   Meanwhile, the interim formula applied 
to all other PHOs whose populations had light and moderate primary care 
requirements and who reside in nondeprived areas (Cordery, 2008).  In 
order to reduce the level of copayments for primary care, the government has 
increased the higher subsidy rate to include all age groups starting from July 
2007 onwards (Jatrana & Crampton, 2009).  
 
The initial implementation of the 2000 reforms was reported as proceeding 
relatively smoothly (Ashton, 2005).  Cumming (2011) claims that evaluations 
of the new health care system revealed some important achievements and 
improvements in health care services, including statistically significant 
improvement in health disparities and in health outcomes.  For example, the 
Ministry of Health reported that infant mortality was dropping for both 
Maori and the total population, with the rate declining from 11.5 deaths per 
1,000 live births in 1996 to 6.6 per 1,000 in 2005 (45%).  Meanwhile, in 
relation to life expectancy, the statistics showed an increase of 3.5 years for 
males and 2.2 years for females over the period 1998-2007 (Smith, 2009). 
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Cumming (2011) claimed that, on the surface level, the 2000 reforms 
appeared to improve the health system, at both the primary and secondary 
care levels.  However, in-depth analysis of the 2000 reform strategies 
indicated some problematic mismatches between the management of health 
care and the health delivery frameworks and the initial reform objectives 
(Ashton, 2005; Cumming & Mays, 2002).  For instance, DHBs were facing 
several challenges in their roles as purchasers and providers in delivering 
health care services.  Although DHBs were given authority to manage their 
funding according to local needs, DHBs continued to face difficulties in 
planning for their populations.  The difficulties arose because of inaccurate 
information about the districts’ populations as a result of rapid internal 
migration (Ashton, 2005).   
 
Similarly, Ashton, Tenbensel, Cumming, and Barnett (2008) revealed that the 
DHBs’ chief executives and chairpersons claimed that the government used 
outdated population statistics in calculating health funding and sometimes 
gave incorrect domicile information for patients.  In many instances, DHBs 
were subjected to the requirements of the Ministry of Health, which retained 
control over discretionary spending.  For example,  this was the case when 
new money which was transferred to DHBs had already tagged for spending 
on specific services such as primary care and mental health service (Ashton 
et al., 2008).  For these reasons, it was sometimes difficult for DHBs to 
redistribute funds on the basis of local needs.    
 
Furthermore, DHBs were also struggling with financial difficulties.  Most 
DHBs had inherited a deficit from the previous CHEs structure (Ashton, et al., 
2008).  From the beginning of their establishment, DHBs were strongly 
encouraged by the government to reduce their deficits by 2005 and to work 
within their budget means.  By 2005, all DHBs had succeeded in reducing 
their deficits by reducing costs within their own hospitals and through the 
injection of additional funds from the government.  The combined DHB 
deficits in 2001/2002 fell from $287 million to $15 million in 2004/2005.  
However, this trend did not last because the health expenses increased from 
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time to time.  Again, by 2008/2009, DHBs were running a combined deficit of 
about $150 million and had made unfunded capital requests for between 
$436 and $636 million in the same period (Ministerial Review Group, 2009).   
 
Meanwhile, primary health care was also facing a number of serious 
challenges in delivering health care services to the public.  According to the 
OECD (2009) analysis, the result of the first 6 years of the NZPHCS had been 
mixed, and was mostly disappointing.  Of the total of 82 PHOs, half were 
categorised as small, with fewer than 20,000 enrolled in total (Gauld & Mays, 
2006). According to the OECD (2009) report, these small PHOs tend to be 
“community based, intrinsically motivated and receptive to community 
needs, and they have achieved some encouraging local successes, especially 
in deprived, poorly served areas with obviously high needs”(p. 126).  
However, in terms of management efficiency, the small PHOs were found to 
be less efficient due to their newly-formed status, restricted capacity and 
limited funding.  For instance, the management cost for a small PHO 
accounted for up to 21% of the total budget and subsequently the 
government increased management funding (Gauld & Mays, 2006).   
 
The other issue related to the PHOs model was the domination of the IPA-
formed PHOs in the primary care sector.  In the early implementation of the 
PHO model, the government announced that the capitation funding for 
primary care could flow only through membership with PHOs (Ministry of 
Health, 2001).  Following the announcement, some of the IPAs-aligned GPs 
took the lead in forming new IPAs provider-driven PHOs (Gauld, 2008; 
Howell, 2006).   Following this new formation of PHOs, the IPAs focused on 
other functions such as management services, clinical support services and 
advocacy, while the GPs continue to control patients charges (Gauld, 2008).  
Analysis of PHOs’ formation and enrolment patterns confirms that over 90% 
of individuals were registered with PHOs formed around IPAs (Howell, 
2006).  As a result, PHOs formed by IPAs simply became larger PHOs in their 
geographical areas.  The OECD (2009) analysis indicated that the larger PHOs 
“may be geographically scattered with little local loyalty and often appear to 
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be mostly business propositions to capture and channel public money” 
(p.126). 
 
As well as all the issues highlighted above, overall operations in the New 
Zealand health system were expected to become more pressing in the future 
due to a shortage of health workers.  For example, the Association of Salaried 
Medical Specialist (ASMS – the hospital doctors' union) revealed that New 
Zealand is facing a serious shortage of specialist doctors (Powel, 2011).  
OECD data released in 2009 show that New Zealand was positioned at the 
bottom of the OECD table in terms of the number of practising specialists, 
with 0.8 specialists per 1,000 population (Association Salaried Medical 
Specialist, 2010).  Thus, New Zealand falls well short of its international 
counterparts in having less than half of the OECD average 1.8 per 1,000.  By 
contrast, Australia, which is also experiencing health workforce shortages 
and also fell short of the OECD average, still managed to have 1.4 specialists 
per 1,000 population (Association Salaried Medical Specialist, 2010).  
Meanwhile, the New Zealand Nurses Organisation reported a shortage of 
2,000 nurses (Powel, 2011).  The Executive Director of ASMS claimed that the 
shortage of senior hospital specialists and nurses was causing DHBs to fail to 
meet the government health care targets. 
 
In addition, the National Party raised concerns about the growing percentage 
spent on health. Since 2000, the DHBs system was seen as consuming a large 
amount of the public budget, i.e., $5 billion or 9% of GDP.  However, the 
budget increment was not followed by a growth in the quality of health care 
delivery as waiting times were growing (Ryall, 2007). The National Party 
Leader, John Key, argued that while too much taxpayer money was being 
wasted,  too few improvements were being made (Ryall, 2007).  As a result, 
several questions pertaining to the performance and sustainability of the 
New Zealand health system emerged.  In response to them, National 
proposed a better health performance through smarter use of resources.  The 
following subsection discusses the post-2008 health reform. 
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5.6 Towards a unified model of care (post-2008 reform) 
 
5.6.1 Issues prior to reform 
 
Prior to the 2008 election, the National Party published a series of policy 
announcements for health.  Perhaps, because the government noticed that 
previous arguments had been inadequate to persuade people to concur with 
more reforms, arguments for reform in recent reviews of health services 
have changed slightly. The arguments have shifted from the impact of macro 
issues (economy and social factors) to the micro or internal issues in health 
services (health sector performance). For instance, in 2009, the Ministerial 
Review Group (MRG) rationalised the needs for reform from sustainability 
perspectives.  According to the report, the future of New Zealand public 
health system is under serious threat because of several challenges such as 
ageing population, health workforce shortages, poor quality of services and 
unsustainable health funding due to raising costs in health services.   
 
The National Party believed that the existing public health system, which 
operated in a fragmented structure, was seen as unable to face such 
challenges.   The fragmented health structure had resulted in administrative 
and service duplications which led to variations in quality of care, 
unacceptable waiting times, and unequal access to health services (Ryall, 
2007).  Gauld (2012) describes the scenario of the public health system as 
follows: 
For a small country of 4.3 million, 21 DHBs and 81 PHOs 
seemed excessive, with high transaction costs, considerable 
duplication of planning, purchasing and administrative 
activities and wide-ranging concerns about variation in size, 
efficiency and service access.  Clinical staff, meantime, had 
become increasingly alienated from management and policy 
makers. (p. 111)   
 
Therefore, from the National party perspective, reform was needed in order 
to ensure the future sustainability of the health sector.  In the BSMC paper, 
the National party highlighted its proposals for improving the overall 
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performance of health services (Ryall, 2007). According to National, the 
outlined proposals not only react to today’s problems but also prepare health 
services for future challenges. The concept of BSMC demonstrated the NPS’ 
intention to deliver better, timelier, and more convenient health care for all 
New Zealanders.  According to Ryall (2007), objectives of the BSMC policy are:  
1. to  reduce waiting times 
2. to improve quality and performance of health care 
3. to create a more conducive health care for better individual patient 
and family experience 
4. to provide a more trusted and motivated health workforce.   
 
In its publication, “Health policy: funding and framework”, National 
announced its funding intention and specific BSMC strategies (National Party, 
2008).  At the same time, National promised not to restructure but, rather, to 
focus on strengthening the health system by improving its performance 
(Gauld, 2012).  Soon after the election of National in 2008, the MRG was 
commissioned to review the health system and its performance (Gauld, 
2012).  The commission was chaired by Dr Murray Horn, a former Treasury 
Secretary and a private sector banker; the group also included leading 
clinicians and managers in the health sector (Gauld, 2012; Ryall, 2009).   
 
In the MRG’s report, “Meeting The Challenge”, the Commission revealed that 
the New Zealand public health and disability system was under serious threat 
due to excessive bureaucracy, lack of integrated care, low focus on patients' 
safety and quality, and lack of financial sustainability (Ministerial Review 
Group, 2009).  The Commission presented 170 recommendations on how to 
reduce bureaucracy, improve frontline health services, and improve value in 
the public health and disability sector through structural changes at the 
national, regional, and local levels. 
 
However, in a Parliamentary statement, the Minister of Health asserted that 
the government had no obligation to accept all the MRG’s recommendations.  
The government was concerned only with recommendations which would 
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help to reduce the problems of bureaucracy and inefficiency in health service 
delivery.  In the same statement, the government promised to ensure 
minimal disruptions in the wider health sector while implementing the 
process of reforms (Ryall, 2009). 
 
5.6.2 The formats of reform and their challenges 
 
In 2009, the government officially introduced BSMC initiatives as a “new 
model of care”.  This model focuses on patients rather than institutions as a 
core principle of service delivery (Cumming, 2011).  The aim of this model is 
to improve the efficiency and quality of care by reducing unnecessary 
bureaucracy and waste, and by moving resources to the front-line services 
(Gauld, 2012).  By focusing on quality improvement, the health system aims 
to deliver better patient outcomes and ensure better access to health services 
through smarter planning on resource allocations (Ministerial Review Group, 
2009).  
 
The government then formulated three main strategies to facilitate the 
achievement of these aims.  The strategies are: shifting responsibilities away 
from the district level at the regional and national levels by implementing 
several structural changes at the national, regional, and district levels; 
adopting the development of information technology (IT), both in purchasing 
and in providing services; and, addressing the problem of health workforce 
shortages (Ministerial Review Group, 2009). These strategies signalled that 
health services would enter into another round of change.  This new strategy 
for change conflicted with the government’s earlier promise that reform 
would be implemented without changing the existing health frameworks and 
structures (Ministerial Review Group, 2009).  
 
As with previous cycles reform, changes in health during this round of reform 
were also driven by the issues of financial efficiency and sustainability. 
Having 20 DHBs to deliver the same services in different districts was seen 
by the commission as a duplication of administrative tasks which led to a 
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waste of public resources.  Therefore, the government redesigned the 
existing structure of health service delivery.  The structural changes began in 
2009 at the central government level with the establishment of independent 
business units under the Ministry of Health, such as the NHB, the IT Health 
Board, Capital Investment Committee, and the HWNZ.  
 
Made up of a ministerially appointed board, the NHB is a Crown Health 
Funding Agency that reports directly to both the Minister and the Director 
General of Health (Gauld, 2012).  The NHB was set up to play crucial roles in 
creating more integrated health and disability support system at the national 
level.  The NHB has developed a long-term policy plan with the objective of 
providing a high level of direction for the health sector.  This 20-year plan 
describes the likely challenges, solutions and implications for the health 
system in the future.  The plan also provides guidance for future decisions 
regarding service configuration and investment at all levels of the health 
(national, regional and district) and disability support system (National 
Health Board, 2010).   
 
Following the creation of the NHB and long-term health plans, the roles of the 
Ministry of Health and DHBs were restructured to align with these plans.  The 
Ministry of Health is now the government’s principal advisor on health and is 
fully responsible for health policy developments, and regulatory functions.  
The Ministry’s other responsibilities, such as a funder of health and disability 
services, and manager of national operations, have been transferred to the 
NHB. In order to reduce duplications of some of the roles played by the DHBs 
and the Ministry of Health, the NHB is fully responsible for planning and 
funding those health services that are truly national in scope (Ashton & 
Tenbensel, 2012).  For instance, the NHB took over some of the DHBs’ 
responsibilities, for example, as funders of services for their district’s 
population and as providers of health and disability services.  Simultaneously, 
the NHB is also responsible for monitoring, funding and organising DHBs, 
including improving DHBs’ performance, ensuring a national focus for DHBs, 
and reducing duplication and bureaucracy, especially around planning and 
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funding for primary care, maternity, mental health and some other services 
(Gauld, 2012).  
 
The NHB is supported by two subcommittees, namely the Capital Investment 
Committee and the IT Health Boards Committee.  The primary objective of 
the Capital Investment Committee is to ensure better investment decisions in 
the health system through a new, centrally-led process of national planning 
and prioritisation for capital funding and investment in the health sector, 
along with advising on investment and infrastructure matters to support the 
government’s service planning direction (Ministry of Health, 2014).  
Meanwhile, the IT Health Board was established with the objectives of 
strengthening the leadership of health information technology in the context 
of improving the overall performance of the health system, and of ensuring 
the IT strategy is reflected in capital allocation (National Health Board, 2010).  
The vision of the IT Health Board is to achieve high quality care and to 
improve patients' safety.  In this way, by 2014, member of the New Zealand 
public was expected to have a core set of personal health information 
available electronically to them and their providers, regardless of the setting, 
as they access health services (National Health Board, 2010).   
 
The government also established the HWNZ, another independent agency 
under the Ministry of Health, which has overall responsibilities for the 
planning and development of the health workforce.  The aim of the HWNZ is 
to ensure that New Zealand has a high quality, fit-for-purpose, and motivated 
health workforce by aligning staffing issues with planning for service 
delivery (Ministry of Health, 2014) . The link between the NHB and the other 
three independent agencies – IT Health Board Committee, Capital Investment 
Committee and HWNZ – is that the chairpersons for these three agencies are 
members of the NHB’s board.  Therefore, the NHB is expected to ensure all 
the efforts and strategies in the health sector are closely coordinated. 
Strategically, these agencies are working together with the Ministry of Health 
to consolidate planning, funding, workforce planning and capital investment, 
in addition to monitoring public expenses for various health agencies, 
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including public hospitals, primary care and other health services (Ministry 
of Health, 2014). 
 
In 2010, the government established a Crown-owned company called Health 
Benefits Limited (HBL).  A nationally-shared services organisation, HBL is 
owned by The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance with the 
objective of reducing costs and increasing savings through the effective and 
efficient delivery of administrative support, and procurement services for 
DHBs (www.health.govt.nz).  According to Gauld (2012), the goal of HBL is to 
reduce funding for nonclinical services by $700 million over 5 years through 
centralising DHB office functions.  The government also formed another 
Crown agency called the Health Quality and Safety Commission. The 
objectives of this commission are to lead and coordinate work in the national 
health system for the purposes of monitoring and improving the quality and 
safety of health and disability support services (Health Quality & Safety 
Commission New Zealand, n.d.) 
 
The establishment of the above key agencies at the national level is in line 
with one of the MRG’s recommendations to adopt a centralised approach.  
The centralisation approach is seen by the government as a reliable strategy 
to correct the perceived fragmentation problem in health services as it is 
expected to reduce unnecessary bureaucracy, and to ensure rapid 
implementation of the government’s national priorities.  Meanwhile, at the 
regional and local levels, the BSMC initiatives aimed at making the current 
DHB- and PHO-based model work better within a more unified system.  The 
MRG’s report argued that having too many DHBs had caused problems of 
fragmentation in the New Zealand health care system, whilst large variations 
in PHOs failed to contribute to wider system efficiency (Ministerial Review 
Group, 2009).  Therefore, a collaborative-based approach for DHBs and PHOs 
was seen as being required in order to make these agencies deliver their 
services efficiently.   
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The MRG also recommended greater regional collaboration between DHBs.  
Through regional collaboration, DHBs are expected to find optimum 
arrangement for the most effective and efficient ways in delivering health 
services (Ashton & Tenbensel, 2012). The collaboration involves 
procurement of supplies, human resources and payroll, the management of 
financial planning and information system, and provider audits (Ashton & 
Tenbensel, 2012). Collaboration is believed to reduce administrative 
duplication and to help DHBs meet the health and disability needs of their 
populations (Ministerial Review Group, 2009). To realise the regional 
collaboration, the government established four Regional DHBs in 2010.  The 
governance of the Regional DHBs comprised all the DHBs’ chairpersons and 
CEOs. The establishment of the Regional DHBs was expected to enable 
effective regional decision making on behalf of the constituent DHBs at a 
regional level.  Table 5.2 shows the configuration of the Regional DHBs. 
 
Each Regional DHB is required to produce regional service plans across a 
wide range of services.  In preparing a regional service plan, each region 
needs to identify 3 to 5 key service areas it intends to address and to provide 
more detail on the actions it intends to take (Ministry of Health, 2011a).  The 
Regional DHBs’ governance has to ensure that the actions are linked to and 
supported by IT and workforce planning (Ministry of Health, 2011a).  The 
NHB is expected to provide feedback for the regional DHBs before receiving 
the finalised Regional Service Plan. According to the Ministry of Health 
(2008), the implementation of these strategies shows that DHBs are working 
both for local populations and for the population of the country as a whole. 
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Table 5:2 The configuration of the regional DHBs 
Region(s) DHBs 
Northern Northland, Waitemata, Auckland, Counties Manukau 
Midland Waikato, Bay of Plenty, Lakes, Tairawhiti, Taranaki 
Central Hawke’s Bay, Mid Central, Whanganui, Wairarapa, Hutt Valley 
Southern 
Nelson, Marlborough, Canterbury, West Coast, South Canterbury, 
Otago, Southland 
Source: Ministry of Health, 2008 
  
In order to improve efficiency and effectiveness of health services, the 
National government also extended the collaboration strategy to the primary 
care level. National argued that, although the NZPHCS had been effective in 
improving access to primary care services, it was not working in producing 
more comprehensive care provided by a wider range of health professionals 
(Ashton & Tenbensel, 2012).   Therefore, the government required DHBs to 
collaborate with other local health care agencies, including hospitals, PHOs, 
and community clinicians, and also with the patients. The aim of the 
collaboration is to develop a new model of care with patient-centric services 
delivered closer to home.  This model is expected to promote integrated 
family health centres and clusters in order to provide more health care 
services outside of hospitals and shifting care closer to home by helping 
people to keep themselves well, reducing avoidable hospital admission and 
readmission, and reducing unnecessary prescribing, tests and referrals 
(Ashton & Tenbensel, 2012; Cumming, 2011).  In 2009, the government, 
through a request for Expressions of Interest (EOI), invited PHOs to develop a 
new model of care within the existing NZPHCS 2002 framework; however, 
the model of care that is proposed by PHOs had to employ the BSMC 
initiatives (Cumming, 2011).  The BSMC initiatives for primary care are: 
1. to provide services closer to home 
2. to make New Zealanders healthier 
3. to reduce pressure on hospitals     
(http://www.health.govt.nz/) 
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In order to achieve the integrated model of care, the government also 
required PHOs to form a consortium or a collaborative group of primary care 
providers which would meet specific criteria. For example, the PHO consortia 
must have their own governance group and integrated operational 
management structure. In developing the EOI proposals, PHOs are also 
required to use contractual mechanisms to advance their proposals. The 
setting up of such contracts generally requires the disclosure of all 
information (including financial information), the objectives shared and the 
rewards distributed, based on actual outcomes.  According to Gauld (2014), 
the alliance concept derives from the construction industry, where 
independent companies are suggested to collaborate rather than compete.  
This concept is believed to ensure large and complex projects can be 
delivered on time and within expected budget.    
 
More than 70 EOI proposals were received in response to the government’s 
EOI invitation, with 9 groups (which later became health alliances) selected 
to proceed with the implementation of their proposals; these alliances were 
called BSMC business cases.  Table 5.3 shows the 9 recent health alliances 
approved by the government under its BSMC strategy. The health alliances   
involve participations of DHBs and PHOs members across regions.  The 
alliances cover almost 60% of New Zealand’s population, while the 
remainder of the population is covered by 43 local independent PHOs 
(http://www.health.govt.nz/).     
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Table 5:3 List of Health Alliances and their memberships 
No Health Alliance DHB PHO 
Enrolled 
population 
1. Canterbury Clinical 
Network 
Canterbury 
DHB 
Rural Canterbury PHO 
Christchurch PHO 
Partnership Health PHO  
380,000 
2. Greater Auckland 
Integrated Health 
Network (GAIHN) 
Auckland DHB 
Waitemata 
DHB 
Counties 
Manukau DHB 
East Health Trust PHO 
Procare PHO 
Total Healthcare PHO   
 
1.1 million 
3. Health Alliance Plus PHO 
- A Pacific-led PHO 
Counties 
Manukau DHB 
Auckland DHB 
AuckPAC 
Tongan Health Society 
TaPasefika PHOs 
75,000 
4. Eastern Bay of Plenty 
PHO 
Bay of Plenty Eastern Bay of Plenty 
PHO 
Kawerau PHO 
Te Ao Hou PHO 
51,130 
5. Mid Central PHO Mid Central 
DHB 
Whanganui 
DHB 
Otaki PHO 
Horowhenua PHO 
Manawatu PHO 
Tararua PHO 
152,693 
6. Midland Health Network Lakes DHB 
Tairawhiti 
DHB 
Taranaki DHB 
Waikato DHB 
Waihi Beach Medical 
Centre 
Tokoroa Primary Care 
Medicentre and 
Caldwell & Simpson 
500,000 
7. National Hauora Coalition 
PHO 
- A Maori-led PHO 
Auckland,  
Waitemata,  
Counties 
Manukau, 
Waikato,  
Taranaki, 
 Whanganui  
Northland 
Bay of Plenty 
Te Puna Hauora 
Waiora Health Care 
Tamaki Health Care 
Te Kupenga o Hoturoa 
Nga Mataapuna Oranga, 
Tauranga 
North Waikato PHO 
Toiora PHO 
Te Ao Hou PHO 
Ngati Porou Hauora, 
Ngati Porou,Tairawhiti 
Te Tihi Hauora  
270,000 
8. Wairarapa Community 
PHO 
(In 2012, Wairarapa 
Community PHO merged 
with Compass Primary 
Health Care Network.  
The new health alliance is 
known as Compass 
Health)  
Capital & 
Coast DHB 
Wairarapa 
DHB 
Compass Primary 
Health Care Network 
The Wairarapa 
Community PHO 
MATPPO 
286,669 
9. West Coast PHO West Cost 
DHB 
n.a 31,202 
Note: This table was developed by this author based on the New Zealand Parliamentary 
Debates (Hansard), the PHOs websites, medical bulletins, and newspapers. Due to the 
merging and acquisition in the primary network, there were small changes to the identities 
of some primary networks.  
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The changes in the public health structure were complemented by the setting 
announcement of health targets.  Health targets are a set of national 
performance measures which have been specifically designed to improve the 
performance of health services.  The health targets not only signalled the 
government’s priorities but also provided a focus activity for health services 
(Ministry of Health, 2013). The results of the health target are published 
through the media quarterly each year.  Table 5.4 indicates the current New 
Zealand health targets set by the government.  
 
Table 5:4 National Health Targets 
Health Targets Specifications 
Shorter stays in emergency 
departments 
95% of patients will be admitted, discharged or 
transferred from an emergency department within 
six hours.  
Improve access to elective 
surgery 
The volume of elective surgery will be increased by 
at least 4,000 discharges per year. 
Shorter waits for cancer 
treatment 
All patients, ready-for-treatment, wait less than four 
weeks for radiotherapy or chemotherapy.    
Increased immunisation 90% of 8 month olds will have their primary course 
of immunisation (i.e., their 6 weeks, 3 months and 5 
months immunisation events) on time by July 2014 
and 95% by December 2014.  
Better help for smokers to 
quit 
95% of hospitalised patients who smoke and are 
seen by a health practitioner in public hospitals and 
90% of enrolled patients who smoke seen by a 
health practitioner in general practice are offered 
brief advice and support to quit smoking. 
 
Within the target a specialised identified group will 
include progress towards 90% of pregnant women 
(who identify as smokers at the time of confirmation 
of pregnancy in general practice or booking with 
Lead Maternity Carer) are offered advice and 
support to quit. 
More heart and diabetes 
checks 
90% of the eligible population will have had their 
cardiovascular risk assessed in the last five years. 
Source: Adopted from the Ministry of Health (2011) 
 
The post-2008 reforms have brought considerable changes in the health and 
disability system of New Zealand.  To date, the implementation of post-2008 
health reforms has achieved one of the government’s objectives: to reduce 
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the number of PHOs.  The establishment of health alliances had reduced the 
number of PHOs throughout the country from 82 in 2010 to 36 in July 2011 
(Ministry of Health, 2011a).  However, the establishment of key agencies at 
the national and regional levels has increased the level of complexity in the 
health structure.  Instead of directly reporting to the Ministry of Health, DHBs 
now have another set of accountability relationships with new regional DHBs 
and the NHB.  The web of relationships for health alliances has also expanded 
as DHB has to collaborate with other DHB partners and PHOs. Figure 5.1 
shows the current structure of the New Zealand public health system.   
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Figure 5.1 The Structure of the New Zealand Public Health System 2013 
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5.7 Understanding the patterns of change and the issue of 
accountability in the public health system 
 
This section attempts to identify the changes that have taken place in the 
New Zealand public health system over the last three decades. Drawing on 
evidence collected from the document reviews, presented in the earlier 
narratives, I conclude that the New Zealand public health system has 
undergone a profound change in its governance and structures.  Table 5.5 
shows the summary of changes that have taken place in the health structures 
and governance over the last 30 years and the objectives behind the reform. 
 
Table 5:5 Summary of structural and governance changes in the New 
Zealand public health system from 1984 to the present 
Year(s)/Stage(s) 
of reform 
Structural and governance 
changes 
Objectives of reform 
1984 -1992/   
The beginning of 
market-based 
reform 
14 Area Health Boards 
 
 
 
To improve efficiency, effectiveness 
and performance of the health 
services and also to increase 
accountability. 
1993-1999/ 
Radical market-
based reform 
 
 
23 Crown Health Enterprises 
(health service providers); 4 
Regional Health Authority 
(health service purchasers) 
To focus public funding on the most 
important treatments and the 
neediest patients; and to improve 
the efficiency of hospital systems. 
 
2000-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
21 DHBs and 82 PHOs 
 
 
 
 
 
To improve the health of the 
population, reduce health 
disparities, and ensure access to 
quality of services by allowing 
greater public input into health 
decision making. 
2009-present  
(as October 2014) 
 
 
 
1 NHB, 4 Regional DHB, 20 
DHBs, 9 Health Alliances, 34 
PHOs  
 
 
To improve the efficiency and 
quality of care by reducing 
unnecessary bureaucracy and waste, 
and by moving resources to the 
front-line services. 
 
Table 5.5 illustrates the changes that have taken place in the New Zealand 
public health system.  It can be inferred that the patterns of change from one 
stage of reform to another were inconsistent and seemed to be contradictory. 
The patterns of change revolved around centralised and decentralised 
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strategies in the public health governance at the local and national levels. 
These findings were supported by previous scholars (see Ashton, 1995; 
Ashton et al., 2005; Cumming, 2011; Gauld, 2003a, 2012; Morgan & Simmons, 
2009; Starke, 2010). For these reasons,  it is difficult to suggest that any one 
of these structures produced any better results than the earlier one (Gauld, 
2003b; Morgan & Simmons, 2009).  Interestingly, what was noticeable about 
the pattern of reform was that, regardless of which model of reform was 
adopted, the objectives of reform remained aligned with the effort of 
improving efficiency and effectiveness of the public health system. In other 
words, the objectives of reform were repetitive and the repetition, therefore, 
indicates that the government had to remodel the previous reforms because 
the previous strategies were unsuccessful in achieving their initial objectives.  
 
Previous studies (see Gauld, 2003b, 2012; Morgan & Simmons, 2009) claimed 
that the adoption of reform in the public health system was heavily 
influenced by the government’s political ideology rather than the need to 
change.  In detail, Gauld (2003b) noted that: 
 
New Zealand has a single-chamber, cabinet dominated 
parliament that facilitates “fast law”. The political culture is 
adversarial, and a 3-year electoral cycle impels hasty 
political change.  This combination means policy is often 
driven by party ideology rather than evidence or 
demonstrated need and implemented in a relatively 
undiluted form, free of the checks and balances natural to 
their political systems. (p. 202). 
 
In many instances, politicians appear to be primarily interested in retaining 
their governmental positions or being elected as the government.  For this 
reason, they define the policy problem by looking at symptoms and choose 
the policy strategies which enable them to secure their positions.  As a result 
of this practice, the policy strategies in the New Zealand public health system 
are fragmented and inconsistent because they are designed according to 
political rather than public needs. 
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Consequently, debates over the implementation of the New Zealand public 
health reform have raged for nearly three decades and are still ongoing.  The 
public health system was criticised because it remained disconnected and the 
level of complexity and ambiguity in the existing dual health system 
increased significantly. For examples, in the 2000s, Easton (2002) regarded 
the New Zealand public health reform as ‘unfinished business’, because, 
despite the fact that the health sector has undergone several phases of 
reform, a number of issues still remained to be addressed. Around the same 
time, McKenna and Richardson (2003), described the situation of the New 
Zealand public health system as “. . . unknowable, there is no right answer 
and what they do often appears ‘bitty’ and unconnected to any bigger 
picture” (p. 81).  In terms of efficiency, more recently, Morgan and Simmons 
(2009) revealed that the spending patterns in the public health system 
become costly due to the fat administrative structures and conflict of 
interests between politicians and DHBs.  The scenarios in the health system 
were seen as undermining the potential of health institutions to deliver 
better services to the public due to fragmentation and inconsistency in health 
reform directions   
 
Newman (2004) provides a new understanding about the effects of reform 
on the operations of public organisations. Newman claims that the 
implementation of market-based reform changed not only the structure and 
governance of public organisations but also influenced the thoughts of public 
senior managers. Public managers were depicted as having been captured by 
neoliberal ideologies that influenced managerial practices in public 
organisations. For instance, there was a significant shift from a traditionally 
bureaucratic function to a new managerial regime which produced a strong 
belief in competition and efficiency through the formation of new delivery 
techniques, known as contracted-out arrangements, privatisations, and 
partnerships.  These situations raised a question regarding how the changes 
have affected the accountability arrangements in health services. The 
following subsection discusses the emergence of accountability issues in the 
public health system. 
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5.7.1 Reforms and the emergence of accountability issues 
 
The adoption of neoliberalism reform has challenged the meanings, 
mechanisms, and relationships of traditional accountability.  Nevertheless, 
little is known about the effects of constant reforms on accountability in the 
context of a public health system. Studies on the New Zealand public health 
reforms have focused more on the effect of reforms on governance structures, 
service delivery frameworks, the health system in general (Ashton, 2005; 
Ashton et al., 2008; Barnett et al., 2009; Gauld, 2003b, 2008, 2012; Starke, 
2010), and outcomes of the policy reform on the targeted populations rather 
than accountability (see Ashton et al., 2008; Barnett & Barnett, 2004; Smith, 
McDonald, & Cumming, 2008).   
 
Some researchers acknowledge that the health reforms resulted in changes 
to the accountability systems (Lawrence, Alam, Northcott, et al., 1994; Mackie, 
2010; Starke, 2010). Accountability arrangements in the public health system 
have been reported as complex, due to duplication of contracting 
accountability and accounting activities (Duncan & Chapman, 2010); and, 
ambiguous and conflicting due to the involvement of multifunders in 
delivering health services and diverse expectations of many stakeholders 
(Cordery, 2008).  The blurred lines of accountability have had a serious 
impact on the public sector as they have created confusing situations, 
sometimes allowing participants to escape being held accountable.   Mackie 
(2010) describes, “the blurring lines of accountability [as] allowing the 
Ministry to separate itself from poor DHBs performance, while taking credit 
for the good and leaving the DHBs to take the bad” (p.21).   
 
Existing research reveals that the changes in the accountability systems have 
been identified as a source of tension in managing the health sector (Dowling 
et al., 2008; Mackie, 2010; Starke, 2010; Tenbensel et al., 2007). For example, 
the practice of dual accountability under the AHBs system resulted in 
conflicting goals and accountabilities between locally elected boards and 
central government.  While the AHB system was scrapped and replaced by 
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other systems, accountability remained an issue in the subsequent stages of 
reform.  For instance, Tenbensel et al. (2007) examined the implementation 
of the NZPHDA 2000.  Their study found that the new health system provided 
stronger local identity because it created more local venues for decision 
making by involving NGOs in health administration. However, the 
implementation of the new health system has affected the forms of 
accountability.  In detail, Tenbensel et al. (2007)  report: 
 
Accountability in New Zealand’s publicly funded health 
sector since 2001 reforms have become more multi-faceted 
with a mix of hierarchical, network and market forms in play.  
As a result, governance is more complex and sometimes 
more opaque in comparison to the 1990s.  (p. 23) 
 
Investigating the issue further, Cordery (2008) undertook an ethnographic 
study on PHOs and their stakeholders in different regions of New Zealand.  
The aim of Cordery’s study was to examine the accountability relationships of 
PHOs in New Zealand and to determine the mechanisms by which they might 
best discharge their accountability obligations to multiple stakeholders.  The 
findings indicated that accountability arrangements in the new health policy 
structure had turned out to be complex, ambiguous, and conflicting as 
regards the different types of accountability faced by PHOs; this state of 
affairs resulted from the involvement of multiple institutions in delivering 
health services.   
 
Although the studies mentioned above confirm that accountability remains 
an issue in the New Zealand public health system, they do not specifically 
discuss accountability in the context of reforms.  Therefore, little is known 
about the effects of reforms on accountability. Too frequently, government 
has used the term “improving accountability” (see Table 5.5) as a reason to 
adopt new reform strategies, but little is known about the extent to which 
accountability has been improved and how it has been developed within the 
health sector.  In my view, accountability has become enmeshed in fragile 
health structures that employed uncertainties in accountability practices. 
This situation raises a further question: what does accountability mean in the 
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context of constant reform?  The existing documents and research provide 
limited answer to this question. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the 
impact of constant reforms on accountability provision and understanding 
more fully.   
 
5.8 Chapter summary 
 
This preunderstanding chapter identified changes which have taken place in 
the public health system over the last three decades and the effects of the 
changes on accountability arrangements in the health system.  On the basis 
of historical review and analysis of policy between 1930s and 2014, it can be 
concluded that New Zealand underwent four stages of reforms, which 
resulted in massive changes in the public health structure and governance. 
Analysis of the 4 structures of reform indicates that New Zealand has 
experienced successive and contradictory changes in the public health 
system for the last 30 years.  Although reform was implemented with the aim 
of improving policy efficiency and effectiveness, the adoption of reforms has 
brought complexity in health structures, governance and accountability 
along with it.  The next chapter will take us to Stage 2 in the application of 
hermeneutics, that is, the understanding stage which involved interviews 
with health managers. 
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6 CHAPTER SIX 
 
UNDERSTANDING 
THE EFFECTS OF REFORMS ON ACCOUNTABILITY: 
THE EXPERIENCE OF PUBLIC HEALTH MANAGERS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This study is concerned with the effects of constant health reforms on 
accountability provision and practices in the public health system. The 
preunderstanding narrative in Chapter Five (Stage 1) revealed that reforms 
have changed the structure and governance of the public health system, 
including its accountability arrangements. Although this series of reforms did 
achieve some advances, the direction of reform from one stage to another 
appeared to be fragmented and this fragmentation has led to inconsistent 
changes in the public health system. The preunderstanding narrative 
provided only a part of the whole understanding of accountability 
arrangements in the context of New Zealand public health reforms.  However, 
this preunderstanding offered a sound basis for engaging with health 
professionals to learn from their experiences of reforms and new 
accountabilities.  
 
To deepen my understanding of the research issue, this study adopted a 
naturalistic inquiry method to collect qualitative data. A series of 
semistructured interviews was conducted with 13 health managers with the 
aim of obtaining further insights on specific issues from their recalled 
experiences.  I believe a better understanding of accountability in the context 
of reform can provide a new and insightful interpretation of the way in which 
accountability has affected and transformed the public health system.  
Starting from the premise that the health managers are experts in their own 
area of the health system, a hermeneutic approach was adopted for this study.  
I encouraged the health managers to share their views and lived experiences 
in dealing with reforms and accountability in their own words and based on 
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their own interpretation of their experiences.  In order to understand and to 
make sense of the participants’ experiences, the process of analysing data 
employed a critical perspective within the hermeneutics approach (Myers, 
2013).  A critical perspective was used because it enabled me to evaluate 
critically the totality of accountability understanding in the context of the 
public health reforms. My aim was not to present a theme, but rather to 
engage in thinking through what the texts (interview transcripts) reveal 
about how managers responded to the implementation of constant reform 
and changes in accountability.   
 
This chapter represents the second stage (or Stage 2, see Figure 3.1, p. 72) of 
understanding about accountability conceptions and practices in the context 
of the New Zealand health reform. The findings are presented in two main 
sections.  The first section is devoted to discussing the public health 
managers’ experiences concerning the implementation of reforms. In 
particular, this section represents my understanding of health managers’ 
experiences in valuing the rationales for implementing reforms and the 
responses of health institutions to organisational change, and the challenges 
of implementing reforms. The second section discusses the effects of reforms 
on accountability understanding and practices in the health services. 
Specifically, this section describes my understanding of the health managers’ 
lived experiences in dealing with accountability issues. 
 
6.2 Reforms, policy changes and responses to organisational 
change  
 
Dacin, Goodstein, and Scott (2002) explain that institutional change revolves 
around a dialectical interplay between actions, meanings, and actors.  
According to Dacin et al. (2002), as agents of change, actors have resources 
and power to initiate reform and shape the character of institutions through 
institutional change. Theoretically, actors will interpret pressures for reform 
(whether they are functional, political or social) and give meanings to them 
(rationalising the pressures) before responding to them. Putting this 
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theoretical view into the context of New Zealand health reform raised 
questions on how the health policy makers (the government bodies) 
interpret the pressures for reform, including the rationales for introducing 
the reforms, and how the policy implementers (the health managers) 
respond to frequent organisational changes in the public health system.  
 
The preunderstanding chapter suggested that the government was pressured 
by functional and social factors to implement reforms.  The government 
interpreted the pressures as threats to the health sector, and suggested that 
New Zealand had no choice but to change the way in which the health system 
was operating because the existing system was inefficient. The government 
then portrayed itself as being responsible for protecting the system and the 
people of New Zealand through the implementation of reforms.   
 
Nevertheless, the public health system has been heavily criticised by the 
public for the failure of reforms to realise some of the government’s 
objectives.  The criticisms imply that there is a significant amount of anxiety 
related to reforms and accountability in the public health system.  To 
examine this anxiety, the public health managers in this study were asked to 
share their experiences in dealing with reforms and policy changes.  They 
were invited to explain the rationales for implementing frequent changes in 
the public health system from their own perspectives and experiences. 
 
6.2.1 The rationales for implementing reforms 
 
I started the conversations with public health managers by asking them to 
provide their overall evaluations of the implementation of reforms.  The 
public health managers related their diverse experiences, and provided 
mixed responses to my question.  In general, I found that most of the public 
health managers, regardless of their experiences, positions and length of 
service, acknowledged the benefits of some of the reforms for the public 
health system.  For example, one senior manager states: 
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I was around during all those transitions. When we 
developed the IT systems and accounting systems and we 
put in DRG systems, and we put in resource management 
systems, we got better understandings of what we were 
doing. The CHEs system was also useful at that time in 
regards to making the health system more accountable to 
New Zealanders and to the government. When we moved 
into the DHBs system, you know the concept of population 
health responsibility was a really useful thing. – (P05, a 
senior manager of a PHO) 
 
P05 served the Ministry of Health and a number of DHBs in senior level 
positions, prior to her current appointment. In her 26 years’ work experience, 
P05 experienced all four stages of reform (see Table 5.1, p. 105), and played 
critical roles either as a policy maker and/or policy implementer.  Based on 
her experiences, P05 agreed that health reforms have produced some 
benefits for the public health system. According to P05, reforms made public 
institutions more accountable for the management of their resources. 
 
P07, who was a clinician before going into management also states:  
 
The outcomes of reform weren’t all bad . . . the formation of 
DHBs . . . had some really worthwhile intent around 
‘capitation’ based funding and the intention for DHBs to be 
accountable in terms of population health outcomes as well 
as individual patient outcomes. And it solved some of the 
primary sector issues in terms of a GPs model of care and 
business model. – (P07, a senior manager of a PHO). 
 
The benefits of reform described by P07 related to the DHBs system (1999-
2008).  Despite all the controversies or criticisms, P07 suggested that the 
formation of the DHB system improved the level of health equality through 
the introduction of a new ‘capitation’ funding system and a new primary care 
model.  The capitation system was introduced to replace the targeted funding 
scheme, and aimed to reduce copayments for all populations by providing 
extra funding to ensure a reduction in out-of-pocket expenditure for the most 
vulnerable groups.  Meanwhile, with the introduction of the PHO model, the 
primary care service was no longer dominated by private GPs, who operated 
on the basis of a profit-business model rather than the needs of the public. 
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Under the new model, PHOs were recognised as the DHBs’ vehicles for 
providing essential primary health care services to their enrolled populations.   
 
P06, a CEO of a society-based PHO also revealed his positive views toward 
reforms despite the rapid changes in the health system. 
 
There are many things in health policy that I completely 
agree with. I don’t see that the direction of health is very 
different under different governments. I think the direction 
in health service development necessitates changes in policy 
and I’m very comfortable with that. – (P06, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
P06, regardless of which political party has been in power, acknowledges the 
benefits of reform brought to the health sector. P06 provided some examples 
from his experience as a general manager in one of the RHAs in the late 
1980s.  He indicated that before the adoption of reforms, the government 
could not measure the quality of services provided by visiting anaesthetists 
in small rural hospitals due to a lack of procedures, regulations, and record 
systems. For instance, in June 2000, the New Zealand Nurses Organisation 
wrote to the Minister of Health and contacted the media about concerns over 
nurses employed at a small, provincial public hospital (Health & Disability 
Commissioner, 2009). The Nurses Organisation reported the admitted reuse 
of syringes by a visiting anaesthetist and the potential risk of disease 
transmission to 134 surgical patients (Health & Disability Commissioner, 
2009).  An investigation conducted by the Ministry of Health found that the 
breaches of duty of care by hospital providers were caused by the failure of 
health organisations to have adequate quality assurance and incident 
reporting systems in place.  As a response, the Ministry of Health emphasised 
in its reform agenda the need to improve health delivery management by 
keeping documentation and quality manual up to date (Health & Disability 
Commissioner, 2009).  According to P06, the reforms introduced by the 
Labour government improved not only work procedures and record systems 
but also created an effective work place and safety system in health services. 
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For P06, despite the National government sometimes being somewhat 
critical of the health sector, the policy changes introduced around 
Pharmaceutical Management Agency (PHARMAC) in the 1990s resulted in 
the best of innovations. PHARMAC was formed as a centralised bargaining 
agent for public pharmaceutical purchasing (Von Lanthen, 2004).  PHARMAC 
introduced competitive purchasing tenders, at a time when a number of key 
pharmaceuticals were coming off patent. It has succeeded in bringing unit 
costs down over time (Von Lanthen, 2004).  New Zealand is reported to have 
obtained the best deals in drug purchasing compared to other OECD 
countries (Matheson, 2009).   
 
In my view, although P06 and P07 shared no common experiences, all the 
reform benefits described by them referred to improvements in financial 
management and resource usage, including some managerial procedures in 
the public health system. The improvements indicate that, in general, reforms 
have successfully achieved their initial objective: to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness in the public health system. It can be inferred that the 
participants, regardless of their backgrounds and experiences, principally 
agreed with the implementation of reform as they could see how reforms 
facilitated health institutions to respond to economic and social changes.   
 
Nevertheless, the public health managers simultaneously raised criticisms of 
the same reform strategies.  Despite all the improvements they cited, the 
majority of health managers felt that the reforms failed to realise all their 
objectives in the wider context of the public health system.  For instance, P13, 
a DHB board member claims: 
 
Health by its very nature keeps revolving; our ability to treat 
it keeps evolving.  Annual plans, the government spending 
caps are very blunt.  They are not refined mechanisms.  They 
don’t recognise, they don’t evolve as the diseases develop. – 
(P13, a board member of a DHB) 
 
According to P13, the biggest challenge in managing health care is that the 
trend for services demanded of this industry changes according to factors 
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beyond the health system’s financial control; hence, the existing strategies 
are not seen as flexible enough to support the process of change.  For P13, 
accounting tools and strategies which were introduced under market-based 
reform were tremendous mechanisms for business management but they did 
not work well for public services, especially in the public health system.  
According to P13, the public health system operates in a unique framework 
due to its structural components and social elements.  Therefore, improving 
the public health system is not only about increasing the health status of 
households, but also concerns other issues related to the distribution of 
health resources and services among populations, the cost of financing the 
system, and  diseases prevention.  In the experience of P13, the new 
accounting tools were unable to support the overall change in the public 
health system because they focused on financial activities.   
 
P13 claims that in reality, health care is not an economic commodity which 
can be controlled using a rigid throughput system. He argues that the public 
health system requires the government to introduce a distinct approach 
beyond financial boundaries because a rigid financial-based strategy reduces 
the ability of the health system to respond to change. According to P13 the 
failure of the government to recognise the limitation has affected the 
performance of the health system in general. He claims: 
 
If you want to talk about reforms and efficiencies, we have 
not gone anywhere near far enough. – (P13, a board member 
of a DHB) 
 
The excerpt shows that reforms produced limited improvements in terms of 
efficiency.   P13 justifies the point saying: 
 
I found that just amazing that in a country of our size, we 
don’t have a national health computer system.  I’m horrified 
with the fact that there are multiple purchasing departments 
in a country of 4.5 million people. Can’t we just have one, 
very large, well-managed purchasing department? For 
example, let’s buy 20 CT scanners at once, rather than 20 
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DHBs try[ing] to negotiate the best possible deal for one 
individual DHB. – (P13, a board member of a DHB) 
 
Using the DHB system as an example, P13 explained how reforms have 
reduced rather than improved the level of efficiency in health services.  The 
establishment of the DHB system with the aim to increase democratic values 
in health service governance has resulted in excessive bureaucracy and 
administrative overheads in the public health system.  P13’s reflections on 
reforms were supported by Rankin (2011), who reported that none of the 
reform introduced at that stage was able to restrain the rising cost of health 
care and that there was very little evidence that the rising costs had 
improved healthcare outcomes for New Zealanders. 
 
The health managers’ experiences can be explained in two ways. Firstly, the 
NPM and NPS styles of reform are more concerned with short-term economy 
and efficiency effects than with the long-term benefits for organisations and 
populations (Atreya & Amstrong, 2002; Van de Walle & Hammerschmid, 
2011). Secondly, the efficiency and resource-based contributions do not 
bring lasting achievements, due to uncertain economic performance, and 
changes in demands among health populations (Brunsson & Sahlin-
Andersson, 2000). Another possible explanation for this may be that the NPM 
and NPS models are rather general and not related to problem solving 
activities (Christensen & Laegreid, 2011a; Jones & Kettl, 2003).  For these 
reasons, existing solutions which were originally based on the short-term 
strategies may not be able to respond to such situations and so necessitate 
another round of restructuring.   
 
The public health managers’ stories describe that they have lived through 
two opposite experiences. On the one hand, the health managers appreciated 
reform strategies that improved financial and resource management, but on 
the other hand, they deprecated the same reform strategies due to the 
inability of the strategies to realise their objectives in the wider context of the 
public health system. Based on the health managers’ initial responses as 
described above, it is possible to conclude that the operation of the public 
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health system is characterised by a series of paradoxes.  In order to help me 
to understand why and how the paradoxes emerged in the public health 
system, the public managers were asked to explain the rationales for 
implementing a series of reforms in the public health system from the 
perspective of their personal experiences.      
 
The interviews show that pressures for change came from the government 
which believed that the existing public health system was inefficient and 
ineffective.  P09, a DHB senior manager says: 
 
Reform is more about politics than policy . . . Reforms have 
been driven off by the issues that come from the politicians 
who have been abused [by a belief] that our health system is 
not working for the people.  – (P09, a finance manager of a 
DHB) 
 
P09 has worked for a DHB for 24 years.  He has lived through almost all the 
stages of reform driven by the market-based model.  As a certified accountant, 
he acknowledges the benefits of market-based reform to health management 
in terms of financial control and resource management.  However, he also 
suggests that the implementation of reforms is sometimes an uncomfortable 
experience for him. In P09’s view, decisions to implement reform came from 
the government because it believed the public health system was performing 
below par. In this sense, P09 talks explicitly about the government’s 
decisions in implementing reform in the New Zealand public health system. 
 
For P09, it was only the government that believed that the health system was 
problematic and delivered a poor quality of services. According to P09, the 
government’s beliefs can be linked to the published reports which make the 
public health system look worse than it really is (see the government’s report 
published prior to the implementation of reform, for instance, Unshackling 
the hospitals (1988), Your health and the public health (1991), The 
Ministerial Review Group (2009), etc.). The government has attempted to 
persuade the people to concur with its beliefs, in order to make the public 
agree with its prescriptions for reform.   
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P09 personally disagrees with the claims that health services in New Zealand 
are problematic.  He states:  
   
You might have some complaints, you can judge the food, 
you can like the nurses, and you can hate the doctors.  But 
for whatever reasons, you can walk in here [hospital] with a 
reasonable confidence that you will get well treated. The 
stuff [the problem of efficiency and effectiveness] that we 
talked about is still embodied in [it] but the hospital services 
are functioning as they’re supposed to. – (P09, a finance 
manager of a DHB) 
 
P09’s statements illustrate his views on the implementation of reforms in the 
New Zealand public health system.  Despite all the controversies, he 
considers that the health service performance, especially at the individual 
level, is still good and reliable. For P09, although reforms brought 
considerable changes in the public health system, they did not substantially 
change the functioning of hospitals or medical centres.    
 
In my view, P09’s experience shows that the government has a strong 
political influence in New Zealand health reform decisions.  Political influence 
refers to situations where “policy decisions are frequently made or altered 
not because someone has found the best way to do things but because certain 
people have a lot to say in the matter” (Barker, 1996, p. 21).  P09’s experience 
aligned with Gauld (2000), who claims that  the existing governmental 
system permits the government to utilise power and authority for its own 
benefits.  New Zealand follows the unicameral system, a Westminster-style 
system in which the decision making power is concentrated in the Cabinet.  
The unicameral system allows politicians to “push through new policies” 
without determining the viability of each policy (Gauld, 2000, p. 186).  In this 
sense, it is possible to implement reforms as long as the government can 
justify the needs to implement reforms to the public.    
 
P01, a CEO of a PHO also raised similar concerns related to political nature of 
policy decisions and implementation.  He claims: 
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Overall, in my sense, things [policies and programmes] take 
too long to implement; innovation is very hard to implement 
in the New Zealand health system, and . . . the health system 
in New Zealand is very political.  Sometimes, the government 
tends to be cautious around health care and there was 
political expedience rather than which is the right thing to 
be doing.  – (P01, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
P01 has 15 years’ experience in the public health system. Prior to his current 
appointment, P01 served in senior executive and senior manager roles for 
the Ministry of Health and DHBs. P01 believes that reform decisions are 
driven by the government’s political motives rather than contemplation of 
the right strategies for the health sector. P01 suggested that reforms, 
especially those related to policy innovation, are very hard to implement. P01 
referred to the policy innovation linked to the implementation of the BSMC 
business case.  As discussed in Chapter Four, the BSMC business case is a new 
health delivery strategy whose design was based on collaboration strategies.  
However, P01 has experienced several difficulties, especially at the beginning 
of the business case implementation, due to refusal of several health 
institutions, including Crown agencies, to give their cooperation (details of 
P01’s experience are provided at 5.2.3.4). 
 
Another participant, P04 also acknowledged the influence of a political 
motive in the process of implementing reform. 
 
The government introduced change but because of political 
experience you see. They want to stand [up] for election.  
They try to show to the public they do this, they have done 
that, you see.  But in reality they haven't done anything. – 
(P04, a senior manager and a board secretariat of a PHO) 
 
P04’s narrative describes reforms which were introduced because of the 
government’s political requirements. He referred to this “political experience” 
because the government’s private agenda that was “to stand [up] for 
election”. According to P04, the government aimed to be on top of policy and 
to take credit for every potential benefit produced by reforms.  By showing 
such achievements, the government hoped to please voters and win elections.  
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However, in P04’s experience, implementing reform in the public health 
system is very challenging.  The government not only has to deal with endless 
inefficiency issues, but also has to pay attention to any unexpected outcomes 
which emerge from the reform strategies. The unexpected occurred because, 
as the reforms were implemented, changes, both expected and unexpected, 
would appear.  All the unexpected outcomes need solutions, otherwise they 
will exacerbate the problems of the health sector. Nevertheless, over the last 
30 years, P04 believes that the government did not prepare itself to respond 
to those unexpected outcomes, and, therefore, the ability of health 
institutions to improve policy outcomes was always likely to be limited.   
   
The participants’ stories demonstrate that they believed that the rationales 
for implementing reform were driven by political motives rather than the 
needs of the public.  Gauld (2003b) provides support for this finding when he 
says that “. . . changes were all imposed by politicians seeking to make an 
impression on the health sector” (p. 210) 
 
In addition, the interviews reveal a significant clash in terms of the health 
managers’ interpretations and the government’s justifications with regard to 
the rationales for implementing reform. The preunderstanding chapter 
suggested that the government introduced reforms with the aim of 
protecting the public health system from functional and social pressures.  
However, in the experience of public health managers, reforms were 
introduced by the government for their own political ends rather than to 
meet the needs of the public.  Indeed, the experience of the public health 
managers is reflected in  Lawrence (1999), who claimed that health reform 
was not introduced to solve specific problems but to express politicians’ 
ideological commitment.  
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Summary 
 
This section explored the public health managers’ subjective experiences in 
dealing with reforms in the context of the New Zealand public health system.  
In particular, this section attempted to identify the health managers’ overall 
evaluations of the implementation of reforms, and to understand the 
rationales for implementing reforms from the health managers’ perspectives.  
It revealed that the public health managers have lived through two opposite 
experiences as reforms produced diverse outcomes. Market-based reform 
apparently produced recognisable benefits for the public health system in 
terms of resource management and financial control.  However, the reform 
benefits appeared to be limited in the larger health context of the public 
health system.  Consequently, the public health managers experienced a 
significant disjoint between policy and practice. Indeed, their experience 
relating to the policy mismatch made the public health managers consider 
that the government had misrepresented the meanings and directions of 
reforms in the public health system.   
 
In my opinion, the needs for reforms were justified by economic and 
functional factors, but the solutions or prescriptions were designed according 
to the government of the day’s political interests. As a result, the course of 
reform in the public health system appears to have been uncertain and highly 
subject to political influences. Given these situations, it is my conclusion that 
the New Zealand public health system is trapped between two opposing 
requirements. The first is a requirement to meet policy objectives aimed to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness and to increase the quality of health 
services; the second is a requirement to meet the political agenda of the 
ruling government.  For these reasons, rather than solving the problems, 
reform is seen as producing a continuing dissatisfaction.  Interviews with the 
public health managers recorded a series of paradoxes in the health 
managers’ recalled experiences with regard to this issue. 
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The following subsection tries to understand the responses of public health 
managers toward organisational change in the public health system.   
 
6.2.2 Responses toward reforms and organisational changes 
 
Policy makers have the power to influence or determine policies and 
practices but they are not involved in the process of implementing policy. The 
process of implementing or executing policy relies on policy implementers. 
Sebele (2013) described policy implementers as a group of inductive thinkers 
who build on an operative theory of collaboration from the synthesis of their 
experiences.  The roles of policy implementers are equally important as those 
of policy makers because the process of implementing policy often requires 
policy implementers to translate the intangible policy visions into tangible 
development (Sebele, 2013). 
 
The health managers, who suggested that reform decisions were driven by 
political ideology, were asked to describe their personal responses to 
organisational changes in the public health system.  According to all public 
health managers, decisions to reform apparently came from the top, and 
therefore, the implementation of reform was seen as compulsory for all 
health care agencies, including both publicly and privately owned entities.  
Throughout the interviews with the public health managers, it was apparent 
that the way of responding differed among health agencies and individual 
policy actors depending on the types of organisation within which they 
worked, and each individual’s personal beliefs in reforms.     
 
For instance, as one of the Crown entities (part of the government bodies), 
DHBs were obliged to adhere to all the reform requirements introduced by 
the government.  However, in certain circumstances, it was difficult for DHBs 
to follow the government requirements as they were constrained by 
uncontrollable factors such as lack of resources and time. In response to such 
situations, some DHBs changed their patterns of working as well as their 
reporting.  Drawing on an example from his DHB, P08 revealed how his DHB 
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redefined the way in which it managed its activities in order to meet the 
government’s targets on elective activities.  Under the national health targets, 
the government aimed to reduce the numbers on waiting lists for elective 
activities by increasing the volume of elective surgery by at least 4,000 
discharges per year (Ministry of Health, 2013).     
 
According to P08, managing elective services was challenging for every DHB 
because elective and acute activities were sharing the same hospital 
resources. For example, both acute and elective activities use the same 
hospital facilities and rely on the same health experts or specialists.  P08 
claimed that it was not easy for DHBs to plan their resources for managing 
both elective and acute activities because health is random by nature: 
management is unable to predict what will be happening in health industry in 
the future.  According to P08, although DHBs are able to come up with a 
perfect plan, its implementation will be imperfect because people’s health 
status and disease development are beyond the control of management.   
 
P08 recognises the importance of hospitals giving elective activities the same 
priority as acute activities.  However, in practice, due to their urgency, 
hospitals have to give priority to acute needs.  As a result, the demands of 
elective patients are always deferred, and the numbers on the waiting lists 
for elective activities grows significantly as a result.  To meet its elective 
activities as required by the government in the health targets policy, P08’s 
DHB had to set up an internal policy that enabled the hospital to create a 
capacity and space for electives. The internal policy states:   
 
For operating theatres we will do 80% of our acute demand 
within 24 hours and 100% within 48 hours.  – (P08, a 
business support manager of a DHB)  
 
According to P08, creating an internal policy such as the one outlined above 
enables the DHB to put in resources that allow the DHB to meet its acute and 
elective demands by managing this goal through recreating space and 
capacity to do the electives. However, in practice, the 20% allocation for 
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elective surgery was inadequate to reduce the existing waiting lists.  As an 
alternative, his DHB outsourced some of its elective activities to private 
hospitals where doctors from public hospitals work.  P08 discloses that his 
DHB spends about $15 to $18 million per year on such surgery. For P08, 
while such a technique may have helped the DHB to meet the government’s 
current health target, it does not solve the actual problem around the elective 
activities. P08 confesses that contracting-out is not a sustainable mechanism 
in the long run because it does not help public hospitals to build or improve 
their capacity to provide elective activities. He also notes that the outsourcing 
strategy merely benefits the private providers in the long-term because they 
received a consistent supply of patients and money from public hospitals.  
However, according to P08, his DHB has a limited choice because all DHBs 
across the country must reduce the number on waiting lists in hospitals or 
face financial penalties.  
 
P08’s experience provides an impression that the process of implementing 
policy is constrained by the government’s policy requirements. In other 
words, DHBs are given autonomy to determine the best way to implement 
policy decisions, but in practice, DHBs decisions on policy activities are 
subject to the government control which can be seen through a rigid policy 
requirement such as systematic reporting and tight budgeting (detail of the 
government control will be discussed in Section 6.2.3.1).  DHBs have to work 
within their resource capacities and redesign the framework of policy 
implementation in accordance with the requirements outlined by the 
government.  In this sense, it seems to me that DHBs are focused on meeting 
the government’s policy requirements rather than the demands of their 
populations, as they might interpret them.    
 
Similarly, primary care organisations have limited options in responding to 
reform. However, as primary care services are run by NGOs (community- and 
privately-own agencies), their degree or level of responding is seen as 
relatively steady compared to that of DHBs. The statement below describes 
how the PHO health manager, P03, responds to change. 
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I see myself as having a good understanding of the policy 
drivers and change and how we reposition our organisation 
to take advantage of these policy drivers.  Perhaps we have 
been fortunate that this organisation is seen as one of the 
organisations that can respond to the change and move with 
required changes. If I could look back 21 years ago, the only 
thing that is unchanged is the name of this organisation.  I 
would respectfully say that what we have today is certainly 
different from what we were 21 years ago. – (P03, a CEO of a 
PHO) 
 
The above narrative reflects P03’s experiences in responding to reforms and 
policy changes. P03 is a CEO and founder of a Maori-based PHO.  He is proud 
of his achievements over the last 21 years.  Although the government has 
been implementing different reform strategies for the last two decades, P03 
believes that he has succeeded in managing the challenges of reform.  
Understanding the needs of reform has enabled him to protect the interests 
of Maori through his organisation.  For P03, being a Maori means that he has 
a big responsibility to his people.  Therefore, he continuously repositions 
himself and his organisation in order to secure the interests of Maori.    
 
P03’s experience evidences that primary care is more responsive than DHBs 
to the government reforms. Unlike DHBs, PHOs are not involved in 
translating health policy decisions.  As contracted service providers, they are 
expected to deliver translated policy decisions to the public.  In this sense, 
PHOs merely follow their contractual agreements in delivering health care 
services. Furthermore, the status of PHOs as NGOs, has allowed PHOs to 
easily align their organisational interests with the government policy changes.   
 
In my opinion, the rapid and contradictory changes are not a major problem 
for NGOs such as PHOs because they rely on the government contracts as 
their source of income. Therefore, as long as the policy changes have allowed 
the flows of contract income to be maintained, changes in their delivery 
system have not been a major concern for PHOs. Throughout the interviews, 
it appeared that the majority of primary health managers choose to support 
the implementation of reform by accommodating themselves to changes in 
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order to ensure their PHOs remains as one of the players in the health 
industry.  
  
Nevertheless, there were also unexpected responses from the people in the 
health system.  For instance, P07 states: 
 
We see a massive loss of health system intelligence leave health 
New Zealand as a result of BSMC.  And in the last role that I had, 
over 40 people had resigned their space within a few months as 
an ongoing impact of change of that they don’t believe in.  And, 
when you talk around the health boards or the NGO-PHOs sector 
that was a very common story.  – (P07, a senior manager of a 
PHO). 
 
P07 talks about the response of health professionals or clinicians to the 
government’s reforms.  As a clinician who moved into management, she 
found that some of the managerial procedures or strategies which were 
produced with the aim of improving efficiency and effectiveness of health 
services worked against to the clinicians professional values (will discuss in 
detail in Section 6.2.3.4).  In addition, some of the health workers simply lost 
their belief in the health system due to constant reforms, and decided to leave 
their work organisations: either moving overseas, joining private providers, 
or going into private practices. As a result, the New Zealand public health 
system is at present facing a serious loss in health professionals.   
 
The above discussions indicate that the level of response to organisational 
change differ for health institutions and health actors.  Most of the health 
institutions adhere to requirements of change and align their paths with the 
government reforms. However, some of the health actors, especially health 
professional, react differently, especially, when they find the policy 
requirements go against their professional values and practices. 
 
In summary, this section described the health managers’ experiences in 
responding to organisational changes in the public health system.  It reveals 
that the responses of health institutions and individual policy actors to 
organisational changes differed significantly in terms of their level. As part of 
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the government agencies, DHBs find it difficult to play their roles as policy 
implementers because they have to ensure that they translate policy 
decisions in accordance with the government requirements. In this regard, 
DHBs seem not to act as they believe most appropriate for their populations 
but to perform in line with the measurable policies of government.  
 
In contrast, PHOs as NGOs are in a better position because they are merely 
responsible for delivering translated policy decisions according to what has 
been agreed in their service contracts.  To maintain the flows of the contract 
income, PHOs often change their strategic directions including organisational 
structures to accord with the ruling government’s reform frameworks. In my 
view, PHOs have taken proactive actions in responding to reforms in order to 
retain their positions in the health industry.   
 
It is my conclusion that health providers (both publicly and privately owned 
entities) cooperate with the government reforms. However, it is apparent 
that the government has difficulties in convincing health professionals to 
believe in reforms. To understand how health managers are coping with the 
impact of health reforms on their organisations and the health system as a 
whole, the public health managers were asked to describe their experiences 
in dealing with reform.  Their reminiscences describe the challenges of 
dealing with reform.  Details of the health managers’ responses are presented 
in the following sections. 
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6.2.3 Challenges of dealing with reforms 
 
The aim of this section is to understand how the health managers feel about 
dealing with frequent changes in the public health system.  Specifically, I 
wanted to examine the experience of public health managers who operated 
in different systems, played different roles with different responsibilities and 
dealt with different policy approaches.  The public health managers mostly 
confessed that being in such situations was not only demanding but also full 
of frustrations. The following comments from health managers clearly 
communicate this frustration: 
  
It was a mixture of frustration. – (P01, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
I think the people who work in the health care system are 
extraordinarily frustrated a lot of the time. – (P05, a senior 
manager of a PHO)  
 
. . . that leads, from the governance point of view, to some 
frustrations. – (P13, a DHB board member)  
 
It is very frustrating, yes . . . I think the greater increase in 
the frequency in change upsets and frustrates people . . . the 
implementation of reform frustrates me. – (P06, a CEO of a 
PHO) 
 
In order to understand the health managers’ frustrations, I asked them to 
elaborate on their experiences in relation to the challenges of implementing 
reform, and to explain how these challenges frustrated them.  Throughout the 
interviews, it appears that frustrations among the participants, regardless of 
the institutions they represent, were caused by at least four issues, namely: 
political interference, lack of policy leadership and policy support, poor 
policy planning, and silo effects.  The following subsections discuss these four 
issues. 
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6.2.3.1 Political interference  
 
The issue of political interference was captured during the conversations 
with the participants about the challenges in dealing with the 
implementation of reforms.   
 
The people making decisions are often based in Wellington 
of course . . .  local entities are not given the opportunity to 
make local solutions.  So, it is very much top-down decision 
making. – (P06, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
Ministers have the ability to build a political platform for 
how the future might be. – (P02, a board member of a PHO) 
 
The government was never want [ing] to lose a desire to 
control. – (P13, a board member of a DHB)   
 
The Ministry of Health still controls something. – (P05, a 
senior manager of a PHO) 
 
The above extracts show that the government appears to retain its control 
over the health system. Indeed, some interviewees reported that it was 
unusual for them to make local decisions without political approval.  In this 
context, the public health managers are aware of the political power that 
appears to control the directions of reform.  
 
Reflecting on his role as a DHB board member, P13 indicates how the 
government imposed a control on the governance of DHBs: 
 
I would say I would struggle to articulate more than four or 
five achievements in my 12 years on the health board 
because the plan is filled and the role has been so 
constructed by Wellington to ensure their vision is 
implemented. As an elected member, I can’t directly 
influence the total direction of the ship but I can make the 
ship as a pleasant sailing, on its course.  To change course is 
very hard. It’s driven by Wellington and friends in 
management. And that is whether Labour’s in power or 
National’s in power, doesn’t matter which political colour. – 
(P13, a board member of a DHB)  
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P13’s narrative illustrates his belief that government exerted its control over 
his DHB.  According to P13, the elected board system was introduced with 
the objective of fostering community participation in health improvement.  
However, in his experience, the elected board members had limited influence 
over health policy decisions because such activities were centralised at the 
government and bureaucrat levels.  P13 comments further: 
 
Although we implement the PHO policy locally, the [name of] 
DHB is actually a Wellington-driven strategy.  And it goes to 
the point there’s very little room for local innovation.  
Innovation in the [name of] DHB or any DHBs can’t be 
mentioned in the same sentence.  So, all [annual plans] are 
very prescriptive.  We look at it and we can try to influence it 
but only within a very narrow prescriptive nature of the 
template and then, the draft goes to the Ministry of Health, 
who looks at annual plans and says, “Oh! It looks like it fits 
the criteria in the box, good annual plan! Wonderful annual 
plan Mr [name of] DHB! Good work!” – (P13, a board 
member of a DHB)   
 
According to P13, the government introduced a ready-made annual plan 
template for all DHBs in New Zealand.  From his perspective, the template 
was very prescriptive and narrow.  For example, the government’s recent 
annual plan template required DHBs to incorporate the national health 
targets in their annual plans.  According to P13, the decision to implement 
the national health targets was made at the central government level without 
considering the local health agencies’ views. P13 argued that DHBs struggled 
to implement innovations (outcome-based policy) in health delivery because 
their annual plans were highly prescribed and circumscribed by the 
government. To ensure DHBs follow the government’s requirements, DHBs 
are required to file their annual plans with the Ministry.  
 
In P13’s experience, any attempt on the part of a DHB to resist the Ministry’s 
requirements and implement its own visions would most probably result in 
conflict because, in reality, a DHB board is ruled by the government’s vision.  
A DHB board comprises 7 elected and 5 non-elected members.  Although the 
elected board members outnumber the nonelected, the chances of elected 
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board members influencing the policy decisions are very slim because DHBs’ 
strategic directions are directed by nonelected members, and the 
chairpersons were ‘handpicked’ by the Ministry. According to P13, in many 
instances, the strategic directions of a DHB were controlled by the CEO and 
appointed board members: 
So, in theory, elected members outnumber the appointed 
members. But think about politics, you are never ever able to 
get the 7 elected members to agree.  So, with the 5 
ministerial appointees plus with the very natural politics, 
the government is pretty safe.  And, the chair is incredibly 
important; he chairs the meeting, controls the direction, and 
liaises with the chief executive.  And this is why you always 
hear that the DHB board is simply being [the] rubberstamp 
person. – (P13, a board member of a DHB)   
 
By referring to his own DHB, P13 demonstrated how a DHB board is 
controlled by the government.  According to P13, the government masters a 
DHB board through its appointed board members.  Appointed board 
members appear to be dominant as they have stronger voices and support.  
He also claimed that the government applied a double standard to its 
treatment of appointed and elected board members. For example, “in a 3-
year term, occasionally, ministerial appointees will have conferences directly 
with the minister and we elected members aren’t invited to that meeting”.  In 
terms of the domination of appointed board members in his DHB’s 
governance, P13 sees this as “the tail is wagging the dog”. For P13, such 
domination was seen as an effort to limit the voice of people in health.  
 
P13’s reflections give the impression that his experiences directly contradict 
what had been outlined in NPM and NPS reform principles: that control 
should be implemented through cooperation and collaboration. P13 
acknowledged that the government transferred some of its responsibilities to 
the lower level health agencies like DHBs; however, instead of facilitating 
local decision making, the government appears to have taken control over the 
health system.  This experience has frustrated P13.  
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In addition, the government’s control can make the DHB boards appear to be 
incompetent:  
 
They [the board members] represent themselves as 
something that they called governance, but if you make 
comparisons between the boards that you have in nearly all 
other DHBs’ boards for that matter, and make comparison 
with the board of Fonterra, Mainfreight, New Zealand 
electricity, Air New Zealand, or anyone, you will find a very 
different level of confidence and capabilities.  Our board 
does not do that . . . they have no influence. – (P08, a 
business support manager of a DHB)  
 
P08 talks about DHB board member’ lacking the qualities which were needed 
for effective actions. According to P08, a DHB board is supposed to operate as 
an independent board of directors which has the ability to assess overall 
directions and strategy of the DHB.  However, looking at the way in which his 
own DHB board operates, and comparing the ability of his DHB with other 
companies’ boards, he feels they lack such capabilities. Drawing on his 
experiences, P08 suggests that some of the board members exhibited a lack 
of knowledge and experience of the public health system. Therefore, they 
exert limited influence over policy decisions.  
  
According to P08, while in theory a combination of elected and appointed 
board members in DHBs is a good idea, it provides a difficult working 
environment in practice.  The board members elected by the public can be 
anyone from society regardless of their experience and knowledge. 
Meanwhile, appointed board members are selected by the government, and 
their appointments are based on their professional experience and they are, 
for example accountants or lawyers. At times, there is a gap between the 
appointed and elected board members in terms of their views and 
understanding because of their different backgrounds.  Such situations are 
exacerbated when the government exercises its control via appointed board 
members.  As a consequence, in P08’s opinion, a DHB board was perceived as 
being unable to function as efficiently as other business boards in New 
Zealand such as those of Fonterra, Air New Zealand, or Mainfreight.  It can 
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thus be supposed that the inability of DHBs’ boards to make decisions about 
strategic directions diminished the overall performance of DHBs.   
 
P08’s experience demonstrates that many reforms are ideal in principle, but 
not so in practice.  He suggests that the concepts of NPM and NPS such as 
‘steering’, ‘devolution and deconcentration’ and ‘public participations’ are not 
fully adopted due to the exercise of overwhelming political control.  However, 
despite its interference in reforms, the lower level health agencies such as 
PHOs continuously urge the government to include them in the reform 
processes: 
 
The Ministry has a difficult task to do but often is out of 
touch.  Sitting in Wellington, sitting in . . .  dare I say,  an 
ivory tower and only based on evidence-based research 
which is important of course but it’s not always logical, 
doesn’t always lead to  good policy because human nature, 
culture, perceptions influence the implementation of a policy 
. . . They don’t have the information.  They could get it if they 
got out from the ivory towers and really engage with people 
like ourselves on the ground, intimately. – (P06, a CEO of a 
PHO) 
 
P06 expresses his disagreement with the centralisation approach adopted by 
the government.  He claims that the government lacks understanding of the 
needs of various health populations in different regions and districts. P06 
believes that better policy solutions could be explored and achieved if the 
policy makers engaged local people in the reform process.  P06 recalled his 
experience of being in a meeting with a group of high level policy makers. He 
revealed how they interpreted the information at hand due to lack of 
understanding of the health system: 
 
And again, the Ministry will sit down and argue in 
Wellington: “Look! There are 3000 GPs in this country and 
it’s more than enough”. – (P06, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
According to P06, such interpretations indicate that the policy makers are not 
au fait with the way the GPs system in this country works.  In fact, they are 
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unaware of the existence of a ‘hidden’ workforce in the health system. In the 
experience of P06, not all of these 3,000 GPs are working full-time because 
some of them have opted to work on a part-time basis. Furthermore, not all 
registered GPs are resident in the country all the time.  In reality, New 
Zealand relies on overseas doctors, and many GPs who remain on the list may 
have gone back home or to other countries such as Australia.  P06 claims that 
such simple mistakes can lead to the wrong policy solutions and increase the 
level of complexity in the health system.  
 
Another health manager, P07 raised her concern regarding the inability of 
the government policy leaders to make health policy decisions. From her 
position, the policy leaders had ignored the fact that New Zealand is a ‘rugged 
and remote’ country.  She argues that New Zealand is different from other 
countries, and despite modernisation, New Zealand has remained isolated 
due to its colonisation history and geographic location. Therefore, in her 
opinion, imitating other countries’ policies and blanketing the whole health 
system with one standard replicated policy in the hope of getting the same 
outcomes is ridiculous.  
 
Both P06’s and P07’s experiences illustrate how the lower level health 
agencies recognised the importance of including their voices in influencing 
decisions on reforms.  They believe a centralised strategy limits the benefits 
of reforms because the limited understanding of policy leaders about the 
health system and the various needs of health populations.  
 
In summary, the political interference has caused the health managers to be 
concerned about the government’s tendencies to control the process of 
reform. On the whole, it was the DHBs’ public health managers who 
expressed their frustrations with the government control because such 
controls limit their ability to deliver good health services to the public.  The 
PHOs’ managers also indicated a sense of disappointment with the 
government due to its failure to include PHOs’ views in reform decisions.    
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6.2.3.2 Lack of leadership and policy support 
 
Some participants associated the challenges of implementing reforms with a 
lack of leadership and policy support.  
 
When it came down to the implementation, there wasn’t 
enough leadership in the sector, or support from the 
government to really transform health service delivery to 
improve outcomes for health populations. – (P05, a senior 
manager of a PHO) 
 
P05 reflected on her experience in implementing reforms and dealing with 
organisational changes. She found that the process of implementing reforms 
sometimes became difficult due to a lack of support from the policy leaders in 
terms of providing guidelines and information on how to implement the 
policy.  Policy supports are important because they help to reduce the 
knowledge gap between policy leaders and policy implementers.  If health 
policy implementers were clear about the systems and the implementation of 
policies, and the aim of those two, P05 believed they would be able to drive 
health institutions to a high level of performance.  
 
Drawing on the example of the 1990s health reform, P05 described the 
confusion among health managers in dealing with reforms and policy 
changes.  According to P05, because the 1990s reforms were driven by 
market strategies, the public health managers were requested to match up 
their investments with the operational units. Each unit manager was made 
accountable for the units’ activities, which were measured in output terms.  
The policy leaders made the health managers believe that the strategy would 
enable the public health system to deliver the highest quality of care and 
achieve the best customer satisfaction.  However, due to insufficient 
guidelines on how to implement the policy decision, the managers were 
simply ‘breaking down’ the hospital system into small departments or 
agencies with the aim of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of health 
services.  The health managers then noticed that the strategy failed to achieve 
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its objectives. Instead, it resulted in complexity in health service delivery.  For 
that reason, P05 states: 
 
We don’t do that well in the sector, we’re very confused. 
– (P05, a senior manager of a PHO) 
 
P05 says further: 
 
The Ministry of Health has really struggled with the 
leadership for the last 7-8 years and got confused about its 
roles. And the District Health Boards have just been off doing 
their own thing and the performance of the system is highly 
variable depending on who’s in charge. . . what we’re seeing 
now is a declining performance of the system without that 
leadership. – (P05, a senior manager of a PHO) 
 
As P05’s sees it, the public health system has, since the 1980s reform, 
undergone rapid changes. These have resulted in changes in its structures 
and governance.  Frequent changes in both public health structures and 
governance, however, have led to considerable confusion about roles and 
responsibilities on the part of public health actors.  P05 had witnessed how 
the Ministry of Health and the DHB leaders struggled to realise the objective 
of reforms because of this confusion.  As a result, the required changes failed 
to materialise at times because the Ministry and DHBs were unable to steer 
the requisite changes onto the correct path.  
 
In her experience, P05 has found that reforms usually come with a large, but 
vague, framework.  The process of implementing reform, including decisions 
on mapping the reform framework, is largely left to DHBs’ own 
interpretations; thus P05 suggests that the effective change has depended 
heavily on who was in charge at the local level.  
 
Our new policy setting for this government is potentially 
very useful.  But it has the same risks as previous policies, as 
there isn’t a leadership to affect it well, so, we will head out 
with the dog’s breakfast. – (P05, a senior manager of a PHO) 
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P05 discloses that the policy makers may approve a good policy framework 
that potentially will benefit the public health system but, because there is a 
lack of leadership to support the implementation of reforms, a good policy 
framework often turns into a mess.   
 
In contrast to P05, P08 defines a policy support as a clear policy framework 
which can be used for navigating the implementation of policy.  He claims 
that without such support, it is hard for health managers to implement the 
policy.  
Health policy is about what we are going to do, but never has 
context of how to do it, and how to operationalise it.  That is 
a very significant problem in New Zealand.  The government 
of the day will never come along and say to DHBs or the 
Ministry of Health – “this is what we want to buy, this is 
what we say that we are going to deliver and this is the way 
we want you to deliver it”. – (P08, a business support 
manager of a DHB)  
 
According to P08, the problems of implementing health policy in New 
Zealand are rooted in the absence of a standard policy direction, such as 
‘what is to be done’; ‘how it is to be done’; ‘why it has to be done’; and ‘what 
the accountabilities are for the delivery of it’.  As a result, policy leaders tend 
to interpret policies in accordance with their own understandings. P08 
illustrates his view using the following analogy: 
 
Think about this [lack of leaderships and policy supports], it 
would be equivalent with the All Blacks coach being 
appointed. He would go to a tent meeting with the players 
and meet with the junior staff of the All Black side.  He would 
say to them: “Guys, this is the direction that I want you to go 
in for the next 12 months; I’ll let you know if I’m coming to 
any of the games, other than that I want you to teach 
yourselves and train yourselves, I want you to look after 
your own logistics and supplies, and by the way, if anything 
goes wrong, don’t call me.   – (P08, a business support 
manager of a DHB) 
  
P08 interpreted his analogy as follows: first, all the public health managers 
are expected to perform according to a standard of performance which is set 
by the government.  However, there is no proper training and clear 
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information given to the health managers. The public health managers feel 
that they are unlikely to perform well because of this failing. According to 
P08, reforms always come with new ideas and approaches, but policy 
implementers are often “clueless” especially at the beginning of reform 
implementation.  For that reason, P08 believes that reforms need supports 
from the policy leaders, in the form of training and guidance. In other words, 
it is important that policy setters support policy implementers. However, in 
his experience, policy implementers are not given such support; the policy 
leaders themselves often have limited information or “know how” related to 
new reform programmes announced by the government. Second, P08 
explained that the models of reform generally advocated that managers 
should be accountable for the result that they create.  This reform component 
indicated, albeit indirectly, that the government should not be blamed if the 
policy went wrong because sound implementation is the managers’ 
responsibility.  Another health manager, P09 also lived through a similar 
experience:  
 
You will clearly see within DHBs a lot of money to create 
Maori health units under different names and types.  So, 
there has been a lot of resource taken out from clinical and 
other areas to put into Maori health, attempting to improve 
their health status. But that policy was given to us without a 
framework. In response to that we created the Maori Health 
unit, with the aim of supporting the clinical unit. We changed 
the programme from time to time try to meet the objectives. 
And that is just how we responded.  Have we achieved 
anything since 2011 back to 1993? Has it had an effect? I 
would say ‘no’. – (P09, a finance manager of a DHB) 
 
P09 shares his observations of the implementation of Maori Health Policy. 
According to P09, over the last 20 years, DHBs have been required by the 
government to improve the health status of Maori people. Responding to this 
call, his DHB made a significant effort to meet the government’s requirement, 
including the establishment of a Maori Health Unit.  However, because there 
were no clear guidelines from the beginning on how to implement the policy, 
and because the DHB policy leaders also had limited knowledge about Maori 
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health, and despite the programmes have undergone frequent changes, none 
of the objectives had been achieved.   
 
Without leadership and policy support from the government, the process of 
implementing reforms leads to conflicts among policy implementers.  Using 
the implementation of BSMC policy as an example, P07 shares her experience 
as follows: 
 
Because we have 20 DHBs, we definitely have difficulties and 
tough dilemmas in dealing with DHBs. Although we have a 
national policy, called BSMC that clearly says about 
boundaries and borders between DHBs and PHOs, there 
were some DHBs which refused to recognise us as a partner 
in this health care system.  For example, there was a local 
PHO from [name of the DHB], wanted to marry [to join] with 
our organisation, it will become our representative in that 
region, and hold the agreement on behalf of us.  However, 
the DHB said that is not going to happen because they [the 
DHB] don’t want to have PHOs outside of their districts. This 
was surprising because there were no such regulations 
stated in the BSMC policy framework.  The Minister and the 
Ministry won’t do anything about that because they don’t 
want to hear any unsuccessful story about the BSMC policy. 
– (P07, a senior manager of a PHO) 
 
The above narrative describes P07 experience in dealing with several DHBs 
when first establishing her health alliance.  As the establishment of business 
cases and health alliances were approved by the Ministry of Health, P07 
believed that all the policy actors such as the Minister, DHBs and PHOs would 
be aware of changes around the BSMC policy and would provide support to 
ensure the success of that policy.  However, in the experience of P07, the 
reality differed from what had been agreed earlier.  It seemed to her that the 
political and bureaucratic institutions were unwilling to support the 
implementation of the reform they themselves had introduced. 
 
The health managers’ experiences given above illustrate that implementing 
policy is challenging because those responsible for the process are often in 
situations where they are unsure what to do. Therefore, they frequently look 
177 | P a g e  
 
to policy leaders to support the procedural path they take to effect change.  
However, in my view, the participants’ experiences demonstrate that the 
New Zealand public health system lacks support from its leaders. Those 
responsible for policy implementations claimed that policy leaders were 
unable to communicate the views, visions and objectives of policy reforms to 
them. 
 
To understand the situations described by the participants, I asked the public 
health managers explain why they thought the situation outlined above had 
developed. The health managers offered the following responses:  
 
One, they don’t have that level of intelligence; second, they 
don’t know the answers or the solutions to this either. – 
(P08, a business support manager of a DHB) 
 
We don’t have people who are willing to hold that 
conversation [about the implementation of reforms]. – (P05, 
a senior manager of a PHO) 
 
The stronger the Minister, the more ideas he has himself and, 
therefore, quite often the influences are quite often from 
politicians down to the bureaucrats. Of course the 
implementation is from the Ministry through DHBs and 
PHOs. – (P06, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
Sometimes, you may have a new minister that might have a 
very little health educational background. To understand the 
whole health system in short period of time is almost 
impossible. Even if you appointed a consultant from 
Auckland to advise the Minister of Health, he might not fully 
understand the complex environment in the public health 
system. – (P10, a project manager of a DHB shared service 
agency) 
 
The above extracts show that the health managers believe that there is a lack 
of understanding and knowledge among policy leaders regarding the 
substance of the policy reforms.  This deficiency may be because some of the 
policy leaders have been trained within different sectors and have limited 
knowledge of the health industry.  For this reason, some policy leaders are 
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unable to communicate the detail of the policies to the public health 
managers. This finding echoes to Lawrence (2005), who concludes that “the 
public health system is under-resources for the work they do” (p.12). Barnett 
and Barnett (2003) reveal that many health managers came from outside the 
health sector.  In my view, the experiences of public health managers in this 
study illustrate that there is a disparity between the current characteristics of 
health industry leaders, and what Stiller (2010) describes as the expected 
characteristics of policy leaders.   According to Stiller (2010), policy leaders 
are expected to have strong understanding of cause and effect in the policy-
making process and the ability to assist in the development of policy 
innovation.   
 
In summary, a lack in policy leadership is affecting the process of 
implementing reform.  In the experience of public health managers, this 
process is difficult because they are given inadequate support from policy 
leaders. This systemic defect has resulted in confusion among public health 
managers and prevented them from producing good policy outcomes. 
 
6.2.3.3 Poor policy planning  
 
Policy planning is about developing strategies to make policies materialise in 
practice and about considering what is needed in order to operationalise the 
policy strategies (Barker, 1996). However, in the experience of public health 
managers, health policy planning in New Zealand is poor. This issue was 
raised by almost all the participants.  P09 states: 
 
They [policy makers] have only ever kept the health bucket 
at the same level.  So, they expect a policy change or a 
generation change to happen with the same money. They 
very seldom fund to pick it up at the start [sic], what they do, 
they tried to take up the same bucket. So, it’s never worked. 
– (P09, a finance manager of a DHB) 
 
In P09’s view, the policy leaders often take reform planning for granted.  The 
policy leaders simply assume that with the same amount of funding, their 
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new reforms will change the public health system in the ways they intend.  
According to P09, while planning for reform strategies, the policy leaders 
often identify solutions for the health problems at the point at which the 
problems appear; the policy leaders rarely consider the origin of the 
problems in order to produce solutions that address the fundamental issues 
in the public health system. As a result, although health services have 
undergone many stages of reform, they still face the same problems. 
 
To understand the above claims, I asked the health managers to share their 
most challenging moments in implementing reform. Several participants 
identified their experiences in implementing the six hours health target.  The 
six hours health target was introduced in 2009, after National’s returned to 
office in 2008. Its objective was to improve the quality of Emergency 
Department (ED) services and hospital performance in general. The six hours 
target specifies that "95% of patients will be admitted, discharged or 
transferred from an ED within six hours" (Ministry of Health, 2011b). By 
implementing this policy, the government aimed to reduce overcrowding and 
obstructions to hospital access in order to improve both outcomes for 
patients and health service efficiency (Jones & Olsen, 2011).  Overcrowding in 
ED is a problem because long waits are inconvenient and often 
uncomfortable. They may lead to poor outcomes for patients, and even 
mortality (Ministry of Health, 2011b).   
 
In the experience of health managers meeting the six hours target is not easy.  
A senior manager of a DHB, P08 explains: 
 
In terms of the six hours health target, we are the second 
lowest DHB in the country at the moment, and we are about 
to become the worst DHB in the country.  – (P08, a senior 
manager of a DHB)  
 
P08 describes the recent report of his DHB’s achievement in relation to 
health targets.  In speaking about this example, P08 implies the high 
possibility of his DHB being ranked lowest in a future report.  According to 
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P08, ensuring that at least 95% of patients presenting to ED were either 
discharged from ED or admitted to hospitals within six hours of arrival is 
very challenging.  He explains that the number of people across the country 
who come to ED is close to one million every year; in fact in his hospital, the 
number of ED attendees has increased by around 11% compared to figures 
for the previous 12 months. Public hospitals have a limited number of beds 
and that factor constrains hospitals’ ability to support transfer of ED users to 
in-patient beds within the six hours’ timeframe.   
 
P08 describes the overcrowding problem in ED as follows:  
 
At the moment, this hospital is full, absolutely packed.  
Tonight, the ED will not be able to locate any patient in-beds 
in this hospital.  We have been like this for the last couple of 
weeks.  We built a new ED, and everybody comes; so they 
are stuck in the ED and in in-patient beds. – (P08, a senior 
manager of a DHB). 
   
This example shows the situation that P08’s hospital ED faces at present. P08 
repeated that the overcrowding problem in his hospital ED was critical, and 
at certain times, ED was unable to fulfil its fundamental role of providing care 
and treatment for those with serious illness or injuries 24 hours a day, 7 days 
a week.  
 
As far as many public health managers are concerned, the imposition of the 
six hours target fails to help hospitals solve the problem of overcrowding in 
ED.  Overcrowding in ED is not caused primarily by a limited number of beds 
in hospitals, but rather by a disintegrating structural division between 
primary and secondary care.  Although the government invested billions of 
dollars to build new EDs and upgrade ED facilities, the overcrowding 
continues because the underlying structure of the public health system 
requires changes.  
  
According to P13, the fragmentation of the health structure is a serious 
problem in the public health system, but nothing has been done by the 
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government to address the issue.  P13 describes how, when the fragmented 
structure led to overcrowding issues in his ED, he made a complaint to the 
Ministry of Health: 
 
Well Minister, the PHO model that you made us implement 
has created the mechanism where all local GPs joined 
together and they have become huge.  And you Minister have 
advised them to register patients, as many as they want, but 
you forgot to ensure that actually they have enough doctors 
to manage the patients.  So, there’s no measurement in terms 
of patient versus doctor ratio. What is happening is – if 
patients can’t be seen, patients don’t want to go to other 
PHOs because they have to pay a higher copayment fee as 
casual patients. Patients then line up at the ED.  So, our six 
hour target gets blown out. (P13 – a board member of a 
DHB) 
 
According to P13, the implementation of reforms focuses on a narrow health 
perspective. In his experience, decisions about reform are often made 
without considering health services as a whole. P13 claims that when the 
government decided to introduce a new model of primary care, called PHO, in 
2000, very little consideration was given on the effects of the PHO model on 
secondary care services.  Despite the ability of the new PHO model to 
improve the level of access to primary care, the model has not eradicated the 
barriers to access which have their source in the costs of seeking treatment.  
He explains that patients with financial difficulties usually choose to delay or 
avoid seeking care from medical centres (primary care). Another health 
manager, P09, noted that if their health condition worsens, this group of 
patients will go to ED to get treatment because ED services cost them only 
time not money.  The problem of overcrowding in ED continues because ED 
has been made the popular option for lower income groups.  According to 
P09, hospitals are unable to redirect people to after-hours services in other 
medical centres, as doing so conflicted with their social responsibility.    
 
The experience of public health managers in dealing with ED issues indicates 
that policy leaders may introduce reforms to deal with more superficial and 
malleable issues rather than address the more fundamental problems in the 
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health system. The criticisms of the implementation of the six hours health 
targets and national health targets, overall, provide evidence that the policy 
changes have been unable to solve the overcrowding problems in ED, or 
improve the outcomes of the health system in general.  
 
It can, therefore, be inferred that the national health targets are not the best 
mechanisms for measuring health service performance.  For example, P11, 
who is a clinical executive director of a PHO, claims that statistics are only 
raw data and that, in themselves, they have no inherent value in achieving 
targets.  He argues his point further by saying that the health targets are 
designed to compel people in the health system to meet targets. This 
approach, however, runs counter to clinical principles which require health 
providers to perform their tasks that go beyond simple health targets and 
actually help patients to manage their health risks as well as possible.  For 
P11, the ultimate objective of health policy and its reform agenda should be 
directed to improving outcomes for patients: he deems that objective the best 
way to achieve value for money.  He stresses:  
 
We should be doing things that improve outcomes for 
patients.  It’s pretty simple.  We just need to produce a safe, 
good quality of care which has to be value for money – (P11, 
a clinical executive director of a PHO) 
 
In addition, the public health managers associated the poor policy planning 
with the adoption of rapid change in health policy strategies. P01 states: 
 
I think we have too much rapid change and I think 
sometimes we threw the baby out with the bath water – 
(P01, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
According to P01, as reform is driven by political ends, the government tends 
to propose reform strategies which can bring a quick transformation in the 
health system, or at least apparent benefits before the next election cycle 
begins.  The government hopes to show the public that it has succeeded in 
changing the way in which health agencies work. The government simply 
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drops or adds policies which it thinks will lead to this desired outcomes. In 
P01’s experience, most of the reforms are implemented in haste and, as a 
result, the government is unable properly to obtain some of the benefits of 
these reforms.   
  
Similarly, P04 claims the implementation of rapid reform has diminished the 
opportunity for the health sector to achieve some reform objectives. This 
failure arises because certain strategies and health issues require a period of 
time to pass before they deliver the planned outcomes.  P04 explains that the 
failure of health policy makers to understand the health system and its 
fundamental needs, and criteria with regard to change, have led to huge 
disappointments among policy implementers.  P04 shares his experience in 
dealing with the implementation of a rheumatic fever programme as an 
example.  According to P04, New Zealand is still struggling to fight some third 
world diseases such as rheumatic fever.  
 
Rheumatic fever is a problem in this country.  Believe it or 
not, this first world country still has a problem with 
rheumatic fever.  There are many ongoing rheumatic fever 
programmes, but the problem still cannot be wiped out. – 
(P04, a senior manager and a board secretariat of a PHO) 
 
According to P04, the rheumatic fever programme was designed as a 10-year 
programme.  However, the program was discontinued 3 to 4 years after its 
implementation because the newly elected government decided to 
implement another strategy.  The progress of the programme fell below the 
expectation at this point because it had been designed as a 10-year 
programme. Rather than letting the programme run its full course, the 
incoming government took the decision to replace the programme with 
another approach.  The result of such decisions is that they inhibit the 
potential outcomes of a programme from emerging fully.  Rheumatic fever 
remains a serious New Zealand health issue to this day. 
  
To understand the scenario, I reviewed the national programme for 
rheumatic fever. I found that the first national standard programme for 
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combating rheumatic fever was introduced in 2006, and was called the New 
Zealand Guidelines for Rheumatic Fever.  These guidelines were in place for 
only 4 years. According to Hooker (2010), these guidelines were unsuccessful 
due to a lack of resources, support and leadership from DHBs and at the 
Ministerial levels.  In 2011, under the National-led government, the New 
Zealand Health Foundation published a series of three clinical guidelines for 
the management, treatment and prevention of rheumatic fever to replace the 
earlier guidelines.  The government was successful in changing the way in 
which the health agencies work, but not, however, in tackling the policy 
problems.   
 
Another manager, P06 claims that it is not only policy decisions that are 
made in haste. Policy implementations and terminations are also often 
decided on an ad hoc basis. P06 states: 
 
The implementation has been rushed and very vague.  – 
(P06, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
For P06, the process had been hampered by poor policy planning, as well as 
poor communication between the government and health providers. He drew 
on the example of the government’s handling of the diabetes programme: 
 
The Minister made an announcement last year that the 
diabetes programme was going to stop without saying what 
was going to replace it.  And, of course, the number of 
diabetes reviews dropped off dramatically, understandably.  
And the Minister about three months ago asked, “what 
happened to diabetes reviews? They dropped off 
dramatically”. Oh Minister! You made a policy 
announcement that they are going to stop funding these 
reviews and they will be replaced by a broader 
cardiovascular disease and diabetes management program 
but you made the announcement before you had the future 
programme in place. – (P06, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
According to P06, despite the fact that changing a policy strategy is a major 
decision, in practice, such decisions are hastily decided.  Consequently, 
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reform ends in confusion for policy actors and such confusion adversely 
affects efficiency and effectiveness in health service delivery levels.  
 
In relation to the above situations, reforms were also seen to produce 
unwanted outcomes.  
 
Health policy also has created a number of very-very [sic] 
difficult problems for us to overcome. It sounds remarkably 
good . . . it sounds fine, but practically, it is impossible.  – 
(P08, a senior manager of a DHB)  
 
According to P08, reforms often work well on paper but not in practice.  He 
illustrates his claim by referring to the implementation of the BSMC policy 
strategy.  Generally the BSMC strategy is intended to deliver health services 
to the place where people live, in a better format, and sooner.  The key 
objectives are: to improve convenience for patients, reduce pressures on 
hospitals, and reposition the health system for its long-term sustainability.  
According to P08, the government intends to reduce the overhead costs of 
each DHB by pushing some services back onto primary care organisations.  
The government also believes that transferring some hospital services to 
primary care, or medical centres, will reduce pressures on hospitals.   
 
A number of strategies designed to these ends have been implemented: for 
example, delivering more services from integrated medical centres, called 
BSMC business cases (see Section 5.6).  Under this strategy, health 
consultations (as at public hospitals) will also be available in medical centres. 
Another approach is to introduce the concept of “tele-health”.  This strategy 
allows medical centres and hospitals to provide more consultations via Skype, 
phone, and email. 
 
Nonetheless, according to P08, the BSMC strategies are difficult to implement. 
Shifting health consultations from public hospitals to a primary care or 
medical centre has a major impact on hospital services.  New Zealand is a 
small country and it has a limited number of health consultants. If these 
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consultants become primary care-based on a regular basis, the change will 
place more pressures on hospitals because hospitals will face a serious 
shortage of consultants, and may not, as a result, be able to meet the 
demands of hospital users. 
 
The operational reality of life, as I explained to you – you 
can’t put consultants or physicians at the GPs rooms 
[primary care] and still run the service here [hospital].  You 
can’t have one person doing two jobs in two different places.  
It doesn’t operate that way.  It sounds fine, but practically, it 
is impossible. – (P08, a senior manager of a DHB)  
 
For P08, transferring some hospital services to primary care is an ideal 
solution, but it is not practical because both primary and secondary care rely 
on the same human resources.  P08 also raised his concerns on the 
implementation of tele-health.  According to P08, tele-health is a good policy 
strategy but he is doubtful about the implementation of this strategy.  
 
We have moved more and more into tele-health but it's still 
a long way to go and there is little in the way of the clinical 
professionals really trained in tele-health and developing 
disciplines around how to use it, i.e, policy, operational 
framework and such. – (P08, a senior manager of a DHB)  
 
For P08, tele-health is a challenging strategy to implement.  It requires not 
only comprehensive training for health professionals but also demands high 
commitment and passion for using technology in providing health 
consultations on their part. In his opinion, most clinicians are still not ready 
to adopt this new method.  He has had several conversations with a number 
of clinicians: these exchanges indicated that health professionals have little 
interest in the tele-health strategy.  
 
In summary, the public health managers expressed their frustrations toward 
health policy planning and implementation in New Zealand.  In the 
experience of the health managers, health reforms are poorly planned.  The 
government tends to produce policy outcomes that accord with its own 
interests rather than to create policy relevant to the fundamental needs of 
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health populations.  The implementation of reform is seen as driven by short-
term policy objectives and this approach results in greater conflict between 
efficiency and equity. According to Gauld (2006), reform decisions which are 
made in a hurry frequently lead to their failed implementations because they 
lack sufficient detail and allow inadequate time for management and 
clinicians to assess the procedures and finalised the reform strategies 
(Andrews & Boyne, 2010; Gauld, 2006). Consequently, reforms are unable to 
produce the desired improvement either in efficiency or patient care. This 
findings align with Lawrence (2005), who claims that “reforms are adding to 
the illness of the public health system (p.11)”. 
 
6.2.3.4   Silo effects and competitive culture 
 
The aim of reforms meant to improve efficiency and effectiveness in health 
services has led to the creation of divisions and standardised work methods 
based on specialisations in functional areas. The specialisations, however, 
produce unintended outcomes in the health system, sometimes referred to as 
‘organisational silos’. Organisational silos cause breakdowns in 
communications, cooperation and coordination among units in an 
organisation and with other stakeholders; they encourage fragmented 
behaviour (Fenwick, Seville, & Brunsdon, 2009).   
 
In the experience of many public health managers, there are many silos 
within health institutions in New Zealand which flow from the establishment 
of functional specialisation areas.  P08 illustrates this claim, saying:  
 
When you look at this DHB, we give the impression of being 
coherent service.  But in fact, we are a whole bunch of silos, 
all operating independently and there is constant friction 
between each silo. – (P08, a senior manager of a DHB) 
 
At one hand we have surgery, medicine, haematology, 
oncology, radiology etc.; on the other, we have rural and 
community services which are made up of hospitals, family 
health teams, disability and our community supply. We run 
our community oral health services which is across the 
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schools and rural hospitals. None of those are joined-up, 
none of them.  – (P08, a senior manager of a DHB) 
 
P08’s DHB is structured around three main functions namely, planning and 
funding, hospital and health services, and governance and corporate support.  
Each function is responsible for different areas covering both clinical and 
management of health services for the whole population in his health district 
area.  To increase the reported efficiency of health services, each DHB 
function may be structured into a number of small units according to 
predefined specific roles and responsibilities. Over time, the units become 
‘silos’ due to their functional specialisation and organisational barriers 
imposed between units. This arrangement damages communication and 
reduces opportunities for collaboration within the health agencies.   
 
Silo structures create communication problems as constructed by P07: 
 
Those people who are clinicians like myself who went into 
management, were completely devalued just because the 
managers don’t understand the clinical services. The 
corporate managers, who were brought by the government 
in health management lacked contextual knowledge around 
health. They [corporate managers] tried to adopt 
commercial strategies which actually in my view weren’t 
possible.  So, we end up with dichotomy, which take many 
years to work through but I don’t think it’s finished. – (P07, a 
senior manager of a PHO). 
 
P07 reflected on her experience of working in a DHB at the beginning of her 
career in health management.  As a clinician who went into management, P07 
experiences serious tensions between management and clinicians, when they 
are making decisions relating to policy planning and funding.  According to 
P07, her DHB’s planning and funding division was dominated by a group of 
professional managers who came from various industries.  Although they 
were experienced managers, P07 claims that they lacked contextual 
understanding about the public health system. In many instances, those 
managers often perceived health services as the same as other businesses; 
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they believed the adoption of business commercial strategies would boost 
performance.  
 
Considering such perceptions as inappropriate, P07 attempted to rationalise 
the professional managers’ views by offering her experience and knowledge 
from a clinical perspective.  She believes the professional managers should 
understand the implications of managerial decisions on patients, clinicians, 
clinical procedures, and health services in general.  However, P07 has found 
that most of her suggestions were seen as irrelevant and considered as 
against health management objectives, which involved the improvement of 
efficiency and effectiveness of health services. According to P07, 
unwillingness of health management to accept clinicians’ views in delivering 
health services resulted in two silos developing, and those two silos remain.  
 
The management and clinicians rarely share their visions, roles and 
responsibilities which made the process of implementing reform difficult.  
 
I have discussions with some departments across our 
regions. There somebody would say “what will happen to me 
if I don’t deliver the Ministry targets?  And I say “well the 
funding for the DHB is cut”.  They will reply “what’s that 
problem for me? My [the] problem is with the patients.  I 
treat them as they come through the door.  I will accept them 
and treat them as I see them. That’s the most important 
thing for my profession”.  And what can you say to that? – 
(P10, a project manager of a DHB shared service agency) 
 
According to P10, that is the sort of dilemma faced by health management 
and health services in implementing reforms.  Clinicians are important 
players in public health systems as they determine the ability of health 
institutions to offer health services.  If clinicians refuse to be involved with 
the implementation of reforms, or decide to leave their positions, a hospital 
can no longer provide a service for a particular patient cohort; this is a bad 
outcome for patients.  Furthermore, in performing their duties of care, 
clinicians often argue that they are supposed to be accountable for their 
patients’ outcomes; not for meeting the health service management targets.  
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Silos also reduce the ability of management to control the behaviour and 
performance of individual practitioners.  According to P09, in his DHB, there 
is a significant gulf between clinicians and health management due to the fact 
that “doctors and nurses don’t like being told how they will work”.  In the 
experience of P09, some health professionals resist the adoption of new 
managerial practices in their clinical activities. He recalled an example where 
health management wished to introduce a scoring system to help clinicians 
determine waiting times for elective surgery.  Patients were to be given 
scores according to two criteria: first, the length of time they have been on 
waiting list, and, second, those in most need.  However, there were 
longstanding arguments concerning the management of waiting times 
around the criteria. According to P09, such arguments arose because the 
score for waiting time was subject to professional judgment, and some 
thought the system was open to abuse. Nevertheless, due to the existing silos, 
the management was unable to ensure clinicians followed the rules for the 
scoring system.  The conflicts between health managers and clinicians 
resulted from a lack of agreed norms in professional and managerial values 
in the health system. 
 
Some of the participants linked their frustrations with the level of 
cooperation provided by upper level government agencies. According to 
these public health managers, cooperation and coordination between health 
institutions is disappointing.  
 
There is a situation where a DHB can say “well, the BSMC 
policy is all financed well, but we have already made a 
strategic investment plan and it [the investment plan] binds 
you for a 5-year strategic plan. The new government policy 
[BSMC] doesn’t really fit into it.  And we are not really 
prepared to drop off our 5-year strategic plan in favour of 
the new policy”.  So, it is a constant negotiation it would 
appear between the centre and a DHB as to what gets done 
and what gets through. – (P01, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
P01 described his experience in dealing with the implementation of the BSMC 
business case.  DHBs and health alliances had to demonstrate their 
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agreements on the implementation of the BSMC business case. Such 
agreement required: 
1. primary and secondary clinical leadership at alliance decision making 
forums to jointly prioritise funding and service developments that 
best meet population health needs;  
2. investment in primary and community based capacity (facility, 
workforce, information systems) through IFHC developments;  
3. shifting of services where it makes sense to increase access for 
enrolled populations and their families;  
4. real investment in the clinical pathways processes that support 
integrated care for patients.  
(Ministry of Health, 2011a) 
 
However, when it came to implementation, P01 was surprised, and frustrated 
by the responses of some DHBs to the business case being implemented in his 
organisation.  
 
In [location of his PHO], we have approximately 60,000 
enrolled people who cannot be serviced by us, because the 
DHB made a decision that they would not recognise us as a 
primary health organisation in [location of his PHO]. So you 
know, we have sought to resolve this with the DHB, but they 
have shown no interest or inclination to be prepared to 
change their view despite the provider and the wider 
communities being supportive of the direction that this 
organisation wants to take. – (P01, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
According to P01, some DHBs refused to cooperate and recognised his health 
alliance without any reasonable motive for doing so.  For P01, such a stance 
makes it difficult for his organisation to deliver services to the public.  
  
I was told by the participants that the level of cooperation among DHBs 
varied because policy came with general statements, and DHBs were allowed 
to interpret and implement the policy according to their own understanding, 
and the availability of their resources. In another example, P11 said, in order 
for his PHO to deliver the Diabetes Get Checked Programme under the BSMC 
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business case, he has to deal with seven different strategies produced by 
seven DHBs within seven different contracts.   
 
The situation became even more difficult when some DHBs attempted to 
differentiate themselves from other DHBs by implementing their own unique 
programme and being reluctant to share, or use, other existing programmes.  
For example, P07 states: 
 
In here, we and our associated DHB run an intersector 
programme which is designed to tackle rheumatic fever 
disease.  This programme had proven a good outcome and 
had been recognised as a good quality programme by the 
Director General of Health and Ministry of Health.  But, 
because our associated DHB is using it, the other two DHBs 
won’t, even though they also serve the same population. This 
is just because they want to have their own programme. – 
(P07, a senior manager of a PHO). 
 
In the view of P07, the way in which DHBs play their roles in managing health 
services seems to be by competing with each other, and trying to be the 
national champion in health delivery.  For that reason they refuse to 
collaborate with other DHBs and also PHOs.  P07 complained:  
 
I can’t understand why they can’t be treated under one 
system and under [an] integrity system.  We’ve got about 17 
different versions of software systems that collect data; we 
got five of six versions of PMS (performance management 
system) systems in the secondary care and primary care; 
we’ve got different patient management systems in the 
secondary care.  But no one volunteers to collaborate or do it 
in one way. – (P07, a senior manager of a PHO).  
 
In summary, the process of restructuring in the public health system has 
encouraged organisational silos within and between health agencies.  Silos 
affect the level of communication between policy actors. They create 
confusion and unnecessary competition among health actors and institutions. 
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6.2.4 Summary: Reforms, policy changes and responses to 
organisational changes 
 
It would appear that over the last decades, the New Zealand health reforms 
were implemented in a highly politicised and complex environment due to 
political competition among policy actors and health institutions.  The public 
health managers expressed their frustrations in dealing with such situations.  
Health institutions were seen as incapable of being properly accountable 
because the implementation of reforms has been accompanied by political 
interference, poor policy planning, lack of leadership and damaging 
competition between health agencies. These factors reflect the challenges 
dealing with reforms embedded in the mire of political power and authority. 
Consequently, the public health managers have experienced a series of 
paradoxes or disjunctions between policy expectation and implementation.  
 
The structure and governance of the health system is complex, and in the 
view of public health managers, the structures are “unmanageable”.  
According to the public health managers, the government is adding more 
administrative layers onto the structure and governance of the public health 
system through the creation of new agencies with responsibilities. As a 
result, the administrative size of the public health system is ‘getting fat at the 
wrong end’ because the additional administrative layers apparently create 
more duplication.  The public health managers expressed fears that the 
government is risking the interests of the public and the tax payers’ money 
for political motives.  
 
The complexity of the health structure and governance affect accountability 
arrangements in the public health system.  For example,  Gains and Stoker 
(2009) state “the lines of accountability remain blurred and now perhaps 
more uncertain and confusing to citizens than in the past” (p. 446).  The 
constant reforms raise questions concerning their effects on accountability 
arrangements in the New Zealand health system.  The next section explores 
the views of public health managers on accountability arrangements by 
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examining the challenges faced by public health managers in dealing with 
those arrangements.  
 
6.3 The effects of reforms on accountability understanding 
and practices 
 
The aim of this section is to provide an understanding of the implications of 
constant reforms on accountability arrangements in the New Zealand public 
health system. Specifically, the section focuses on two main questions. The 
first, which draws on the public health managers’ experiences, asks: what are 
their views on accountability provision and practices? The second, based on 
health managers’ experiences dealing with various policy changes, asks: what 
does accountability mean to them? Answering these questions should help to 
provide some understanding of how individual health managers comprehend 
and manage accountability in the context of constant health reforms. The 
following subsections present the health managers’ views and experiences of 
dealing with the constant changes in the health delivery framework and 
accountability. 
 
6.3.1 Dealing with organisational changes and accountability: The 
experiences of health managers 
 
This section seeks to answer the first question: what are the public health 
managers’ views on accountability after encountering a series of 
organisational changes.  The public health managers were encouraged to 
share their lived experiences in delivering health services around postreform 
accountability. Throughout the interviews, the public health managers 
acknowledged the importance of accountability in justifying their actions and 
results.  The health managers’ responses to the problem of implementing 
postreform accountability were categorised around two factors. The first 
factor concerns the problems of organisational complexity and multifaceted 
accountability relationships. The second factor relates to the conflicts 
concerning managerial accountability which emerged because of differences 
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in perceiving managerial values.  These factors are discussed in the following 
subsections.  
 
6.3.1.1  The organisational complexity and multifaceted accountability 
relationships 
 
As noted in Chapter Five, the adoption of constant reform resulted in 
complexity of the public health structures and governance. Throughout the 
interviews, the public health managers revealed that the level of 
organisational complexity and responsibility increased over the years and 
affected the notions of accountability and its practices.   
 
I think it is very hard to describe really, how much we’ve 
seen but also it is hard to describe how extensive the health 
service that we overview actually is. But, if you were going 
from top to bottom; and from bottom to top of the health 
system, you will understand the complexity. – (P09, a 
finance manager of a DHB) 
 
P09’s statements clearly evidence that the public health system is operating 
at a high level of complexity.  In his experience, the level of complexity was so 
high and it was difficult for individuals to understand the complexity of the 
public health system unless they experienced it for themselves.  Indeed, the 
Ministry of Health also describes the public health system as “a complex 
system working together” (www.health.govt.nz).   
 
Conversation with the participants revealed that the complexity of the public 
health system had a noticeable influence on the implementation of 
postreform accountability, because, by its nature, accountability is 
implemented in accordance with lines of responsibility.  In other words, the 
more complex the organisational structures and the more uncertain the lines 
of responsibility, the greater the problems that will develop in accountability.  
Using his DHB as an example, P08 briefly listed the roles and responsibilities 
of a management team at DHB level and explained how the complex lines of 
responsibility affected the implementation of accountability: 
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In terms of size and scale, I don’t think many people 
understand just how big a DHB we really are and how much 
we spread our foot prints around New Zealand.   
 
We procure locally for food, dairy products, groceries, milk 
[for hospital kitchen], building materials [for refurbishing 
and building], and providing health services. We are a large 
organisation with a large employed workforce in [name of 
the region], over 6000 employees.  We operate 450 motor 
vehicles – made up of cars, trucks, vans, trailers, motor 
mowers, motorbikes, forklifts. We procure a large amount of 
information technology equipment each year – desktops, PCs, 
laptops, audio-visual gear.  We run one of the largest 
information technology networks in New Zealand.  We have 
nearly 3,000 desktops, devices distributed across the 
organisations. We are technologically connected to other 
organisations.  
 
We are also the lead DHB in the regionalisation project that 
has been devolving under the current government’s 
requirement since 2008.  We are currently involved as one 
of the big five DHBs in the centralisation of shared services 
with Health Benefits Limited (HBL). HBL is the Crown entity, 
charged with centralising and creating a shared service 
agency, the first steps of finance, procurement and supply 
change, payroll and human resource and also information 
technology solutions.  – (P08, a senior manager of a DHB) 
 
P08’s narrative indicates that the tasks and responsibilities of a DHB are 
broad, involving the operation of the public health system at different levels 
of administration across district, regional and national levels. A DHB 
maintains reciprocal relationships with: the Ministry of Health (national), 
DHBs (regional) and PHOs (district/local).  The DHB’s tasks and 
responsibilities are not limited to the provision of health services but also 
embrace the entire management of health services, including contract 
management, health education and information, financial and legal, and 
human resource services.   
 
The lines of responsibility also demonstrate that DHBs are held accountable 
for the way in which they spend the funding and achieve the reform 
objectives. According to P08, all the tasks and responsibilities that were 
developed were meant to ensure that DHBs could create a supportive 
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environment for better health service performance in the New Zealand public 
health system.  In practice, however, managing all the tasks was challenging 
because the lines of responsibility were highly complex. For P08, the level of 
complexity arises because different governments have introduced different 
incremental reforms to the existing health system.  Each reform demanded 
that health institutions continually improved their efficiency, control and 
performance.  In P08’s experience, the process of meeting such a high 
demand requires health institutions to detail their tasks and responsibilities 
through the establishment of new processes, units, and agencies. For instance, 
the involvement of private providers through contracting-out and 
commercialising, and the creation of a market system in health service 
delivery, increased the level of complexity in public health governance and 
changed accountability relationships.  As a result, the health managers were 
all working in multilayered structures and relationships within multiagencies 
with an extended accountability regime which was based on performance.  
 
P08 explained that health policy actors must now recognise multiple 
stakeholders with different accountability bases. The public health managers 
were expected to respond to multiple demands from a variety of sources, 
inside and outside of the public health system, such as the Ministry of Health, 
DHBs, PHOs, and the Treasury. In addition, they were expected to operate 
with a strong focus on health performance and evaluation for the benefits of 
New Zealand health populations.  Simultaneously, the present accountability 
system is making the public health managers accountable first, for their 
institutions’ performance in delivering better health services to the health 
populations; and, second, for the performance of agencies which have been 
awarded contracts for delivering health services on their behalf.  In P08’s 
view, because reforms promised the public health system would perform 
better, the government has a strong confidence in this new accountability. 
 
Nevertheless, the implementation of postreform accountability appeared to 
be difficult, as is shown by the following:  
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 I mean accountability to 11 PHO members is quite difficult 
to do. – (P02, a board member of a PHO) 
 
We are having 20 DHBs in a country of 4.5 million people. 
This is not a good size of structure: 4.5 million [people] are a 
size of a city for other countries. We have ended up with 20 
fragmentation versions or interpretations of what a policy is.  
Because of that we [PHOs] definitely have difficulties and 
tough dilemmas in dealing with DHBs. – (P07, a senior 
manager of a PHO) 
 
For example, a consultant makes a decision: “I need to see 
this patient in 6 months”. The manager then argues “the 
policy says . . . no you have to see him within 4 months”.  And 
the consultant will argue, “but the patient is well enough, I 
don’t need to see him until after 6 months”.  The manager 
then says, “you have to because my KPI, my pay, my . . .  
everything is based on your meeting this target”.   And this 
consultant will be saying “my duty of care is only with 
patients, I don’t care what your policy says!”  So, you can see 
a very clear disconnect.  – (P10, a project manager of a DHB 
shared service agency) 
 
The above excerpts reflected the health managers’ views and experiences in 
dealing with policy changes in the complex public health structures and 
postreform accountability. These participants associated difficulties in 
implementing accountability with the complexity of public health structures 
and multifaceted accountability relationships. 
 
In particular, both public health managers, P02 and P07 spoke about 
obstructions in dealing with accountability at the PHO and DHB levels. 
Meanwhile, P10 talked about the contradictory nature of accountability 
relationships between health management and clinicians.  P02 described the 
difficulties his PHO faced in dealing with other 11 PHOs when first 
establishing a health alliance (see section 5.6.2).  According to P02, these 11 
PHOs were located across a large geographical area, across 9 DHBs.  For P02, 
the transition from a PHO to a health alliance was challenging for all 11 PHOs 
because they had different management styles and clinical practices. The 
situation, has remained difficult and full of impediments even after the 
transition period because the new alliance still has to deal with 9 DHBs which 
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have different management and clinical practices. Indeed, a health alliance 
had to refer to each service agreement held by its alliance members (PHOs) 
before dealing with particular DHBs because the content of each service 
contract differs slightly across DHBs.  For these reasons, P07 described her 
experience of dealing with various DHBs on behalf of a health alliance as 
tough and full of dilemmas.  
 
Meanwhile, P10 explained how the contradictory nature of the accountability 
relationships led to difficulties and conflicts in the public health system.  In 
P10’s experience, the problems usually arise from disagreement between 
managers and clinicians on certain things. According to P10, management 
demands clinicians perform their tasks in accordance with standard 
administrative procedures or key performance indicators (KPIs), including 
health targets, because their performance is measured according to 
procedures and targets.  However, clinicians are sometimes unwilling to 
commit themselves to these standards because some of the procedures and 
KPIs were developed in line with management perspectives and they 
sometimes go against the clinicians’ standards of professional practice.   
 
The experiences of these participants confirm the impression that 
postreform accountability is problematic because it was implemented in a 
complex public health structure and within multifaceted lines of 
responsibility.  The multifaceted lines of responsibility led to increased 
demands for accountability.  However, Messner (2009) cautions that in the 
case of ethical decisions or behaviours, more demands for accountability are 
undesirable because increasing demands for accountability are often 
translated into “a perceived need for tighter management control” within 
organisations (p. 919).   Messner (2009) argues that in practice, tighter 
management controls are unable to ensure various accountability 
expectations can be fully met.  
 
My observations suggest that the public health system is governed by a 
combination of various groups of actors and underpinned by several types of 
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accountability relationships.  These encompass managerial, political and 
professional accountability. However, as the criteria for each type of 
relationships are different (see Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; Sinclair, 1995), the 
prospect of facing conflicts in accountability relationships is relatively high.  
For example, as policy implementers, DHBs hold not only managerial 
accountability but are also subject to political accountability from their 
constituents and policy leaders (the government, the Ministry of Health, and 
health Crown agencies). Simultaneously, DHBs also have horizontal 
accountability to clinicians who are bound by professional accountability.  As 
compared to managerial and professional accountability, political 
accountability is relatively powerful, especially in influencing accountability 
arrangements in the public health organisations (Cordery et al., 2010).  
Political accountability is underpinned by hierarchical relationships, which 
enable the principal (the governments in the context of the New Zealand 
public health system) to coerce the agent (public health institutions such as 
DHBs and PHOs) to comply with the principal’s demands for accountability. 
Even though, the health managers (DHBs) are given considerable freedom in 
making managerial decisions (in terms of financial and resource use), the 
opportunity of health managers to exercise their managerial autonomy 
appears to be limited because of the clashes which arise within and across 
these accountability relationships.   
 
Furthermore, holding political accountability has granted the government full 
control over DHBs and PHOs, meaning that most of DHBs’ decisions and 
PHOs’ activities are subject to government approval. Throughout the 
interviews, the health managers revealed that the ability of DHBs to 
determine their strategic directions was constrained by the government 
requirements or sudden interventions created in response to political 
pressures.  This situation indicates that the democratic criteria suggested by 
NPS have not been totally employed. 
 
Simultaneously, interview data show that there were constant arguments 
between health management and clinicians relating to a mismatch on certain 
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managerial standards and clinical procedures between DHBs’ management 
and clinicians due to lack of understanding between them. For example, 
clinicians saw health management as interested in financial matters rather 
than outcomes for the health populations; meanwhile, health management 
considered that clinicians, as a group of people, were difficult to work with 
because they do not like being told how they will work.  Clashes between 
managers and clinicians have been regarded as conflicts between medical 
and accounting logics (see Lawrence, 2005). 
 
The work of Parker and Gould (1999) may provide some further insights 
regarding the clashes in accountability relationships.  Parker and Gould 
(1999) identify that the increasingly different forms of accountability 
emerging in the neoliberal reform era have resulted in different 
interpretations of accountability and tensions between the roles of different 
stakeholders.  Such differences are likely to result in diverse and vague policy 
decisions and those impacts could lead to negative effects to public 
organisations including, negative behaviours (Budding, 2004).  Thus, it is my 
conclusion that postreform accountability has become mired in the complex 
health structures resulting in difficulties in the implementation of post-
reform accountability. 
 
As noted earlier, in principle, the public health managers appreciated the 
implementation of reforms as they could see some of their valuable benefits 
for the management of public health organisations (see section 5.2.1). 
However, most of the public health managers expressed their 
disappointment with the implementation of reform because they felt that 
reform did not address changes in accountability:   
  
Policy [reform] hasn’t prepared this organisation for any of 
that [changes in accountability]. We operate in real 
uncertainty and lack of clarity.  – (P08, a senior manager of a 
DHB) 
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There was no one trained for that and at end of the day, they 
[the government] expect that to happen. – (P09, a finance 
manager of a DHB) 
 
The Ministry directions are too vague. They are not 
structured in a way that you should provide this in this way.  
It’s very much like – please provide this – (P10, a project 
manager of a DHB shared service agency) 
 
These managers’ statements are typical of what the majority of the 
participants reported with regard to difficulties in dealing with postreform 
accountability. As policy implementers, these participants felt that DHBs 
were struggling in dealing with policy changes and accountability due to 
vague reform guidance.   
 
Having received inadequate training to deal with reforms, P05 expressed her 
unpreparedness to work competently with organisational changes and 
accountability. P05 provides further explanation when she says: 
 
We didn’t build accountability system around that [the 
reform frameworks]. – (P05, a senior manager of a PHO) 
 
To give an example, P05 explained that at every stage of health reform, the 
government endorsed a general guideline and planning for policy actors as 
their references. For instance, since the first market-based reform was 
introduced, the government has passed a number of guidelines and plans 
including the Area Health Boards Accountability Act 1983, the Health and 
Disability Services Act 1993, The New Zealand Public Health and Disability 
Act (NZPHDA) of 2000, and the New Zealand Primary Health Care Strategy 
(NZPHCS) in 2002.  Even though, these guidelines did provide descriptions of 
health actors’ roles and responsibilities in implementing reform, the 
guidelines were, nevertheless, all rather generalised. For P05, the 
frameworks did not provide further information about accountability 
provision and practices for health policy actors.   
 
203 | P a g e  
 
Based on the public health managers’ responses, my conclusion is that 
organisational complexity has led to the development of multifaceted 
accountability relationships and that those multifaceted features have 
affected accountability arrangements in the public health system.  
 
6.3.1.2 The conflicts in accountability 
 
As noted earlier, postreform accountability has developed along the lines of 
managerial values, and emphasised performance, with a strong focus on 
efficiency, value for money, and customer satisfaction.  This new 
accountability has been enforced through a web of actions and relationships 
involving the implementation of specific performance targets and the 
monitoring compliance through reports and audits.  However, in terms of 
implementation, the participants disclosed that dealing with postreform 
accountability was perplexing because measuring performance in forms of 
results was complicated.  The participants associated the problems with the 
conflicts in managerial values which underpinned postreform accountability, 
namely, efficiency and effectiveness, outputs and outcomes, and auditing and 
reporting.   The conflicts emerged because of the different perceptions of 
policy leaders and policy implementers regarding those values.  
 
6.3.1.2.1 Efficiency and effectiveness 
 
In order to sustain accountability for performance, neoliberal reformists 
emphasise the adoption of the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness in 
policy decisions.  According to P08, health policy leaders appeared to have a 
strong belief in efficiency and effectiveness.  They urged policy implementers 
to scrutinise the level of efficiency and effectiveness in the public health 
system, with the aims of improving accountability of health institutions and 
increasing the performance of health services.  However, P08 reports a 
different experience:  
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There is a huge amount of issues with efficiency and 
effectiveness.  If we want to deliver health services properly, 
they have to be efficient and effective.  You cannot have one 
without the other.  The efficiency has the implication of cost 
management, minimisation of waste.  The effectiveness is 
about outcome. But my experience is often different.  I can 
make thing very efficient, but I may not make them effective. 
– (P08, a senior manager of a DHB) 
 
 
The above narrative reflected P08’s views on the concept of efficiency and 
effectiveness in health service delivery.  According to P08, the government 
made policy actors believe that efficiency and effectiveness are mutually 
dependent, and therefore, adopting these two concepts in governing health 
services will improve the performance of health service delivery.  However, 
in P08’s experience, efficiency and effectiveness were two quite different 
concepts which have different policy implications.  For P08, efficiency focuses 
more on finding the most efficient ways in managing cost, whilst 
effectiveness is concerned with the best ways of improving policy outcomes.  
P08 further comments: 
 
Management is unable to grab the whole organisational 
problem and resolve it through efficiency and effectiveness 
strategies. They may lose attention to what it should be 
doing [because of differences in these concepts].  If 
management is pressured to focus on certain things, like 
financial performance for example, it will lose attention on 
another thing. – (P08, a senior manager of a DHB) 
 
The excerpt illustrated P08’s position on the adoption of efficiency and 
effectiveness concepts in postreform accountability.  According to P08, due to 
a lack of resources (time, financial and experts), it was difficult for policy 
implementers like DHBs to adopt both efficiency and effectiveness concepts 
in delivering health policy.  Indeed, P08 believed that these two concepts 
should not be linked together in the same context, arguing that when a 
manager focuses on efficiency, the goal of effectiveness can get lost, and vice 
versa.  In my opinion, P08’s statement reflected the point that efficiency and 
effectiveness are quite separate matters, and concentration on the success of 
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one does not guarantee, or automatically bring with it, success in the other 
sphere.  P08 draws on an example when he says: 
 
Our DHB is going to find savings this year of about $44 
million.  We have spent so much time looking for savings, we 
will end up losing some of that money because we are 
looking at the savings but not worrying about how we are 
delivering the service.  – (P08, a senior manager of a DHB) 
 
P08’s narrative described how his DHB lost its focus on policy outcomes 
(effectiveness) because of undue focus on efficiency.  According to P08, his 
DHB was working hard to improve its financial efficiency by seeking savings 
of up to $44 million.  However, his DHB ended up losing some of the saving 
because, while focusing on increasing the saving, less attention was given to 
improving health services.  Lack of effectiveness in delivering services 
increased the operation costs of the public health system and reduced the 
overall saving. Therefore, it is my conclusion that efficiency is an opportunity 
cost of effectiveness, and effectiveness often comes at the cost of efficiency.     
 
6.3.1.2.2 Outputs and outcomes 
 
Both output and outcome are important concepts in postreform 
accountability.  These concepts were introduced during the implementation 
of reform with the aim of ensuring the given course of actions or resource 
investments achieved their intended results (Day & Klein, 1987).  Generally, 
the concept of output helps to answer ‘what is being produced and how much 
it costs’. As output is easily measured and can be seen within a short period 
of time, it has been regarded as an appropriate performance measurement 
for public services (Norman, 2004).  Meanwhile, the concept of outcome 
refers to broader changes or benefits created by policies, at certain times of 
their implementation (Norman, 2004). 
 
Across the interviews, it was seen that the participants valued the 
importance of these concepts, especially in managing public funding and 
resources in health services. Indeed, some of them agreed that these concepts 
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are strongly linked when measuring the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
public health system. 
 
When you spent your money on that particular client, will 
you get your outcome that you need?  Because of that you 
need to measure the effectiveness of the service that you are 
delivering.  Not just at the service level but individually 
down to the client level. – (P08, a senior manager of a DHB) 
 
P08’s comment underlines the importance of measuring health service 
performance.  According to P08, postreform accountability has linked the 
concept of efficiency with output-based measurement.  P08 explained that 
output-based measurement was introduced with the aim of ensuring DHBs 
and PHOs were accountable for delivering performance. However, health 
care services are subjective in nature, and therefore, measuring performance 
based on output has been considered as infeasible.  According to P08, the 
government prompted a significant shift in measuring health performance by 
complementing output with outcome measurement. In relation to such 
changes, the participants reported that the government placed the emphasis 
on delivering outputs that contributed towards outcomes. 
 
Nevertheless, the implementation of output- and outcome-based 
performance was reported as problematic. Throughout interviews, 
difficulties in measuring output and outcome appeared to be common issues 
among the public health managers: 
 
They (outputs and outcomes) look similar to each other 
really . . .  We can demonstrate how we have spent the 
money on programmes but we have no control on how the 
money will develop the outcomes. – (P02, a board member 
of a PHO) 
 
I guessed the mental thought today is very much about 
outcomes.  But we’re not mature enough to understand 
outcomes.  I would rather say it was a mismatch of 
performance measures. – (P03, a CEO of a PHO) 
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The above excerpts describe the problem faced by the public health 
managers in dealing with output- and outcome-based measurements.  P02 
spoke about difficulties in differentiating between these two concepts.  In 
P02’s experience, measuring efficiency based on policy output was easier 
than identifying outcomes.  Meanwhile, P03 mentioned the inability of policy 
actors to understand the concept of outcomes in the context of health 
services.  According P03, as a result of that lack of understanding, there was a 
large gap between health output and outcome, and he considered the gap as a 
mismatch of performance measurement. 
 
Citing a specific example, P03 provided a detailed explanation of how the gap 
or mismatch occurs in a breastfeeding programme.  According to P03, his 
PHO had to respond to assessment questions provided by the DHBs with 
regard to the breastfeeding programme carried out by his PHO. The 
assessment questions asked:  
 
How many babies are fully breastfed? How many babies are 
exclusively breastfed? P03 argued strongly against the 
assessment questions, saying: I would say this is nonsense!  
What is the difference between fully breastfed and 
exclusively breastfed? What is the purpose of having this 
data?  What are the outcomes that these measurements are 
trying to achieve?  This is the sort of craziness that I talked 
about! – (P03, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
In order to understand P03’s complaint, I looked at the definition of 
breastfeeding used by the Ministry of Health for both breastfeeding concepts.  
The definition of exclusive breastfeeding is “infant has never had any water, 
infant formula, or other liquid or solid food, only breast milk and prescribed 
medicine have been given from birth” (Hungerford & Robertston, 2009, p. 
11).  Meanwhile, full breastfeeding is defined in this way: “within the past 48 
hours, the infant has taken breast milk only and no other liquid or solids 
except a minimal amount of water and prescribed medicine” (Hungerford & 
Robertston, 2009, p. 11).  In my opinion, the breastfeeding definitions 
provided by the Ministry of Health are complex and confusing, especially 
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when it comes to practice since the difference between these two concepts is 
too narrow.   
 
Due to a lack of clarity in performance measurements and understanding of 
outcomes, policy implementers appeared to concentrate on policy outputs 
rather than outcomes: 
 
The problem of DHBs is they concentrate more on outputs . . . 
so many outputs accountability. – (P04, a senior managers 
and a board secretariat of a PHO) 
 
We avoid the whole question of accountability for outcomes. 
– (P02, a board member of a PHO) 
 
I think people are just worried about accountability in terms 
of health dollars, and people are not worried about 
accountability for patients’ outcomes. – (P07, a senior 
manager of a PHO) 
 
Health targets are the examples of obsession of the [health] 
sector to the output-based performance. We measure 
particular, and very detail-specific clinical things.  We think 
that if we measured those things the whole system will 
change, but it hasn’t.  – (P05, a senior manager of a PHO) 
 
The experience illustrated above shows that some managers have found 
postreform policies place more emphasis on output than outcome. According 
to these participants, policy outcome is intangible in nature and it takes some 
time to produce.  The government, however, often refused to wait a sufficient 
length of time for the desired outcomes to manifest themselves because the 
government itself was pressured by Treasury to show it had done something 
to improve the level of efficiency, and because the government needs to 
provide some reliable results to please the electorate.   Consequently, all the 
efforts and resources were centred on the production of policy outputs and, 
as a consequence, the public health system appeared to be obsessed with 
output-based performance.  Interviewees expressed criticism of the undue 
effort and focus on output-based performance.  According to them, output-
based performance neither reflects the actual performance nor does it help 
209 | P a g e  
 
the government to improve the outcomes of the system.  In fact, simply 
meeting the health targets is not going to improve anybody’s life. 
 
The participants’ experiences in dealing with output- and outcome-based 
performance provide an impression that the public health managers were 
confused with the measurement criteria used for monitoring accountability.  
It is apparent that the government itself was unable to provide a clear 
measurement for policy implementers.  Haque (2000) sheds light on the 
issue of output- and outcome-based performance in this way: 
 
The use of such performance measures is likely to encounter 
greater problems . . . where measurable performance criteria 
have hardly been a part of organizational culture in public 
governance.  Many of the government’s final outcomes are 
intangible and hard to define and translate into instrumental 
output measures. (p. 437) 
 
6.3.1.2.3 Auditing and reporting  
 
Across the interviews, auditing and reporting was identified as another 
critical issue that contributed to the conflict around postreform 
accountability in the public health system. Generally, auditing and systematic 
reporting was recognised as one of the control mechanisms for postreform 
accountability.   
 
Overall, we believe in auditing and reporting, we believe in 
targets, we believe in publishing results.  They are all good 
things. – (P07, a senior manager of a PHO) 
 
We all engage with integrity with [the] DHBs, with [the] 
Ministry, who we are reporting to and we will deal with it. – 
(P11, a clinical executive director of a PHO) 
 
Accountability is characterised by reporting. We have a 
delegation of authority, we have reporting lines, we have our 
annual account, and we have the statement of intents.  We 
have to report all those things. – (P09, a finance manager of a 
DHB) 
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We will get audited by independent auditors from top to 
bottom as to make sure our management practices, clinical 
practices, quality systems, and governance are complying 
with the national service agreement. Yes, it is complex. – 
(P01, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
The excerpts illustrated above show that many of the participants have 
recognised the importance of auditing and reporting in the public health 
system. These participants reported experiences of dealing with various 
types of audit and reporting to align the implementation of reforms with the 
intended results.  Despite the complexity involved, these participants 
acknowledged the importance of auditing and reporting process in the public 
health system. 
 
However, those who closely engaged with auditing and reporting process 
were unlikely to agree with the way in which the auditing and reporting 
process was implemented.  P06 drew the example from his experience in 
dealing with audit and compliance issues.  As someone who is responsible for 
organisational and staff performance, including clinical and audit compliance, 
financial risk management and clinical accountability of the PHO teams in 
meeting contractual obligations, P06 has experienced numerous challenges 
with those responsibilities.  For instance, he commented on the challenges 
created with regard to the ambiguity caused by the lack of agreement 
between providers and auditors concerning performance targets.  
 
It’s very important to agree what is the appropriate level 
even if it is a simple measure.  When I asked the auditors: 
“when was that agreed? When was that negotiated?” They 
got angry with me. – (P06, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
P06’s point was echoed by another health manager, P13: 
 
But in the health context, I don’t know if we all fully agree on 
what the expectation is. – (P13, a board member of a DHB) 
 
The above excerpts pinpoint the main problem of control mechanisms in 
postreform accountability.  According to these participants, there was a lack 
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of agreement between policy leaders and policy implementers about the 
measurement criteria in health services and, therefore, there was a serious 
flaw in auditing and reporting.  For instance, P13 disclosed that decisions on 
health target criteria were made at the policy leaders’ level without 
discussions with policy implementers. 
 
Furthermore, audit practice, from P06’s view has become worse as auditors 
come with vague targets and seek to impose penalties.  P06 provides this 
example: 
 
One of our auditors asked us to prove that our PHO has an 
appropriate level of service for our enrolled population. I 
said to the auditor, “please define what appropriate means?”  
He simply repeated, “prove that you have an appropriate 
level of service to your enrolled population”.   Then, I said, 
“so, now, how do I measure appropriate?” The auditor read 
the audit question to me again! – (P06, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
He commented further: 
 
You can’t have auditors coming around with vague targets. 
Auditors must have specific criteria that were agreed, 
negotiated and signed off by all the parties. But, in actual fact, 
they [the auditors] were just asking questions and some 
questions are irrelevant.  For example, they asked if we came 
out with a figure of 1 doctor for 5,000 people. Because I 
don’t even know if anything would have happened, then, it 
would be like some little comment in my audit form.  But, 
again why are they asking such question? If it’s not 
important don’t ask it. If you don’t have an answer for me, 
don’t ask the question, if you can’t tell me what the right 
answer is, what is the target that I should be aiming for, 
don’t ask the question. – (P06, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
According to P06, because there was a lack of clarity between policy leaders 
and policy implementers on what was to be measured, auditors came with 
vague measurements.  In his experience, auditors asked for irrelevant 
information which in his view was not useful for future improvement.  From 
his point of view, the implementation of result-based accountability has 
increased the focus on targets and counting things, thereby increasing audit 
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and compliance pressure.  He personally believes this undue scrutiny of 
details is unhelpful. P06 believed the audit and review process should be 
more helpful and bring about improvement.  P06 felt that the auditors should 
come and say: 
 
Hey! This is fantastic and here are a couple of suggestions for 
those areas where you are not performing so well, not read 
the questions 3 times!  – (P06, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
He also explained the link between funding, contracting and auditing.  In 
order for PHOs to secure long-term contracts, they have to prove that they 
can be trusted.  Trust between the government and PHOs is developed 
through the contracting and auditing process.  However, according to P06, the 
process of auditing frustrates many PHOs. He provided the following example: 
 
 If they [PHOs] have 30 contracts, auditors will come this 
month and do [audit] four contracts, then, 3 months later, 
another one [auditor] comes and does 3 more contracts. 
Some of the information is generic but they ask the same 
questions . . . half of it maybe is generic like your business 
cases and overall financial budgets.   But, they will ask again 
instead of sharing that information and having that 
information. They take an enormous amount of time to ask 
for the same information again and then another auditor will 
come in and will do 4 other contracts, but 1 of the 4 
contracts includes a contract that was audited 6 months 
previously and then these 3 . . .  So I think audits of entities 
rather than words on contracts would be very helpful. – 
(P06, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
P06’s narrative described his experience in dealing with auditing processes 
whereby he found that most of the audit processes involved were asking for 
the same questions for different contracts.  He criticised the standard of 
auditing and the quality of auditors, commenting that “health auditing in New 
Zealand is really only in its infancy”.  P06 considered the auditing processes in 
the public health system to be ineffective.  From P06’s point of view, the audit 
process would be meaningful, if it could be regarded as a learning process for 
organisations. He believes organisations would be able to improve their 
performance if the audit processes were to encourage organisational learning.   
213 | P a g e  
 
In summary, this section explored the health managers’ experiences in 
dealing with organisational changes and accountability.  Specifically, this 
section attempted to understand the health managers’ views and experiences 
on the implementation of postreform accountability.  It revealed that the 
public health managers have acknowledged changes in the notion of 
accountability in terms of criteria and requirements.  However, the 
implementation of postreform accountability was reported as problematic.   
 
Postreform accountability was seen as too focused on the production of 
health service output and too rigid in its auditing processes due to confusion 
over the key concepts of efficiency and effectiveness.  From the point of view 
of the health managers’ experiences, the performance measurement results 
which report statistics do not reflect actual health performance.  It appears 
that health policy leaders have not given the issue of accountability much 
attention as they have very little information on how to deal with postreform 
accountability. In addition, it can be seen that the structural and governance 
reforms in the health sector are becoming obscured and that the full benefits 
of policy implementations are not being realised. 
 
6.3.2 Understanding the meaning of accountability in the context 
of public health reform  
 
In this section, the focus shifts to the second question: what does 
accountability mean to the public health managers? As discussed in the 
earlier sections, the adoption of reforms has had a profound effect on the 
public health structures and governance as well as accountability provision 
and practices. The public health managers saw the existing public health 
structures and governance as incompatible with supporting the multifaceted 
nature of postreform accountability.  Indeed, the earlier sections 
demonstrated that the participants are working in a complex environment 
due to contradictions, conflicts, dilemmas, and frustrations in dealing with 
policy changes and postreform accountability.  Hence, it is important to 
understand how these apparent situations influence the understanding of 
214 | P a g e  
 
accountability in the context of constant policy changes. The participants 
were requested to share their understanding of accountability through 
reflections on their experiences.   
 
In analysing the participants’ understanding, I looked closely at the context of 
participants’ experiences and derived from them some common and 
uncommon accountability attributes to help me understand the pattern of the 
data. Across interviews, it was noted that the participants’ personal values, 
beliefs and experiences shape the meaning of accountability. My interviewees 
all accepted that health service accountabilities sometimes do serve to 
motivate them to improve organisational performance.  However, comments 
from my interviewees illustrate that sometimes the accountabilities imposed 
on them through the health service have actually made it more difficult for 
them to act to improve performance in the health system in ways they would 
like.   
 
Therefore, it is my conclusion that the participants understood accountability 
as two sides of the same coin: accountability means being accountable; 
accountability means being not accountable.  ‘Accountability means being 
accountable’ refers to the participants’ beliefs that accountability functions as 
a mechanism for improving organisational performance. While, 
‘accountability means being not accountable’ relates to participants’ 
understandings that accountability has the ability to distance organisations 
from performance. The following sections provide evidence of both these 
states of affairs. 
 
6.3.2.1 Accountability means being accountable 
 
Generally, all interviewees agreed that reforms have extended the basic idea 
of accountability.  The meanings of accountability were seen to centre on the 
main attributes of neoliberal reform principles such as: ‘performance’, 
‘performance measurement’, ‘outcomes’, ‘results’ and ‘contractual obligation’.  
The attributes the participants ascribed to accountability highlighted support 
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for the observations of Norman (2004): “Pre-1984, the emphasis was on 
‘doing the job correctly and lawfully’.  Between 1984 and 2000, the emphasis 
was on ‘doing the job efficiently’.  Now the primary challenge is to get ‘better 
performance’ from the system”(p. 431). It can be inferred that the 
participants’ understandings of accountability have changed from its 
traditional concept, i.e., providing information or answering questions to a 
broader concept that includes performance management and evaluation.  
 
In relation to the changes, most participants described the meaning of 
accountability as being accountable for organisational performance.  
Interestingly, although these participants did not agree about the nature of 
the difficulties involved in adopting performance-based accountability in the 
public health system (as discussed in Section 6.3), those arguments clearly 
shaped the managers’ understandings of accountability. Indeed, the 
participants believed that they are accountable for their organisational 
performance, and complying with attributes around performance such as 
obligation for contracts, meeting performance targets and measuring results.     
 
It is about result-based accountability.  It is also outcome-
based accountability.  Accountability for performance . . . I 
guess to me personally, I am accountable for running the 
organisation for success. – (P01, a CEO of a PHO) 
 
 
P01’s interpretation of accountability was centred on result-based 
accountability.  He believed that he is accountable for his board members’ 
ensuring that his PHO meets the performance standard set by the 
government and DHBs as written in their service contracts. The results of 
performance, measured in terms of output, were used for assessing 
individual and organisational accountability. P01 acknowledged that his 
conception of accountability was influenced by his personal background, 
values, and his work experiences in the public health system.  According to 
P01, his public administration education has helped him to understand the 
structures and operations of the public health system.  P01 emphasised that 
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his conception of accountability has developed around his experiences in 
dealing with various policy actors at different level of relationships.  
On the contrary, P02 understands accountability thus: 
 
It is about contractual obligation.  Our accountability is 
based on outputs or outcomes. – (P02, a board member of a 
PHO) 
 
P02’s conception of accountability is focused narrowly on issues around 
contractual obligations.  As a NGO, his PHO has formal contractual 
relationships with DHBs and the Ministry of Health, and therefore, the PHO is 
responsible for delivering health services in accordance with the contract 
specifications. To ensure the PHO was meeting the expected performance 
and accountability, the government and DHBs measured the PHO activities 
using output- and outcome-based results.  For this reason, his understanding 
of accountability was established from this perspective.    
 
Simultaneously, P02 acknowledged the complexity of the public health 
system and the issues around output- and outcome-based measurements, as 
well as the problems of multifaceted accountability relationships which 
resulted from reforms, but he preferred to view reforms and accountability in 
a positive way.  P02 says: 
 
I see change in a positive way. Often some people complain 
about change as sometimes being very disruptive and very 
uncomfortable. But, for me change is a useful tool which can 
be managed. – (P02, a board member of a PHO) 
 
P02 believed that reforms would bring positive improvements if policy actors 
were able to manage reforms in appropriate ways.  P02 comments further: 
 
If you made mistakes in this game, someone dies.  It’s good 
to rationalise on how dollars are spent but it’s not important.  
Our accountability is to the people of New Zealand. – (P02, a 
board member of a PHO) 
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The excerpt illustrates P02’s conception of ‘appropriate ways’ as meaning 
being accountable for the New Zealand people.  In other words, in order to 
achieve the intended performance, he believed that policy actors must be 
accountable not only to the government but also to the New Zealand public.  
For P02, health service industry is different from other services because it is 
about managing people’s lives.  Therefore, policy actors must be concerned 
about the implications of their decisions on the public because improving 
individual’s health status is their real accountability.  
 
To understand P02’s conception of accountability, he was invited to share the 
factors that shaped his understanding of accountability: 
 
I guess being a recipient of poor accountability often, and 
watching people do something that is not right are the 
possible factors.  So, when you are given the opportunity to 
give something that may be useful to the community, you 
should be able to demonstrate that you are understood 
accountability: meaning that you have to do something that 
is right. – (P02, a board member of a PHO) 
 
P02’s elucidation illustrated that his understanding of accountability had 
developed around his personal experiences. In my view, P02’s conception of 
accountability might be influenced by his experiences in the military before 
he joined the health sector in 1987.  Although he has served the health sector 
for 26 years, his military values are still apparent.  In our two conversations, 
he referred to his personal courage as a former military leader. He perceived 
reforms and changes as obligations to be fulfilled honourably; and he defined 
accountability as what is morally and legally right, which perhaps invokes a 
concept of military integrity.  For that reason, he expressed no regret about 
the disestablishment of his own PHO that he had nurtured over the years 
when its dissolution was required to support the implementation of the BSMC 
health alliance.  
 
In my opinion, P02’s narrative indicates that he also understood 
accountability as being accountable for performance.  However, his 
conception of performance-based accountability was centred on increasing 
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the public’s satisfactions in health services.  In other words, P02 measures 
accountable performance using citizens’ satisfactions as outlined by the NPS 
model. 
 
Meanwhile, the following three participants also expressed their beliefs in 
performance-based accountability but they focused specifically on 
measurement perspectives.  P08, for example, acknowledged that his 
conceptions of accountability are influenced by his day-to-day job 
responsibilities. 
 
I think working in different environments, and my personal 
day-to-day jobs have shaped my understanding in 
accountability . . .  When we talk about accountability, you 
have fundamentally to come down to some frameworks by 
which you can measure things.  We can measure nearly all 
things in health. – (P08, a senior manager of a DHB) 
 
For P08, accountability in the public health system is about measuring health 
service activities. From his observations, the public health system is 
characterised by some measurement frameworks that are predicted on the 
beliefs that the measurement results would reflect the performance of the 
system. In his experience, some of the measurement frameworks, for 
example, the national health targets, have improved his DHB’s throughput 
activities.  For instance, over the last 5 years, P08’s DHB has successfully 
reduced the elective surgery waiting lists by around 30% to 40%.  In this 
sense, P08 indicated that his conception of postreform accountability was 
influenced by his responsibility in meeting output-based results set by the 
government. 
 
As regards understanding how individual responsibilities influence 
accountability understandings, the work of Matheson (2013b) may provide 
some further insights on this issue.  Matheson (2013b) conducted a study on 
how a leading DHB lost its ability to focus on equality of health services 
during a period of economic constraint.  Matheson’s study reported that in 
the year of 2008/2009, there were strong pressures from the government on 
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DHBs to increase their financial efficiency through the implementation of the 
national health targets.  All DHBs shifted their strategic directions onto 
meeting the government health targets. Such changes in DHBs’ strategic 
directions may have had an influence on P08’s views on accountability 
because, since the implementation of the national health targets, DHBs’ 
activities have been driven mainly by efficiency and measurement 
frameworks. 
 
According to P08, despite all difficulties and criticisms, accountability 
survives successfully.  P08 describes his views on accountability using this 
analogy: 
 
This sounds flippant but actually I don’t intend it to be . . .  
we are like mushrooms, we operate in the dark, we feed in 
an environment of food that sometimes is not really healthy, 
but at the end of it we turn ok as mushrooms.  And 
mushroom is fundamentally a good thing. – (P08, a senior 
manager of a PHO) 
 
According to P08, policy implementers described themselves as being 
trapped in a complex system full of conflicts between autonomy and policy.  
Nevertheless, in P08’s experiences, the concept of accountability remained 
strong over time and had made people believe that accountability is one 
possible mechanism that could bring improvements to public services. 
 
Both P05 and P07 also described their conceptions of postreform 
accountability on performance measurement, but they valued performance-
based accountability from a normative perspective: 
 
 In my experience, accountability is about clarity and 
purpose – what we’re here to achieve; and the measurement 
and reward system – how to contribute to that and the 
effects of one’s actions.  – (P05, a senior manager of a PHO) 
 
Accountability is for what you do, how much that you do, 
how well you do it, and how well in terms of practice and 
who are better off as a results of it.  Not supposed as how 
much and what.  It is also about transparency, responsibility, 
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openness and contributions.  – (P07, a senior manager of a 
PHO) 
 
These extracts encapsulate the idea that both these participants linked the 
meaning of accountability with performance measurement and normative 
standards (internalised moral and ethical values).  P05 believed that 
accountability is about clarity in its objectives, measurements, and reward 
systems, while P07 understood accountability as individual behavioural 
actions and implications for organisations. To get better accountability 
results, P07 preferred accountability to be measured in terms of outcomes 
rather than output. Similar to P05, P07 associated the success of 
accountability measurements with the inclusion of moral values such as 
transparency, responsibility, openness and making contributions. It is my 
view that the participants’ understandings of accountability, arrived at 
through reflections of their experiences, indicate a sense of hope that 
postreform accountability will improve the performance of health services. In 
this sense, the participants hold the view that accountability will bring about 
improvements, if performance-based accountability is delivered with 
normative standards.  
 
It is my conclusion that the meanings of accountability described by the 
participants give an impression that the conceptions of postreform 
accountability were influenced by the participants’ personal values, beliefs, 
and work experiences. Regardless of the particular perspectives from which 
accountability is understood, the participants seem to believe that 
accountability means being accountable for the performance of their 
institutions.  To achieve the intended performance, the participants also 
suggest that policy implementers should focus on citizens’ satisfaction and 
employ normative values in the process of delivering health services. 
 
6.3.2.2 Accountability means not being accountable 
 
The public health managers’ conceptions of accountability changed slightly 
when they were asked about their confidence level in the new system of 
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accountability in terms of being accountable for performance.  The public 
health managers reported that they still believe in accountability and 
endorse its strong fundamental purpose because accountability has the 
ability to transform the performance of organisations.  
 
However, in terms of implementation, not all public health managers 
reported such positive outcomes.  The health managers’ responses drew my 
attention to some apparent inconsistencies and contradictions within and 
between the managers’ experiences, as illustrated in the following comments: 
  
The system of accountability in the New Zealand public 
health service is loose and weak. – (P03, a CEO of a PHO);  
 
The notion of accountability is getting worse . . . 
accountability is problematic and [has] reduced the 
efficiency of the policy. – (P04, a senior manager and a board 
secretariat of a PHO)  
 
The problem of accountability is . . . it is very murky . . . my 
personal experience tells [me the] accountability mechanism 
in New Zealand is being weakened. – (P01, a CEO of a PHO).   
 
These statements are drawn from the stories of the participants’ overall 
evaluation of the implementation of postreform accountability. In the 
experiences of many of public health managers, accountability is, in terms of 
its theory, an ideal concept but not such in its implementation.     
 
The structure of accountability can be drawn on a piece of 
paper. But if you step back and look at our business and how 
hard it is to manage and deal with, I mean in terms of 
practice, you will get a true picture of it. – (P09, a finance 
manager of a DHB) 
 
P09’s comment illustrates that the implementation of postreform 
accountability is not as simple as it appears to be.  Similarly, P08 says: 
 
If you look at the health system now and make comparison 
to commercial entities such as Fonterra, Air New Zealand, or 
any other large entities whose basic underpinning is 
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customer service, and you take a view on what the health 
service looks like in New Zealand, you will certainly ask, 
“how can health service in New Zealand possibly operate 
like this?” – (P08, a senior manager of a PHO) 
 
 
P08’s extract comes from the story of health managers in dealing with 
postreform accountability.  In P08’s experiences, the notion of accountability 
in the public health system is complex if compared to other business entities. 
Accountability is underpinned by various relationships, including formal and 
informal ones; and it rests in several managerial values. As discussed in the 
earlier sections (section 6.3.1), varied relationships and contradictory values 
have led to difficulties in practising accountability caused by the blurring 
lines of responsibility.   
 
For that reason, P08 felt that in practice, he could not exercise any real 
accountability.  P08 states: 
 
I think at the individual level, my job, personally day to day, I 
have virtually no accountability through anything that I’m 
doing.  I have a lot of tasks that I simply have to do and I am 
accountable for doing these things. However, in terms of the 
performance of the enterprise though, I’m not accountable 
for anything. – (P08, a senior manager of a DHB) 
 
P08’s statement implies that he understood his roles and responsibilities as 
well as his accountability, in terms of performance, those financial and 
throughput activities which related to his portfolio.  However, in reality, P08 
believed that he had no accountability over his organisation’s performance.  
According to P08, there were no policies or regulations saying that he is 
accountable for a particular performance.  P08’s descriptions indicate that 
public health managers may account for their day-to-day work but not the 
overall performance of their organisations.   
 
Listening to P08’s and P09’s experiences, it seemed to me that, rather than 
enforcing accountability, reforms have in effect opened up opportunities for 
confusing accountability. The study’s findings are aligned with Norman (2003) 
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who claimed that the blurred lines of accountability diffuse responsibility for 
management decisions and permit poor management.  Indeed, Messner 
(2009) suggests that the adoption of reforms foster more distance in 
accountability.   
 
Two particular examples support this point: 
 
We have the policy that says ‘every patient should be seen 
by a senior medical officer within 48 hours’.  It doesn’t 
happen.  They [patients] might be seen with 8-10 hours, but 
if we discharged the patient within one day, they might not 
be seen by a senior medical officer.  We have the policies 
that say ‘we will structure the care plan, we might make 
them visible’.  We don’t do that.  Sometimes, we don’t even 
see the final results of diagnostic tests of the patient that has 
been discharged. – (P08, a senior manager of a DHB) 
   
They are worsening the outcome for the patients actually. 
Because they are doing additional administrative work, and 
moving the patients around which they don’t have to. Just 
simply to meet the Ministry’s target.  They meet the clinical 
time but they don't treat the patients equal to a lot of issues. 
They just build wards to place patients in. – (P10, a project 
manager of a DHB shared service agency) 
 
These extracts were drawn from the story of the six hours health target 
policy.  Both participants were clinicians before joining DHBs’ management 
teams.  These participants expressed a sense of dissatisfaction with the 
admission flow to ED.  They claimed that the flow was created to meet the six 
hours health target but not to meet the clinical requirements. According to 
these participants, patients who come to ED will be seen by nurses to identify 
the acute types; then, the patients will be sent to the waiting room or short-
stay wards for several hours before they are discharged (if patients have no 
serious acute condition) or transferred to a ward for further treatment.  This 
admission flow has enabled DHBs to meet the Ministry’s target, but it has not 
aligned with clinical guidelines, which require patients to be seen and treated 
by doctors before they are discharged or transferred from ED. 
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Due to such problems, P13 perceived accountability as: 
  
A really blunt measure . . . are we delivering a world-class 
health system?  And we measure that by: is the life 
expectancy of our citizens’ improved? Is there deprivation or 
the occurrence of certain ethnic groups who have a higher 
density [sic] to have health issues: is that reducing?  Are we 
meeting health targets?  And if we not, then we have failed, 
that’s the measure of our accountability.  It’s blunt, and it’s 
not well articulated.  That’s the best that I can describe. – 
(P13, a board member of a DHB) 
 
P13’s narrative illustrates that his conception of accountability was 
established from his observations on the implementation of output- and 
outcome-based measurements in his DHB.  He perceived the performance 
criteria used by the government to measure accountability and performance 
as “blunt” and “not well articulated”.  P13 justifies his views, saying: 
 
I would say the health targets, annual plan and the 
government spending cap are the best attempt.  But, they are 
not a refined mechanism, they are blunt, and if you were 
over reliant on them, you would be unwise to do that. If we 
hold it [accountability] purely based on health targets, that 
would I say my 9 years were failed.  I mean on some 
occasions we reach the targets but that’s not even 1 year in 
any of my 9 years, where the board has achieved every one 
of the health targets.  – (P13, a board member of a DHB) 
 
 
P13 appreciated the government efforts for introducing the performance 
measurement in the public health system.  However, in his experiences, most 
of the measurement criteria were unable to reflect actual performance of the 
public health system.  P13 also expressed a feeling of disappointment for his 
DHB’s populations due to his limited power to influence the government’s 
crafting of better measurements (see discussions in 5.2.3.1). P13 comments 
further: 
 
And, if I am going to be held accountable, then I would want 
more ability as a DHB member to change the strategic 
directions. – (P13, a board member of a DHB)   
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The excerpt illustrates P13’s desires to have more authority in determining 
his DHB strategic directions.  He believed that DHBs will be more accountable 
for the public if the government reduced the control on DHBs.   
 
In summary, Section 6.3 provides a discussion of the effects of constant 
reforms on accountability arrangements in the public health system. 
Throughout the interviews, it was noticeable that the participants’ 
understandings of accountability were influenced by their personal values, 
beliefs and experiences.  As reforms were implemented under neoliberal 
principles, the health managers’ conceptions of accountability were centred 
on performance and issues around managing performance. Nevertheless, 
working in the new accountability format within a complex public health 
structure was challenging for public health managers. The practice of 
accountability appears to be difficult due to its multifaceted relationships and 
conflicts in managerial values.  Despite the difficulties, the public health 
managers still have a strong believe in accountability. Hence it can be 
deduced that the public health managers understood accountability as being 
two sides of the same coin: i.e., on one side, accountability means being 
accountable; while, on the other, accountability means not being accountable. 
   
6.4 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter described the second stage of understanding of accountability in 
the context of reforms. In particular, this chapter described the public health 
managers’ lived experiences of dealing with the implementation of reform 
and accountability in the public health system.  I arranged the discussions 
according to two main issues: first, the government’s rationale for 
implementing reforms and how the public health managers respond to 
organisational change; second, how the public health managers deal with 
reforms and changes in accountability.   
 
The study’s findings indicate that reform was implemented in a highly 
politicised and complex environment due to endless competition among 
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political institutions and health organisations.  As a result, the public health 
system has undergone a series of changes in its governance and structures.    
However, due to political interference, lack of leadership, poor policy 
planning and the effects of silos, the reforms have hindered rather than 
improved the performance of the public health system. The public health 
managers have experienced a series of disparities between policy 
expectation and implementation. In other words, reforms failed to deliver the 
promised objectives to the public. This failure has led to the frustrations of 
public health managers.   
 
As expected, the confusing situations in the public health system have had a 
profound impact on accountability provision and practices.  The findings of 
this study suggest that reforms have changed the health managers’ views on 
accountability.  The public health managers’ views on the concept of 
accountability have progressed from compliance (traditional accountability) 
to the adoption of a performance perspective.  Accountability has become 
problematic due to the multiple accountability relationships that have 
evolved and the unclear criteria and values of accountability.  The study’s 
findings disclose a serious conflict concerning relationships, criteria and 
values of accountability. Nevertheless, the public health manages still believe 
that the implementation of proper accountability system could lead to 
improved performance. They believe that it is still possible if accountability 
systems are implemented in the right manner.  
 
To comprehend why accountability in the context of reforms was understood 
from two opposite perspectives, the next chapter concludes the research 
issue by presenting a more holistic understanding using the second level of 
analysis, called decomposition approach. This stage is also known as the third 
stage (or Stage 3, see Figure 3.1, p. 72) of understanding.  
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7. CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter concludes the research project by providing the results of the 
research in terms of gaining a comprehensive understanding of the effects of 
continual public sector reform on accountability and its practices in the 
context of the New Zealand public health system. Through the adoption of the 
third stage (or Stage 3, see Figure 3.1, p. 72) of understanding, this chapter 
draws together empirical parts generated from the review of documents and 
interviews. Prior to the discussion of comprehensive understanding, a 
reflection on the major findings of the preunderstanding and understanding 
stages is presented. Subsequently, this chapter presents contributions, and 
limitations of the study, before ending the discussion with recommendations 
for future research and a final reflection.  
 
7.2 Reflection on major findings: From preunderstanding to 
comprehensive understanding 
 
I began this research by presenting my concerns related to the issues of 
accountability in the context of public sector reform.  I argued that the notion 
of accountability has changed throughout the years of NPM and NPS reforms, 
but postreform accountability has brought little improvement in its practices. 
The irony of this situation is that governments have consistently offered the 
public their full commitment to improving accountability in the next round of 
reform. In many instances, governments have given their assurance that 
another round of reform would improve the performance of public 
organisations and enhance accountability.  Dubnick (2011) refers to the 
above irony as the ‘reformist paradox’ because it has been proven that the 
implementation of new policy strategies often reduces rather than improves 
accountability. I argued that the government assurances on improving 
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accountability through the adoption of reforms reflecting the notion of 
accountability were idealistic, and that decisions for adopting reform were 
based on false premises. I was interested in understanding the experience of 
public managers in dealing with continual reforms, resultant changes in their 
governance and organisational structures, and the effects of changes on 
accountability.  
 
The central research question of this study was: what does “accountability” 
mean in the ever-changing New Zealand public health service?  This study set 
out to address the research question using a critical hermeneutics approach.  
The findings of this study were presented according to the hermeneutics 
stages of understanding, suggested by Myers (1994), and Phillips and Brown 
(1993). The stages of understanding are known as preunderstanding, 
understanding and comprehensive understanding.  The preunderstanding 
stage was established through a review of policy documents and relevant 
literature related to the history of New Zealand public health reform. To 
understand the patterns of reform, the findings were arranged according to 
the rationales for and the formats of reform.  The NPM and NPS models were 
used as the basis for examining the patterns of reform. Then, the next stage of 
understanding involved investigation of the health managers’ experiences in 
dealing with reforms and policy changes and their conceptions of 
accountability and its practices.   
 
Preunderstanding and understanding stages were discussed in Chapter Five 
and Six respectively, whilst the third stage or comprehensive understanding 
will be offered in this chapter. The comprehensive understanding has been 
generated from the process of interpretation and reinterpretation of parts of 
understanding into the whole understanding. Prior to a discussion of 
comprehensive understanding, summaries of preunderstanding and 
understanding findings are presented.  
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7.2.1 Preunderstanding  
 
Chapter Five presented the response of this study to the first research 
question: what changes in the public health system have taken place over the 
last four stages of reform and what were the rationales in terms of 
accountability?  
 
Chapter Five reported that the New Zealand public health system has 
experienced different types of reform, including minor and radical changes 
under different ruling governments. A closer examination showed that in 
every new round of reform, the process of transformation was accompanied 
by changes in legal frameworks, administrative structures, and distribution 
of responsibilities. The changes were expected to help the government shift 
its role from funding organisations to funding performances (Norman, 2003). 
The above findings support previous research in this area (see Ashton, 1995; 
Ashton et al., 2005; Cumming, 2011; Gauld, 2003a, 2012; Morgan & Simmons, 
2009; Starke, 2010). 
 
An analysis of the strategies of reform indicates that the pattern of change 
was constant and revolved around centralised and decentralised strategies 
that reflected the influence of NPM and NPS models as discussed in Chapter 
Two. Regardless of which model of reform was adopted, the objective of 
reform remained aligned with the effort of improving policy efficiency and 
effectiveness.  This finding also shows that the objectives of reform were 
repetitive; this repetition illustrates that the previous reform strategies were 
perceived as being unsuccessful in achieving their aims.  
 
The findings move on to suggest that the government does not seem to 
accept that repeating the same reform objectives in each successive round of 
reforms is a sign of the failure of its former policies.  Rather, the government 
chose to define the repetitive objectives as the consequences of the growing 
public expectations in health services. In its arguments, the government 
claimed that the growing expectations have created more pressures for the 
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public health system, and, therefore, that another set of reforms was needed 
to enable the public health system to respond well to such pressures.   
 
To engender public support for another round of reform, the government 
rationalised its arguments using accounting technology and information to 
show the economic reality of the public health system. However, the most 
salient point underlying this fact was that the ruling governments tended to 
introduce distinctive policy strategies rather than consider the ability of the 
strategies to solve the existing problems. Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson 
(2000) claimed that reforms were not aimed at improving the public services 
but rather attempted to change the modes of managing, controlling, and 
accounting for the services. This view suggests that reforms were introduced 
for the government’s political survival rather than to address fundamental 
health problems.  
 
As reveal in Chapter Five, the findings of his study support the work of 
Cumming (2011), Gauld (2012), and Ashton and Tenbensel (2012) who 
caution that the government will face more challenges in the future because 
reforms have increased  the complexity of the public health system.  Indeed, 
the study’s findings report that in the year after the 2011 election, we have 
witnessed more extensive change in the post-2008 reform.  The government 
has established the NHB and the four regional DHBs on top of the existing 20 
DHBs.  It has introduced the concept of health alliance through the formation 
of the PHOs consortia.  The establishment of these new agencies has 
increased the complexity of public health as it has added more administrative 
layers to the existing public health structures.  The formation of new agencies 
is an apparent paradox because the strategies appear to run contrary to the 
initial objective of increasing efficiency by reducing administrative 
duplications and unnecessary bureaucratic procedures. 
  
Reform has signalled a shift in the meaning of accountability and its practices.  
However, the document review provided limited insights into how 
accountability was structured and practised during the years of reform.  
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What is evident, however, is that the term accountability was consistently 
utilised by the government, especially in achieving public support for 
sustaining its reform agenda. As a return, the government, through its policy 
documents, promised the public that it would improve accountability and 
performance of the public health system. However, little information was 
provided by the government on how accountability for performance would 
be addressed within the public health system because most of the policy 
documents defined accountability from the policy actors’ responsibilities.  
 
At the end of the preunderstanding stage, I identified two main conclusions. 
Firstly, the implementation of reforms was constant, but the patterns of 
reform appeared to be inconsistent; they went in diverse directions.  I 
concluded that the rationales for reform were justified from functional and 
social perspectives, but the strategies were designed in accordance with the 
government’s political interests. Secondly, little was known about the notions 
of accountability in the years of reform. It was apparent that some definition 
for accountability was provided in some policy documents, but it was limited 
to the health actors’ responsibilities. In my view, the normative values of 
accountability were utilised by policy makers to increase the public support 
for reforms. There was an expectation from policy makers that accountability 
would be enhanced and the performance of the organisations would be 
improved as the public health actors perform their responsibilities 
accordingly.    
 
7.2.2 Understanding 
 
Chapter Six reported the results of interviews that investigated the health 
managers’ subjective experiences in dealing with constant reforms, 
organisational changes, and the new notion of accountability.  The summary 
of the findings were discussed in two main sections, i.e., reform, and 
accountability.   
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7.2.2.1 Reform: “is more about politics than policy” 
 
This section deals with the second research question: what are challenges 
related to constant policy changes, and how do health managers feel about 
dealing with the changes in the public health system? 
 
One of the findings suggests that reforms made public institutions more 
accountable for managing their resources.  This finding concurs with Gregory 
(2000), who reported that the greatest success of the New Zealand public 
sector early reform was a huge improvement in resource management and 
financial control. However, despite that benefit, the public health managers 
expressed their frustrations in dealing with reforms, and with policy changes. 
The public health managers believed that the health agencies had failed to 
deliver better services because neoliberal reforms focused more on the effort 
of improving resource management than on health services.   
 
The interview findings confirm the preunderstanding conclusions that 
reforms were designed to tackle current issues rather than to address the 
fundamental problems in the public health system. In particular, the 
interview findings suggest that reform is more about politics than policy. The 
model for both NPM and NPS provide only general principles, which allow 
reformists to select only those principles which they wish to adopt and to 
interpret them according to the reformists’ own contexts (Hood, 1991). In the 
context of this study, the government seemed to choose and interpret 
reforms in accordance with its political interests (Gauld, 2003b). These 
findings confirm that the models of reform are essentially rhetoric; i.e., their 
language suggests a sound basis for organisations to adopt change but 
provide little indication on how to operationalise the change (Christensen & 
Laegreid, 2007, 2011b; Hood, 1991, 1995; Lapsley, 2008; Van Dooren & 
Sterck, 2006). 
 
Due to the rhetorical nature of the reforms, all the participants alluded to the 
tension in reform decisions and implementations. As discussed in Chapter Six, 
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the participants reported that reform decisions were centralised at the 
ministerial level; and the implementation of reform was hindered by political 
interference, poor policy planning, lack of leadership and policy support, and 
the issues of silo structures and unnecessary competition between health 
agencies. For example, the government often made ad hoc decisions, which 
were sometimes not rational, just to meet the efficiency objective, rather than 
consider the implication of its decisions on the public health sector. The 
participants also suggest that reforms have been directed to the formation of 
functional specialisation, which in turn led to the creation of silos and 
undesirable competition among health agencies. Therefore, the 
implementation of reform appears to be problematic for the participants 
because the government itself lacked knowledge on how to deliver the 
reforms being introduced.  These findings differ from the work of Van Dooren 
and Sterck (2006), who suggest that political influence has substantial effects 
only on reform decisions and less on daily operations.  The findings of this 
study, however, suggest that the political influence appears to be critical in 
both reform decisions and implementations.   
 
The result also indicates that the government has adopted hierarchical 
relationships, which in turn give the government full control over the lower 
level health agencies (Harber & Ball, 2003; Sinclair, 1995).  This finding does 
not fit with NPM and NPS principles which promote the ideas of 
decentralisation and democratic values in postreform governance. The 
government appears to influence DHBs board decisions through the 
appointed board members while it monitors the activities of PHOs through 
DHBs regulations and contracts. This finding aligned with Gregory (2000), 
who describes the political influences in New Zealand as an “. . . elective 
dictatorship . . .” (p. 115-156). Nevertheless, having full control over the 
health management does not mean the government has any real control over 
the outcomes of reform, because, in the context of health, the services require 
supports from health professionals in order to deliver health services. 
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This study has found that the government appears to have difficulties in 
controlling health professionals but not in controlling health management. 
Technically, health professionals are bounded by their professional and 
ethical guidelines.  In this sense, they are independent and are not subject to 
the government policy requirements.  They, therefore, have the options of 
either supporting or not supporting a reform. This choice is made possible 
because health professionals are accountable for the process of care rather 
than outcome of that process (Wallis, 2013).  Nevertheless, by contrast, the 
managerial accountability does require health professionals to be 
accountable for policy outcome. For these reasons, support from health 
professionals toward reform is limited to only those strategies which aligned 
with their professional accountability. For these reasons, the government 
control over the public health system is effective only in the health 
management division. However, by controlling the operation of health 
management, the government had expected that it would, or could, control 
the overall health service outcomes.  
 
The health managers have expressed their concerns about the level of 
government control over the health management division. They report that 
the government dominates, and often redirects during policy 
implementations. The government control was seen as going against the 
reform principle of ‘let managers manage’. This principle was seen to offer 
the public health managers considerable freedom to use their discretionary 
power to translate all the reform strategies in accordance with their 
institutional capacities and interests (Gregory, 2000; Maesschalck, 2004). 
Nevertheless, with the government retaining its hierarchical control over the 
public health agencies, this discretionary power is limited in actual practice. 
Again, these findings disagree with those of Van Dooren and Sterck (2006), 
who view policy implementers (‘street level’ employees) as the main 
transformers of actions.   
 
In summary, the empirical findings suggest that the challenges in dealing 
with constant reforms and policy changes is rooted in the problem that 
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‘reform is more about politics than policy’.  In other words, the challenges are 
about the difficulties that the policy implementers have in dealing with the 
government’s political interests. The gap between reform decisions and 
implementations created by the government’s political interests has 
distorted the potential benefits of reform.  This state of affairs has led to 
frustrations among the public health managers because reforms have 
changed only the ways services are delivered without making them more 
effective.  These findings have deepened my preunderstanding on why and 
how reforms appeared to be inconsistent and moved in different directions.   
 
7.2.2.2 Accountability is about hopes and frustrations 
 
This section attempts to address the third research question: what are the 
public health managers’ conceptions of accountability after encountering the 
succession of organisational changes? This research question aimed to 
understand how the health managers comprehend and manage 
accountability practices in the context of constant health reforms. 
 
The findings of this study indicate that the meaning of accountability has 
broadened during the years of reform. The process of giving an account has 
extended from justifying individual conducts to a broader concept that 
includes being answerable for organisational performance and evaluation. 
The changes in the meaning of accountability support previous research in 
this area, suggesting that accountability is no longer about scrutinising 
individual actions and decisions but is a matter of organisational 
performance (Dubnick, 2005; Dubnick & Frederickson, 2009; Mulgan, 2000; 
Sinclair, 1995; Thomas, 2003). One possible explanation for the changes may 
relate to the emerging reality of the public health system. Reforms have 
increased the level of complexity in public health organisations and changed 
the lines of responsibilities.  As accountability is closely attached to 
organisational structures and the framework of governance, changes in the 
public health structures and governance were found to shift the notion of 
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accountability and its practices (Broadbent & Guthrie, 2008; Day & Klein, 
1987; Newman, 2004; Sinclair, 1995).  
 
Further, the result of health service performance on how health managers 
comprehend accountability after encountering a series of reform indicates 
that accountability is not as simple as it appears to be. Performance-based 
accountability seems to conflict with a normative standard of accountability 
(moral and ethical values). As discussed in Chapter Six, measuring health 
service performance in terms of the policy output only made the public 
health managers accountable for their daily tasks and responsibilities but not 
for those of other people.  The result of health service performance recorded 
in the forms of statistics did not reflect the actual performance of public 
health organisations. Additionally, the public health managers have 
experienced a series of conflicts in accountability relationships involving 
political, managerial and professional accountability. For these reasons, the 
public health managers believed they had failed to deliver accountable 
performance and expressed their frustrations in dealing with this new 
accountability. Surprisingly, despite that fact, the public health managers still 
believe that accountability, of itself, is not problematic.  Due to these findings, 
I propose that accountability in the context of reform can be understood as 
two sides of the same coin: accountability means being accountable; and 
being not accountable at the same time.  The two diametrically opposed sides 
of accountability reflect the notion that accountability is full of paradoxes 
because it consists of both a sense of hopes and frustrations (see below).     
 
Accountability means being accountable refers to the health managers’ 
beliefs that they are accountable to the public for the performance of their 
organisations. This finding suggests that accountability is an appealing 
concept for the health managers. It is apparent that two factors influenced 
the health managers’ perceptions of accountability. First, they were 
influenced by the internalised feelings (personal values and beliefs) where 
being accountable is seen as a moral obligation (Bovens, 2007, 2010). The 
influence of personal values and beliefs in valuing accountability indicates 
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the meaning of being accountable is defined from the normative perspective.  
Secondly, because reform was designed in accordance with neoliberal 
ideology, the meaning of being accountable for the health managers has 
included their ability to contribute to better performance.  
 
The health managers agreed that postreform accountability is complex, and 
dealing with this accountability in the complex public health system is 
challenging and problematic.  Nevertheless, they contended that the 
complexity was instigated by the reform activities and not caused by a 
deficiency in the accountability concept.  The health managers’ arguments 
indicate that their conceptions of accountability remained optimistic during 
the years of reform despite all the emergent difficulties, as discussed in 
Section 6.2.3.  This conclusion implies that accountability is underpinned 
with feelings of hope because their normative values influence people beliefs 
in accountability. 
 
Accountability means being not accountable is associated with difficulties 
in dealing with the role of accountability when it acts as a mechanism for 
practising good conduct and meeting the targeted performance.  The public 
health managers expressed considerable concerns about their inability to 
follow the formal requirements of the new accountability. Dealing with post-
reform accountability was perplexing because managing performance in the 
form of results was complicated. Measuring the performance of public health 
organisations using managerial concepts such as efficiency and effectiveness, 
and, output and outcome, was challenging in practice.  As discussed in 
Section 6.3.2.2, the implementation of these managerial concepts as indicator 
for accountability resulted in accountability conflicts.  
 
The public health managers reported that achieving the required levels of 
efficiency and effectiveness at one and the same time is almost impossible. In 
practice, rather than being complementary, these concepts appeared to be 
competing, indicating that only one concept could be achieved at any one 
time. The study’s finding here reveals that efficiency could be an opportunity 
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cost of effectiveness and effectiveness often comes at the cost of efficiency. 
Similar difficulties were identified with the adoption of output- and outcome-
based performance.  Although these concepts are useful in measuring public 
funding and resources, they appeared to be problematic in terms of their 
actual application due to a lack of clarity over these concepts.  As a result, the 
adoption of output- and outcome-based performance ended with confusion 
among policy leaders and policy implementers.  These findings are supported 
by the work of McKinlay (2000) who claimed that the output- and outcome-
based performance has been recorded as the least satisfactory part of the 
New Zealand reform because officials are required to focus on outputs and 
have no formal responsibility for the outcomes to which they contribute. 
 
The process of measuring accountability has been criticised due to the 
adoption of auditing and reporting systems, which in the views of health 
managers were a burden and not useful for future improvement.  The 
systems have been narrowly focused on scrutinising details, and scoring 
results within the budget allocated in a particular timeline.  The health 
managers see this type of auditing as unnecessary. There is also a lack of 
agreement between the policy leaders and implementers on the 
measurement criteria, which, in turn, is a further flaw in the process of 
auditing and reporting.  As a result, the process of auditing and reporting is 
done as a formality, not as an opportunity for learning and growth for health 
organisations (Harber & Ball, 2003). The public health managers expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the role of accountability as an organisational 
reporting mechanism, as they felt they lacked effective control.  The reforms 
were regarded as failing to engage with policy actors and to prepare health 
organisations for dealing with the new emergent multifaceted accountability. 
The health managers’ experiences indicate that dealing with accountability 
could also result in frustrations.  A possible explanation for this situation is 
that there was a lack of knowledge among policy leaders on how to deliver 
accountable performance.  Strangely, although NPM and NPS reforms have 
promised better performance and accountability, little information is 
available on how to structure and deliver this new accountability. 
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In summary, the empirical findings suggest that the implementation of policy 
reforms has affected the health managers’ understanding of accountability 
and its practices. However, because the experience in dealing with reform is 
inconsistent (due to the success and failure stories in the implementation of 
reform), the notion of accountability appears fluctuate between one of hope 
and one of frustration.  These findings have helped me to understand the 
notion of postreform accountability and its practices.   
 
7.2.3 Comprehensive understanding: The effects of reform on 
accountability 
 
The empirical findings confirm that the implementation of NPM and NPS 
models of reform has changed the New Zealand public health structures and 
governance.  Although the adoption of these models of reform was expected 
to improve health service performance and accountability, the findings 
indicate that reforms have never realised these expectations. What was 
apparent was that development in the public health system has gone beyond 
the principles outlined by the models of reform. The process of reorganising 
of the public health system using NPM and NPS models resulted in multilevel 
and complex governance structures.  These structures appeared to be 
fragmented and coordination became the key problem in making the 
structures work (Van de Walle & Hammerschmid, 2011). Although NPM and 
NPS reforms offer a reasonable level of freedom for managers to implement 
reform, the health managers felt that their freedom was curtailed by the 
government’s hierarchical control over the public health system.  The 
experience of the public health managers indicates that there were 
significant gaps between policy and practice and these gaps led to 
frustrations among policy implementers (see Section 6.2.3.3).  
 
It would seem that the implementation of reform failed to achieve the desired 
end. Rather than admitting the embedded problems as failures of reform, the 
government repeatedly offered new strategies for improving the results in 
the next round of reforms.  It had also been difficult for the public health 
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system to discard reforms because the reforms were initiated by the 
government. To legitimate the proposal for reform, the government 
rationalised its decisions using accounting information and economic 
calculations to show the public the benefits to be gained. The findings 
indicated that the process of proposing and implementing reform appears to 
go round in circles. Following this line of argument, reform can be described 
as a ‘means without ends’, meaning that reform is continually implemented 
in a political loop in which demand and supply for change are determined by 
the government’s political interests.  
 
The adoption of continual reform has increased the level of complexity in the 
public health system. The complexity of public health governance and 
structures has affected the notion of accountability and its practices because 
accountability rests in the organisational structures. In this study, the 
meaning of accountability has extended from justifying individual conducts 
to answering for organisational performance. Taking together all the 
empirical findings and discussions, this study confirms the arguments of 
scholars such as Bovens (2005) and Day and Klein (1987) that the new 
accountability is a complex concept, and that defining it is even more difficult 
because the meaning of accountability differs from one context to another 
due to its ‘chameleon-like’ criteria (Sinclair, 1995). Indeed, this study agrees 
with Sinclair (1995) that the process of defining accountability is challenging 
because “the more definitive we attempt to render the concept, the more 
murky it becomes” (p. 221).  Interestingly, despite that fact, the public health 
managers viewed accountability as an unproblematic concept (see Section 
6.3.2.1). Therefore, this study suggests that the meaning of postreform 
accountability remains elusive but appealing at the same time.  Based on the 
public health managers’ experiences in dealing with reform and policy 
changes, the meaning of accountability in the context of reform can be 
viewed as symbolising both hope and frustration.  
 
Day and Klein (1987) state that the concept of accountability consists of two 
different functions: accountability as a moral order (normative) and 
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accountability as a mechanism.  As a moral order, accountability is closely 
related to the normative perspective, where being responsible is considered 
as a respect of human dignity, whilst accountability for mechanism is about 
establishing relationships within and between various forms and structures 
of accountability. According to Bovens (2010), despite the significant 
differences between accountability as a moral order and as a mechanism, 
these two concepts are complementary. Accountability as a mechanism is 
meaningless without virtue or moral values and vice versa.   
 
Most studies in the area of accountability have focused either on 
accountability as a normative perspective or accountability as mechanism 
(see examples in Chapter Two). The study’s findings extend the suggestion of 
Bovens (2010) by adding the idea that the two concepts of accountability are 
not only complementary but also confusing and conflicting at the same time. 
The results of this study show that under the influence of the new 
governance structures which emphasise accountability for performance, the 
public health managers understood postreform accountability as a 
mechanism.  Based on this finding, I join Newman (2004) and Sinclair (1995) 
in concluding that the policy implementers’ conceptions of accountability are 
influenced by the ideology of reform.  
 
The public health managers showed their positive acceptance of this 
postreform accountability. They held the view that postreform accountability 
would bring about improvement in organisational performance if it was 
really delivered. The health managers’ views demonstrated that they valued 
postreform accountability from the normative perspective: being 
accountable for performance is understood as an obligation to perform to a 
standard or desirable standard of behaviour required by the public health 
system. Based on these findings, this study confirms that both accountability 
concepts (mechanism and normative) complement each other. This study 
demonstrates that accountability provides hope for the public health system, 
and the New Zealand public. 
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Despite that fact, it is apparent that the concept of accountability for 
performance was loosely defined.  The word accountability was used widely 
in the policy documents but it was accompanied by little discussion on how 
the performance-based accountability should be implemented. Without such 
information to support them, health managers seem to be struggling to deal 
with postreform accountability. The public health managers revealed that 
they were unable to follow the formal requirement of postreform 
accountability such as meeting the health targets, and improving the 
efficiency because they were not given any clear direction on how to deliver 
performance-based accountability. The findings show that the public health 
managers faced significant challenges in dealing with postreform 
accountability because the real focus of the existing system is on the 
managerial process not on achieving outcomes for the health population (see 
Section 6.3.2).  The health managers felt that rather than enforcing relevant 
measures, the new accountability system proved confusing. 
 
Nevertheless, rather than putting the blame on the new accountability 
system, the public health managers placed all their criticisms of 
accountability on the shoulders of policy leaders. In the view of health 
managers, their policy leaders failed to provide proper direction for 
accountability when drafting the reform strategies. The health managers’ 
beliefs show that their views on accountability remained neutral and ideal. 
The health managers’ responses indicated that the policy implementers 
understood the mechanistic role of accountability, but tended to value 
accountability more from a normative perspective.  Perhaps, this was the 
point at which the fundamental paradox in accountability emerged. The 
public health managers had a strong belief in performance-based 
accountability but they considered themselves incapable of being properly 
accountable due to their inability to deliver the formal requirements of 
performance accountability. The gap between accountability understanding 
and its practices resulted in frustrations among policy implementers. This 
study, therefore, suggests that the problem in defining accountability is 
rooted in the conflicts between its two basics concepts: accountability as a 
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moral order and accountability as a mechanism or social practice versus 
technique.   
 
In the light of the findings reported, it can be said that postreform 
accountability may be successful in changing the role of accountability as a 
mechanism but not in altering an individual’s personal belief in 
accountability. This study suggests that the meaning of accountability should 
be understood in terms of its being two sides of one coin.  One face 
[re]presents its social practice, while the other [re]presents its technical 
aspects. Even though reform has enhanced the focus and relationships in 
mechanism accountability, accountability cannot be uncoupled from its social 
or normative perspective.  It can be said that no matter how much the policy 
has changed or will change in the future, the possibility of policy 
implementers facing similar challenges and the same feelings remains high 
because reform produces two identical outcomes for accountability: that is 
hopes and frustrations.  
 
7.3 Contribution of the thesis 
 
The exploratory nature of the thesis makes a contribution to the 
understanding of accountability in the context of reform.  This study aimed to 
provide an understanding of the effects of reform on the notions of 
accountability and its practices.  In doing so, this study reviewed the history 
of the New Zealand public health reforms and explored the subjective 
experience of public health managers in dealing with reforms, policy changes, 
and accountability. The findings of this study make three contributions to an 
understanding of accountability.  
 
 First, it offers valuable insights into the ongoing developments in the 
public health system and the issues of accountability.   
 Second, it contributes to the wider understanding of the effects reform 
have on the notion of accountability and its practices.  
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 Third, it advances an understanding relating to recent discussions on 
postreform accountability. 
 
In particular, the current findings provide additional evidence with respect to 
the findings of Lawrence (2005), who claims that the public health system 
has undergone so many changes that no one can explain what is happening 
and why.  An analysis of the patterns and trends of reform together with the 
health managers’ experiences, has led to my conclusion that reform is ‘a 
means without ends’.  This finding signals that neoliberal reform knows no 
bound because the demand and supply of reform are determined by the 
government on the basis of its political interests. If the theses of current 
scholars such as, “neoliberal reform is still alive” (De Vries & Nemec, 2013, p. 
7); “neoliberal reform will never disappear”; (Hong, 2013, p. 312), and ‘it will 
continue well in to the future’ (Atreya & Amstrong, 2002, p. 14) are valid, 
reform in the public health system is likely to continue in the future.   
 
However, the rationale for implementing reforms remains unclear because 
the decision to implement reform is subject to governmental justifications.  
Due to its chameleon criteria, accountability will be affected by changes in the 
public health system, and further problems will continue to arise in the 
future. However, the interview findings indicate that the public health 
managers still believe in reforms because they understand that organisations 
need to change in order to respond to environmental pressures.  They would 
prefer to have a well-planned reform rather than a hastily implemented 
change. Perhaps, a long-term policy with a clear accountability arrangement 
should be considered for the public health system to provide continuity in 
reform directions. The findings of this thesis could thus be important for 
policy leaders, policy implementers and other health policy stakeholders.  
 
The findings of this study have also responded to the calls of Hodge and 
Greeve (2007)  and Van de Walle and Hammerschmid (2011), for research 
into how accountability functions in the context of reform. These researchers 
have expressed their anxieties on this particular issue because so little is 
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known about it. By exploring the health managers’ lived experiences, this 
study has provided authentic empirical evidences on the effects of reform on 
accountability.  It can be said that postreform accountability was challenging 
because health managers were all working in multilayered structures and 
relationships within multiagencies with different accountability bases. The 
stories of health managers reveal that they have been trapped by paradoxes 
that have evolved in the area of accountability due to the multifaceted 
relationships and conflicts in accountability that exist in the public health 
system. These findings could be useful for future researchers who are 
interested in analysing postreform accountability relationships.   
 
The study’s findings have advanced the understanding on accountability by 
defining it in the context of reform. This study has confirmed that 
accountability remains amorphous because the uniquely fluid nature of 
accountability which allows it to be defined from two distinct standpoints i.e., 
as a normative or social practice and technical perspective.  This study 
suggests that the two faces of the accountability coin are not only 
complementary but also confusing and conflicting at the same time because 
accountability cannot be disengaged from its normative perspective.  
Therefore, the notion of accountability in the context of reform can be seen 
simultaneously as a symbol of hope on the one hand and frustration on the 
other.  This finding will help in building a greater understanding of why 
accountability remains a desirable ideal despite being trapped in the 
complexity of reform which aims to achieve it. 
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7.4 Limitations of the study 
 
Every research project has its own constrains. According to Simon and Goes 
(2013), methodological selection and research design come with limitations 
over which researchers may have little control. This study adopted a 
qualitative methodology and employed a hermeneutics approach as the basis 
of research inquiry.  The methodological selection was arrived at on the basis 
ontological and epistemological views relating to the research questions. 
Limitations in qualitative studies occur because research is conducted in a 
natural setting where it is difficult for researchers to control the research 
process (Bryman, 2004; Simon & Goes, 2013).  The findings of this study are 
subject to at least two limitations. 
 
7.4.1 Focus 
 
The findings of this study were derived from a review of documents and 
interviews with the aim of understanding the effects of reform on the notion 
of accountability and its practices.  This study seems to focus on a broad area 
of health reform in New Zealand. As noted in Chapter Four, I had difficulties 
in recruiting participants due to the major transition in the public health 
system in 2011.  I was unable to proceed with my original plan which 
involved research into the use of public private partnerships (PPPs) in the 
health sector. The structure of the public health system was changing 
significantly, and, as a result, some participants decided to withdraw from the 
study.   
 
To avoid taking on a research project which might have to be terminated 
because of a shortage of willing data providers, I decided to change the 
direction of my research project prior to the data collection stage. According 
to Smith (2004) “one cannot do a good qualitative research by following a 
cookbook . . . what determines the quality of the outcome is the personal 
analytic work done by each stage of the procedure” (p.40). The intention to 
investigate accountability in the New Zealand public health system remained 
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the plan, but the focus moved from PPPs to public health reform in general. 
The new research direction was determined after considering the interests of 
existing participants who remained in this research project and the potential 
of recruiting new participants in the future.   
 
However, the issue of broad research focus might have been mitigated by the 
research process.  In order to answer the research questions as outlined in 
Chapter One, I chose to examine the four stages of reform from a narrow 
perspective that includes the trend and pattern of reform and the emergence 
of accountability issues which resulted from the reforms. Those selected to 
take part in the research were senior managers from DHBs and PHOs who 
each had more than 10 years’ work experience in the health sector.  As 
reform was seen as a process of metamorphosis (Broadbent et al., 1996), that 
closely relates to individual personal experience, the goal of recognising the 
meaning of accountability from a study of health managers’ lived experience 
was adopted.  During the interviews, I posed few questions about 
accountability relationships between health managers and others but placed 
more focus on managers’ personal experiences in dealing with accountability.  
There will be many issues that were not covered during the process of my 
data collection, for example, the issues of accountability relationships, Maori 
health and accountability, and leadership’s accountability.  I chose not to 
evaluate those areas because this study was not specifically designed to 
evaluate those issues.  
 
7.4.2 Idiosyncratic context 
 
The preunderstanding stage was developed based on analysis of various 
government documents. Reviewing government documents enabled me to 
understand the government’s planning for the New Zealand public health 
system from the government’s point of view. The content of government 
documents may represents political ideologies or political interests of the 
ruling government.  Therefore, the context identified for this study implied 
the influences of the ruling government’s political ideologies. It was not the 
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purpose of this thesis to critique such ideologies, but to recognise them as 
potential influences on participants’ responses. 
 
Using government documents was also challenging especially in analysing 
ongoing reform. For example, in the Post-2008 reform, the government 
enforced the changes soon after the announcement of reform.  The 
implementation of the Post-2008 reform strategies involved significant 
changes in the existing public health structures and governance. Although 
most of the changes were reported by the government, it was hard to keep 
track of all the changes because some of the government reports lagged 
behind the actual events. For instance, based on the Ministry of Health 
publication in 2008, I reported that the government established a regional 
DHB for the Southern Region consisting of seven DHBs. However, due to the 
2010 merging between Otago and Southland DHBs (this new entity known as 
Southland), the numbers and membership for Southern Region DHB changed 
after the government’s publications. The Southern Region DHB now 
comprises five DHBs and they are Nelson, Marlborough, Canterbury, West 
Coast, South Canterbury, and Southland DHBs. Therefore, a limitation of this 
documents analysis results from this natural evolution of reforms through 
the government inspired changes impacting on accountability in the ever-
changing structures of the New Zealand health system. The limitation being 
that the findings can become convoluted as they need to be interpreted to the 
relevant time frame in which the findings were discussed. 
  
Interviews also led to a number of limitations. This study was conducted in a 
specific State sector with a small number of participants selected through the 
snowball technique or convenient sampling.  This sampling technique was 
chosen because the health managers’ backgrounds are not publicly available. 
In principle, all the participants selected for this study met the general 
criteria as outlined in Section 4.4.1.  However, because convenient sampling 
is based on referral from other participants, the sample distribution is limited 
to a specific network.  Furthermore, the research questions designed for this 
study focused on health managers’ personal experiences in dealing with 
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reforms and accountability. Therefore, the findings generated from this study 
might not be able to answer a large number of other research issues. 
Nevertheless, the study’s idiosyncrasies might have been reduced by 
monitoring the referral chain.  In this study, the referred participants were 
filtered based on their background and work experience.   
 
7.5 Recommendations for future research 
 
This study provided empirical insights into how postreform accountability 
was understood and practised in the context of the New Zealand public 
health system. A number of potential areas for extending studies in 
accountability and reform have emerged from this study.  To assist the future 
researchers, two areas are identified:  
 
7.5.1 Accountability in the context of public sector reform 
 
Although the concept of accountability remains elusive, the study of 
accountability should be continued in the future. As it is evident that reform 
is a means without an end, the public sector is likely to experience more 
changes in the future. Since accountability is likely to be subject to a never-
ending cycle of change, changes in the public sector will continue to influence 
the notion of accountability and its practices. It would be worthwhile to carry 
out similar kinds of studies in different types of public services in other 
countries. For those who are interested in comparative studies, it would be 
beneficial to compare accountability systems across public services and 
countries, so that a more holistic view and understanding of accountability 
could be established.  
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7.5.2 Accountability in the New Zealand public health system 
 
I believe more studies are needed in the area of accountability in the New 
Zealand public health system. Despite considerable discussions in previous 
studies in this area, a number of issues remain unexplored.  One of these 
potential studies could explore the notion of accountability among 
indigenous health providers.  This issue was raised by a participant in this 
study, but I was not able to include it in this research because it was not 
covered in my objective. However, I believe it is worthwhile to study this area 
because Maori health is a significant issue in the New Zealand public health 
system.  Issues, such as how accountability is experienced by indigenous 
providers, could potentially be valuable.  
 
Second, as this research project focuses on managerial accountability, it 
would be interesting if future studies considered other accountability areas 
such as political, professional, and personal accountability.  Studying a 
specific accountability area would provide in-depth understanding of a 
particular accountability as these types of accountability are underpinned by 
different criteria. Third, the sample of this study is limited to the policy 
implementers who work in DHBs and PHOs. It would be interesting to study 
a group of policy makers (policy leaders) in the health sector to understand 
the workings of accountability within the sector. So that the findings to 
compare their interpretations of accountability with the views expressed by 
my respondents. 
 
7.6 Final reflection: What I have learned? 
 
As I come to the end of my thesis, I realise how the research process that I 
have gone through over the last 4 years has shaped my thinking and 
understanding in particular ways.  Being trained in the field of public 
administration, and engaged closely in policy studies, I should confess that 
my understanding toward public policy was too idealistic and narrow. I was 
influenced by my preconceptions, beliefs and knowledge when I started this 
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research project.  As I viewed public policy as a problem solving activity, I 
believed the problem in defining accountability was rooted in the process of 
policy making and reforms.   
 
However, being engaged in critical hermeneutics has opened up my thinking 
in developing understanding. The three stages of hermeneutics 
understanding have taught me how to structure and develop understandings.  
The process of rereading, rethinking and rewriting not only made me 
reanalyse my thinking and understanding but also required me to limit the 
influence of my preconceptions, beliefs and knowledge.  
 
Having completed this thesis, I now have better understanding about the 
notion of postreform accountability and its practices. Having said that, I 
believe that I have also learned other important lessons with regard to the 
investigated area which I think have certain implications for me and my 
profession. I think the following knowledge will shape my understanding and 
thinking in the future: 
 
 Public policy is not ultimately about problem solving for governments 
and society.  Rather than solving problems, public policy can only 
control the level of a society’s problems, and the ability to control the 
level of problem is dependent on the ideology of the governing elite. 
Reform is a mechanism, is perhaps a license for the political elites to 
impose their new interests, values and preferences on a community.  
 
 Accountability is a naïve concept by its nature.  It can be used and 
reused to engender support for the new policies produced by the 
political elites. Despite all difficulties, failures and frustrations, the 
level of confidence in accountability endures.  There is always hope 
that good outcomes for accountability might arise from well-designed 
reforms.   
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Summary of participants’ backgrounds 
 
Participant 
(s) 
Position 
PHOs 
Responsibility / Experience 
 
P01 CEO 
 
 
P01 has 15 years’ working experience in the health 
sector.  Prior to his current appointment, P01 served in 
senior executive and senior manager roles for the 
Ministry of Health and a number of DHBs as well as PHOs.   
 
P02 Board 
member 
P02 has worked in health services for 27 years. Before 
joining the health sector, P02 worked in the law 
enforcement and military departments.  P02 served a 
number of PHOs as a Chief Executive.  In his current 
appointment, P02 is a PHO board member and holds a 
senior management position in a PHO.   
 
P03 CEO P03 is founder of a Maori PHO and has held the position 
as the CEO of that PHO for 22 years.  P03 served on a 
number of boards including the HFA and DHBs, ACC and 
nursing.  In total P03 has spent about 30 years working in 
the New Zealand health sector. 
P04 Senior 
Manager, 
and Board 
Secretariat 
P04 has worked in health services for 31 years.  P04 was 
a former Executive Trustee and Chief Executive for a 
number of health trust agencies.  P04 has also served a 
number of health boards in various roles. In his current 
position, PO4 is responsible for managing the operations 
of PHO at the national level. At the same time, P04 also 
serves as the PHO board secretariat.   
P05 Senior 
Manager 
 
P05 has been involved in New Zealand health service for 
26 years.  In her 26 years’ experience, P05 has served the 
Ministry of Health in contracting and consulting works, 
including developing health policy plans and long term 
strategies.  P05 also served a number of DHBs at a senior 
level position of similar responsibilities.  
 
In the current position, P05 holds the portfolio of strategy 
and performance for a PHO.  P05 is responsible for the 
performance management system of PHO and also the 
performance of BSMC business case. 
 
P06 CEO P06 has been appointed as the CEO for the last 10 years.  
P06 is responsible for strategic development of the PHO, 
including staff issues and performance, clinical and audit 
compliance, financial risks management and clinical 
accountability of the PHO’s practice teams.    
 
Prior to his current position, P06 was the General 
Manager for a RHA, responsible for communications and 
managing community relationships.  Before joining the 
health sector in 1994, P06 was involved in corporate 
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communication overseas.  His overall experience in a 
management position is 26 years.  
 
P07 Senior 
Manager 
 
P07 has 15 years’ working experience in the health 
sector.  P07 started her career in health as a clinician in 
New Zealand public hospitals before being appointed as a 
senior manager for the DHB’s planning and funding arms. 
 
In her current position, P07 is responsible for integrating 
services and aligning funding for inter community and 
primary environments.  P07 also responsible for 
monitoring the operation of the PHO under the 
requirement of the national agreement. 
 
P11 Executive 
Director 
P11 has been working in health services for 13 years.  He 
started his career as a medical practitioner and worked 
in a hospital for a year before joining primary health care. 
Besides his roles as a clinician, P011 is also doing 
consulting work related to Maori health. According to 
P011, his management experience is developed alongside 
with his clinical roles.  
 
In his current position, P011 is responsible for two 
portfolios.  These are clinical integration in primary 
health services and BSMC business case. His main 
responsibility is providing advice to the senior 
management and to the board on clinical safety and 
quality.  P011 also contributes to the design and 
development of the integration of clinical services with 
BSMC business case.  
 
Participant 
(s) 
Position DHBs/Regional DHBs 
Responsibility / Experience 
P08 Business 
Support 
Manager  
 
P08 has 15 years’ working experience in the health 
sector.  P08 started his career in health as a clinician and 
served in a number of public hospitals around New 
Zealand, before being appointed as a senior manager in 
the DHB’s Finance Section, under the Planning and 
Funding Division.  
 
In his current appointment, P08 plays his roles as an 
internal consultant and a business type advisor 
responsible for two main portfolios: mental health and 
addiction services, and rural and community services. 
 
As a clinician who went into management, P08 is also 
responsible for providing the DHB’s management of 
clinician perspectives and activities. His roles and 
responsibilities require him to work within the DHB, 
outside DHBs, across the primary sector and other health 
agencies including, ACC, ambulance services and rest 
homes. 
P09 Finance 
Manager  
P09 has worked in health services for 24 years. He 
started his career in the health sector as a certified 
accountant in 1989.  Prior to that P09 worked as an 
auditor in a professional service company.  
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In his current appointment, P09 is responsible for 
supporting information services under management and 
financial accounting.  In particular, P09 is providing 
internal support and advice analysis for contracts, 
commercial, legal and financial risks.    
 
P10 Project 
Manager of a 
regional DHB 
 
 
P10 works for a DHB shared service agency as a Project 
Manager of Elective Services. P10 is responsible for 
delivering the Ministry’s contracts across a group of 
DHBs in one regional area.  The main responsibility of 
P10 is to identify the best model of care that can be 
adopted as a standard clinical pathway at a national or 
regional level through auditing processes.   
 
P10 started his career as a clinician and worked in both 
public hospitals and primary care for four years before 
deciding to further his master degree in business 
administration.  Prior to his first appointment, P10 
worked in care facilities on a part time basis for several 
years. 
 
P12 Senior 
Manager  
P12 has 20 years’ experience working in the clinical 
record department of a DHB.  She held a number of 
management positions for eight years before joining the 
current DHB.  As a manager of clinical record, P12 is 
responsible for managing the department in preparing 
clinical record for patients who came for treatments to 
the related parties according to the privacy act 
requirements. 
 
P13 Board 
Member 
P13 is an elected board member of a DHB, who has been 
served the DHB board for 10 years. In the meantime, P13 
is also an elected member of a city council.   
 
Before joining the health sector, P13 was a volunteer 
ambulance officer.  He also involved in a paramedic team 
while he was in the territorial army.  His knowledge 
about health service and health industry was developed 
earlier as he was brought up by a family who has a strong 
health career background. 
 
P13 started his career as a pilot before moving into 
aviation based business and held senior position roles in 
a number of airlines.  Due to his wide experience this 
area, P13 also used to lecture at a couple of universities 
on air transport, and aviation related matters. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Participant Information Sheet  
                                                          
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF AN EVER-CHANGING NEW ZEALAND 
PUBLIC HEALTH 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am Azizah Abidin, a PhD candidate at the University of Waikato, New Zealand.  I am 
conducting the above research as my PhD requirement under the supervision of 
Associate Professor Martin Kelly, Professor Stewart Lawrence and Dr. Mary Low.  The 
objective of my research is to identify the effect of continuous policy reforms on 
accountability provision and understanding in the New Zealand public health system.  
 
The outcomes of this research will provide valuable insights for government and public 
sector organisations to develop better strategies in managing accountability in public 
organisations such as those in the health sector.  It could help to reduce the problems of 
discharging accountability in organisations by increasing understanding on how reforms 
affect the forms of accountability.  It will also identify the current challenges faced by 
organisations in terms of dealing with accountability requirement.  
 
The outcomes of this research cannot be produced without your participation.  As a 
person involved directly in delivering a good health service to the people of New 
Zealand, your opinions and experiences are crucially important in this research.  
Therefore, I would like to invite you to participate in this research. 
 
Pseudonyms will be used for participants when reporting the findings of this research.  
For example, participants will be treated as anonymous and coded as P1, P2, P3, etc.  The 
inputs provided by participants are based on individual perception and experience and 
will not represent the stance of organisations that they are currently attached to. The 
interview recordings will be transcribed and only the researcher and her supervisors 
will be granted access to the data (listen to interview recordings and read all the 
transcribed data).  All the hard copy data (transcribed interviews) will be kept in a 
locked place. The interview recordings will be stored electronically and securely with a 
password.  The recording and the original transcribed data will be destroyed upon 
completion of the thesis and relevant research publications.  
 
The participants in this research will be interviewed for about 45 to 60 minutes 
(approximately).  You may refuse to answer any particular questions and to withdraw 
from the study at any time up until TWO (2) weeks after the interview session.   
 
If you have any questions about this study, please do not hesitate to contact me at 022-
1284174 or email me at naz1@students.waikato.ac.nz or my supervisor Martin Kelly at 
kelly@waikato.ac.nz.  
 
I am looking forward to seeing you participate in this study. Thank you. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Azizah Abidin  
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APPENDIX 3 
Interview Protocol 
                                                          
 
Opening Statement to Interviewees 
 
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me.  I am interested to learn about the effect 
of continuous reforms on the notion of accountability.  It will identify the current 
challenges faced by organisations in terms of dealing with accountability requirements.  
 
This interview will be conducted according to your time preferences.  The interview 
session will take about 45 to 60 minutes and also will be audio recorded, to help me 
concentrate on the interview session.  Please be informed that only my supervisors and I 
will have access to the interview recording and the transcript.  The interview recording 
and transcript will be used solely for academic purposes.  Any quotations from, or 
references to the interview will be completely anonymous.  All the hard copy data 
(transcribed interviews) will be kept in a locked place. The interview recordings will be 
stored electronically and securely with a password.  The interview recordings and the 
original transcribed data will be destroyed after completion of the thesis and relevant 
research publications.  
 
The inputs provided by participants are based on individual perception and experience 
and will not represent the stance of organisations that they are currently attached to. 
During the interview session, I will start with some background information questions 
before moving to the primary questions about your understanding related to 
accountability and its practices.  These questions will be open in nature and I will be 
asking you for examples or further clarifications, drawn from your experience, to 
illustrate the answers given.  Since the implementation of health reforms has started 
since 1984, I provide the summary of reform in Table 1 as to refresh our memory with 
regard to this topic.  
  
The questions to be asked during the interview are as follows: 
 
Background information 
 
 What is the title of the position you currently hold?  For how long have you been 
appointed into this position?  
 Could you please tell me your roles and responsibility in this organisation? 
 Who do you report to? 
 How many years of professional working experience do you have?   
 Which organisations/industries have you worked in before?  
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Primary Questions: 
 
A. VIEWS ON REFORM 
   
 Can you remember how many phases of reform have you experienced?  Did the 
experience change over time? 
 Overall, what do you think about the policy reforms in the NZ public health? 
 Can you tell me the rationales for implementing reform in this sector? 
 What is the impact of reform to the NZ public health system? 
 How you and your organisation respond to the changes? 
 What is the impact of those changes on your roles and responsibility? 
 Did those changes help to better clarify the health provider's responsibility, and 
to whom are they responsible? 
 How do you feel dealing with all these policy changes? Are these changes 
manageable? 
 How would you describe the current condition of the New Zealand public health 
system? 
 In your opinion, to where the New Zealand health policy is heading to for the 
next 5 to 10 years? 
 
B. VIEWS ON ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF REFORM AND 
RELATED ISSUES 
 
 What do accountability means to you? Why do you say so? 
  What makes you view accountability like what you said just now? 
  What is your opinion of the system of accountability in the NZ public health 
system? 
  Can you identify the impact of reform on the system of accountability? 
 Can you identify the rationale of reform in terms of accountability? 
  What major challenges or difficulties have you encountered while performing 
your accountability requirement? 
 Overall, how would you define the system of accountability in the New Zealand 
public health system? 
 
Follow-up Questions 
 
 Can you give me an example? 
 What do you mean by that? 
 Could you please explain that further? 
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A summary of the stages, and objectives and focus of reform in the New Zealand 
public health service since 1984   
 
Stages of reform Objective and focus of reform 
Incremental reform 
(1984-1993) 
Objective: 
To improve efficiency and effectiveness of health policy and to 
improve accountability. 
Focus: 
The government introduced a structural reform through the 
establishment of Area Health Boards (AHBs), a community 
governed board.  
Radical market-
oriented reform (1993-
1996) 
Objective: 
To improve health efficiency in terms of services and financial 
management. 
Focus: 
The government changed overall policy directions to a quasi-
market approach through structural and financial reforms. 
More planned and 
community-oriented 
reform (1999-2008)  
Objective: 
To improve the health of the population  by reducing health 
disparities and ensuring access to quality services 
Focus: 
The government reversed previous health policy, re-
introduced community governed health board system for the 
primary and secondary health care levels. 
Towards a unified 
model of care (post 
2008 reform) 
Objective: 
To improve efficiency and quality of care 
Focus: 
The government implements several structural reforms at the 
national, regional and local health levels.  The structural 
reforms are supported by information technology (IT) 
development and workforce health planning. 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
Consent Form for Participants 
                                                          
 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF AN EVER-CHANGING NEW ZEALAND 
PUBLIC HEALTH 
 
Azizah Abidin, PhD Candidate, Waikato Management School 
Email: naz1@students.waikato.ac.nz 
 
 
Consent Form for Participants 
 
I have read the Information Sheet for Participants for this study and have had the details 
of the study explained to me. My questions about the study have been answered to my 
satisfaction, and I understand that I may ask further questions at any time.  
 
I also understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time up until TWO (2) 
weeks after the interview session, or to decline to answer any particular questions in the 
study.  
 
I agree to participate in this study under the conditions set out in the Information Sheet 
form. 
 
 
Signed: _____________________________________________ 
 
Name: _____________________________________________ 
 
Date: _____________________________________________ 
 
 
Researcher’s name and contact information: 
 
Azizah Abidin 
Department of Accounting  
Email: naz1@students.waikato.ac.nz 
Phone (Mobile): 022-128 4174 
 
 
Supervisor’s Name and contact information: 
 
Assoc. Prof. Martin Kelly 
Department of Accounting 
Email: kelly@waikato.ac.nz  
Phone (Office): 07-856 2889 ext: 8653  
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APPENDIX 5 
 
Interview Guide with Field Note 
Title of the interview: Accountability in the context of New Zealand public health reform 
Archival No: 
Site: 
Interviewer: 
Interviewee: 
Date: 
Start: 
End: 
 
Background information 
 What is the title of the position you currently hold?  For how long have you been 
appointed into this position?  
 Could you please briefly describe you task and responsibility in this organisation 
so I can get some understanding a bit 
 Who do you report to? 
 How many years of professional working experience do you have?   
 Which organisations/industries have you worked in before?  
 
Primary Questions: 
 
1. In this _____ years of working experience, what do you think about the policy 
changes in the New Zealand public health? 
  
 
2. From your point of view, why the government initiated changes in the health 
policy? 
 
 
3. How you and your organisations respond to the changes? 
 
 
4. What was the impact of those changes on your roles and responsibility? 
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5. Did those changes help to better clarify your responsibility, and to whom are 
you responsible? 
 
 
6. How about your organisation? Did the policy changes help to better clarify your 
organisation responsibility and to whom are your organisation responsible? 
 
 
7. In your opinion, was the New Zealand public health systems benefitted from the 
implementation of the health policy changes? 
 
 
8. In your opinion, to where the New Zealand health policy is heading to for the 
next 5 to 10 years? 
 
 
9. What words come to your mind when I mention the word “accountability”? 
 
 
10. What makes you view accountability like what you said just now? 
 
 
11. What major challenges or difficulties (if any) have you encountered while 
performing your accountability requirement? 
 
 
12. What is your opinion of the system of accountability in the NZ public health 
system? 
 
 
13. Drawing from your experience, how would you define the system of 
accountability in the New Zealand public health system? 
 
 
14. Do you think the New Zealand health policy reforms changed the meaning or the 
form of accountability in the public health system?  Could you please explain? 
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Follow-up Questions 
• Can you give me an example? 
• What do you mean by that? 
• Could you please explain that further? 
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APPENDIX 6 
SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW 
 
Title of the interview:  Accountability in the ever-changing NZ health system 
Interviewee: Samuel MacKenzie (P010) 
Site: Meeting room, Hamilton 
Date: 25/9/2013 (Wednesday) 
 
  SUMMARY OF PARTICIPANTS’ BACKGROUND INFORMATION: 
Participant  
pseudonyms 
 
Position 
 
Experience 
P010 
 
 
 
Project 
Manager of a 
regional DHB 
 
 
P010 works for a DHB shared service agency as a 
Project Manager of Elective Services. P010 is 
responsible for delivering the Ministry’s contracts 
across a group of DHBs in one regional area.  The 
main responsibility of P010 is to identify the best 
model of care that can be adopted as a standard 
clinical pathway at a national or regional level 
through auditing processes.   
 
P010 started his career as a clinician and worked 
in both public hospitals and primary care for four 
years before deciding to further his master degree 
in business administration.  Prior to his first 
appointment, P010 worked in care facilities on a 
part time basis for several years. 
 
A. WHAT HAS BEEN LEARNED FROM THE INTERVIEW 
 
Views on reform 
 
1. The public health system in general 
The public health system has two different focuses, but both are operating in the 
same clinical space.  First, is the national health focus, which is concerned with 
people’s health status under one health system.  The national focus is designed 
according to the national health agenda, targets and performance.  
 
Second, is the local focus, which is concerned with an individual health status in 
one area of health.  The local focus is concerned with different individual health 
needs for example individual needs in aging care, mental health, maternity, etc.   
As focuses are operating in the same clinical space, there are using the same 
resources around additional administration to meet the target (as you could 
 290 | P a g e  
 
always discharge and readmit a patient to make it look like they meet the 
indicators) 
 
Reform is needed in the public health system as it helps to improve the system 
but constant reform is not needed. 
 
2. The effects of reform 
The implementation of reform has a large impact on the clinicians and health 
providers, and also the quality of health services. 
 
a. Reforms resulted in policy confusions and a clash in accountability between  
 managers and clinicians 
 
The implementation of reform in health services resulted in structural changes 
which sometimes led to confusion among policy actors, especially the clinicians.  
For example, under the current reform strategy, the government has established 
new Crown entities at the regional and national level, called regional district 
health boards (Northern, Midland, Central and Southern) and the National 
Health Board.  These new Crown entities are expected to help the existing 
individual DHBs to reduce their administrative costs through shared service 
strategies.  DHBs are required to plan services on a regional basis and the new 
Crown agencies will help to deliver the regional plan.  The mix between new and 
old agencies has increased the complexity of the structure of NZ public health 
and confused a lot of people including those in the system, such as clinicians.  
 
Most of the clinicians decided not to bother about reforms.  From their point of 
view, reforms were designed for improving the management of health services 
and assumed that reforms would have less impact on clinicians. Furthermore, in 
performing their duties of care, clinicians are supposed to be accountable for 
their patients’ outcomes; not the health service management. 
 
Over time, the implementation of reform has widened the gap between 
managers and clinicians. Managers are accountable to the government, while 
clinicians are bound by their professional legislation, and they have to stand by 
that legislation.  One of the challenges that has resulted from this gap is to get 
both clinicians and managers to share responsibility because they are bound by 
different types of accountability - the clash between managerial accountability 
and professional accountability. 
 
b. Reforms have affected the quality of clinical services  
When the government decided to introduce reform, some existing health 
structures were seen as unable to support reforms.  Therefore, in many 
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instances, the implementation of reforms is accompanied by a major 
restructuring in the health structural and governance.  Such restructuring 
involved a large amount of money allocated for the health sector.  The more the 
government strengthens the management, the more money goes to that area, 
and the less the money is available for clinical services.  This has led to a 
tolerance in quality in some clinical services    
 
For example: the shorter stay in emergency departments (EDs) health target.  
This national health target has been introduced from 1 July 2009.  This national 
target stated that 95% will be admitted, discharged or transferred from an ED 
within 6 hours.  The aim of this target is to eliminate waits, and delays in all 
parts of the hospital to improve acute patient flow.  As a result of that target, 
most of DHBs decided to enhance the size of their EDs through the development 
of new ED wards and buildings.  In order to meet the six hour target, the flow of 
admissions to an ED did not meet the clinical requirements.  Patients who come 
to an ED will be seen by nurses to identify the acute type; then, the patients will 
be sent to the waiting room or short stay wards for several hours before  they 
are discharged (if patients have no serious acute) or transferred to a ward for 
further treatment.  The flow of admission has enabled DHBs to meet the 
Ministry’s target, but clearly, the admission procedure did not follow clinical 
guidelines, which patients should be seen and treated by doctors before they 
being discharged or transferred from EDs, did not meet the clinical 
requirements. 
 
“They actually are worsening the outcome for the patients because they 
are doing additional administration or work, moving the patients 
around which they didn’t use to have to. Just simply to meet the 
Ministry target.  They meet the clinical time but they don't treat the 
patients equal to a lot of issues. They just build wards to place patients 
in” (P010) 
 
Reform does not focus on the fundamental problems in the public health 
system.  For example, the issue of overcrowding and overstaying in EDs is 
linked to situations in which people who need medical assistance but do not 
afford to see GPs.  These people choose to go to the ED because they know 
that they will get treatments at no costs.  
 
c. Reforms have increased additional tasks to other groups of people  
Some reform brought changes in clinical administration and affected the way 
in which clinicians performing their services.  Some clinicians are not ready 
to change and feel uncomfortable with change. For example: 
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If they don’t want to do it, a lot of time they can decide not to. I have 
discussions with some of departments even across in our region, there 
is somebody would say “What will happen to me if I don’t deliver the 
Ministry target?”  And I say “Well the funding for the DHB is cut”.  
They will reply “what’s that problem for me? My problem is with the 
patients.  If I treat them as they come through the door.  I will accept 
them and treat them as I see them. That’s the most important for my 
profession”.  And what can you say to that? (P010) 
 
This group of clinicians sometimes decided not to bother about change and 
keep doing work in their ways.  In order to achieve the initial reform plan, the 
management has to take other initiatives such as providing administrative 
assistance to that particular group of clinicians.  Although such initiatives 
helped the management to realise their planning, it has increased 
administrative burdens for another group of clinicians such as nurses. 
 
d. The implementation of reforms is limited by the willingness of health 
professionals to change 
Reforms brought changes in health structures and governance.  Such 
changes have indirect impacts on the way in which health professionals 
performing their tasks.  If health professionals felt changes required by the 
management disrupted their clinical work, they may decide to leave their 
positions.  New Zealand is a small country and the healthcare workforce is 
limited a particular area as it is very small (only one or two consultants).  If a 
health professional decided to leave it will result in a huge loss to the 
hospitals and a particular patient cohort.  Therefore, the management have 
to ensure clinicians feel comfortable with health policy changes.  
 
3. Reform is a political decision, always comes from the top but lacks policy 
context 
Decisions to reform always come from the top [the government].  However, 
the government provides only a general reform framework and usually 
leaves it to DHBs to decide or to interpret the general framework.  
 
“Reforms always come from the top but they are not structured in a 
way that you should provide this by this date and this way.  It's very 
much like – please provide this” (P010) 
 
“The ministry direction is too vague” (P010) 
  
Decisions of the policy frameworks are regularly being made by the top 
without understanding what is happening under the ground.  It is very 
challenging for DHBs as they need to decide the criteria of the policy context 
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and at the same time have to suit the policy context with the capacity and 
demographic criteria of their regional population.   
 
In order to meet the policy objectives, some DHBs imposed ineffective 
decisions.  For example, the government introduced capped budget on 
administration with the objective to limit administrative budget in public 
health. However, because decisions made at the ministerial level it created 
another issue.  Some DHBs are small and they usually have inadequate 
clinical and administrative staffs.  The chances to increase the number of 
staff are slim due to the budget cap.  This ended up with clinicians are doing 
administrative tasks. 
 
The government is interested only in the output of the policy so that it will 
have good news to show to the voters when the next election is held. 
  
Views on accountability 
 
1. The notions of accountability 
There are two sets of accountability thought that underlie the public health 
system.  These are: (1) clinical accountability – this is the most important 
part of the public health system. Public health must accountable to the 
patients; the system should pay attention to the needs of patients, i.e., 
patients at the centre of care must be treated first. (2) managerial 
accountability – this is concerned more with the performance of the public 
health system, i.e., KPI, national targets etc. 
 
These accountability thoughts have led to the disconnection of relationships 
between clinical staff and management staff.  For example, the government 
introduced a performance indicator for elective services called Elective 
Services Patients Flow Indicators (ESPIs).  The objective of this indicator is 
to measure on how well DHBs managing the key steps in the elective patient 
journey.  One of the indicators is patients should be reassessed within 5 
months after their first treatment. However, there are some consultants who 
feel inappropriate to follow the policy guidelines. From their point of views, 
if the patient is well enough, there is no point for them to see the patient 
until after six months.  Although clinicians may have a valid argument in 
such situation, it has a huge impact on health managers and health 
institutions. For example, the budget for DHBs may get cut, the managers’ 
work performance will drop due to the failure to meet the national targets. 
 
2. The challenges in performing accountability 
 
a. To develop understanding between clinicians and managers 
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Relentless reform makes accountability keeps moving and makes it difficult 
for clinical staff and managerial staff to come to a clear decision and to stand 
together.   
 
b. Uncertainty 
Public health system in New Zealand is always being in uncertain situations 
because reform is implemented on a short time basis; and directions of 
change are depended on who is ruling the government.  Frequent and 
contradictory changes made people in the system confused and unsure their 
responsibility and accountability lines. 
 
c. Audit 
Reform has increased the amount of audit but input from audits is not being 
so helpful to the system because it focus more on the output rather than 
outcome. 
 
 
  
 
